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This thesis develops in three chapters.
The rst Chapter analyzes the relationship between bankruptcy law and the time horizon
of corporate investment decisions. The paper stems from the wave of bankruptcy law reforms
that have been taking place in Europe early after year 2000 to introduce insolvency proce-
dures analogous to the US Chapter 11. In the model, a \soft" bankruptcy law gives more
power to the distressed entrepreneur to restructure its venture with respect to a \tough"
procedure, and the contracting environment is characterized by asymmetric information and
repeated moral hazard on the side of the entrepreneur. The research question analyzed
concerns how the type of bankruptcy aects the choice between two investment projects:
the ecient one, which leads to high returns in the long-run but exposes the entrepreneur
to the risk of bankruptcy, and the inecient one, which leads to low but safe payos early
on. The main result of the paper is that \soft" bankruptcy may cause a problem of ine-
cient investment. More specically, in the model soft bankruptcy brings about a problem of
\short-termism", that is a bias towards the choice of the investment project that privileges
the achievement of short-term safe payos. The model is extended to deliver a number of
policy recommendations on the design of a \soft" bankruptcy procedure that would not be
aected by the \short-termism" problem: in particular, it is stressed that, during the phase
of reorganization in bankruptcy, the entrepreneur should be closely supervised by the court
and incentivized to undertake a process of technological restructuring.
The second Chapter analyzes the scope for inecient exclusion in Standard Setting Or-
ganizations. Voluntary Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) are consortia of industry
operators devoted to the achievement of an agreement on the rules that dene the design of
a nal product or process. The economic literature has typically undertaken a cooperative
approach to analyze the decision process behind technology standardization, however such
a cooperative stance overlooks the inherent con
icting interests that characterize operators
with dierent business structures in SSOs. Such con
icts arise, for example, between ver-
tically integrated rms and vertically specialized rms.1 The model embeds two vertically
integrated rms and a pure upstream rm. Each rm holds a patented technology; the rst
vertically integrated rm holds an \essential" technology, the second integrated rm holds
a technology that competes with the one of the upstream rm for the employment in the
production of a nal good, but is less ecient. The paper shows that \exclusionary eects"
1Integrated organizations join SSOs to achieve coordination among industry participants in the adoption
of a technology platform, thus they aim at paying low rates for standards' components. Instead, specialized
rms raise most of their revenue from the technology licensing market, by levying royalty rates on the users
of their technologies.




may distort the technology choice taken by manufacturers, leading to market outcomes in
which the technology of the stand-alone rm is ineciently excluded from the upstream
market.
The third Chapter stems from the analysis conducted in the second chapter and studies
the protability of vertical integration in settings with complementary inputs. The litera-
ture on vertical integration and foreclosure has typically focused on settings with substitute
inputs, showing that after integrating downstream an upstream rm has incentive to try and
monopolize the downstream market. The analysis of the consequences of vertical integration
in a model with complementary inputs gives rise to distinct eects. The main twist to the
received literature consists in introducing a market for a complementary input that the inte-
grated company has to acquire to produce a nal good. The model shows that the integrated
organization may still nd protable to foreclose a downstream competitor from the mar-
ket. However, the presence of the complementary input supplier introduces an expropriation
eect that is not present in settings with only substitute inputs and that operates at the
expenses of the merged company. This expropriation incentive leads to two novel results:
rst, the integrated rm may depart from foreclosure when setting the input price to the
competing manufacturer and, second, integration itself may turn out to be unprotable.
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Bankruptcy Law and Corporate
Investment Decisions
1.1 Introduction
The literature in the elds of law and economics has traditionally distinguished the American
\soft" approach to bankruptcy from the \tough" one of European legislators. Recently, this
dichotomy has been put at stake by a process of convergence due to the adoption, in major
European countries, of bankruptcy codes inspired by U.S. Chapter 11. The European Com-
mission has undertaken important actions to support this process, based on the presumption
that a harsh approach to failure would deter risk taking, experimentation and innovation:1
the belief of the Commission is that bankruptcy favors entrepreneurial initiative if it treats
failure in a \soft" fashion.
Several European countries have consequently reformed their bankruptcy codes. In Ger-
many, the reform of 1999 introduced a system of corporate reorganization analogous to
Chapter 11 in the balance of creditors' and debtors' rights. Like in Chapter 11, Germany's
Insolvenzverfahren prescribes the right of the entrepreneur to open the reorganization phase,
the automatic stay on creditors' claims, the super-seniority of lenders that fund the bankrupt
rm and creditors' right to decide over the approval of the reorganization plan. Unlike Chap-
ter 11, it is a court-appointed administrator that formulates the reorganization plan and not
the bankrupt management. In Italy, before the 2006 reform, the insolvency procedure was
1See the website http : ==ec:europa:eu=enterprise=entrepreneurship=sme2chance= for a detailed de-
scription of the initiatives undertaken since 2002 by the Commission to promote a more lenient cultural and
legislative environment towards entrepreneurial failure.
3
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rather \tough" with debtors, as bankrupt entrepreneurs were subject to a long phase of
rehabilitation before they could start a new enterprise. In the current regime, before the
opening of the liquidation phase, the entrepreneur has the right to start a process of nancial
reorganization (concordato preventivo) and negotiate with creditors over the restructuring
of outstanding liabilities, as in Chapter 11. In 2005, the French legislator reformed the in-
solvency law by introducing a proc edure de sauvegarde: the new system gives the right to
the incumbent management to open the reorganization phase and retain control over the
company while devising a restructuring plan under the protection of the automatic stay of
creditors' claims.2
Overall, Germany, Italy and France implemented a \soft" regime and the main novelty
introduced by respective laws is to give more power to the entrepreneur to restructure the
terms of outstanding nancial contracts. These reformed procedures are seriously challenged
by the international nancial meltdown triggered in the fall of 2008 by the failure of major
US credit institutions, which has pushed a number of rms onto the verge of bankruptcy.
Indeed, Standard & Poor's reports that the default rate related to European companies in
its speculative-grade category have risen to 11.1% in 2009 and 2010, from 3.2% over the last
fteen years.3
This Chapter contributes to the analysis of the ecacy of the recent bankruptcy reforms
by showing that, in the presence of a problem of repeated moral hazard and by giving a second
chance to the entrepreneur, \soft" bankruptcy law may cause a problem of short-termism
in investments, that is the choice of investment projects that privilege the achievement of
short-term results.
I employ a principal-agent model with repeated moral hazard, in which a cash constrained
entrepreneur can choose to undertake either a short-term project or a long-term project. The
short-term project is completed in one period and returns a lower net present value than the
long-term project. However, the long-term project requires two periods to be completed and
exposes the entrepreneur to the risk of bankruptcy.4
2For a detailed overview of bankruptcy law and economics see Stanghellini (2007). Also, Brouwer (2006)
provides a comparative analysis between the United States and Europe on the discipline of reorganization
in bankruptcy. Finally, see Franks and Davydenko (2008) for an empirical study of how dierences over
creditors' rights among France, United Kingdom and Germany insolvency systems have an impact over
banks' lending decisions to distressed companies.
3Data from The Economist, \Out of Pocket", December 2008 issue.
4In order to make things more concrete, in what follows the short-term project is designed as a risk-free
investment, like a government bond. Instead, the long-term project is an investment that may deliver high
long-run payos at the cost of early failures, like the investments in R&D.
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\Soft" bankruptcy is modeled through the implications that it imparts on entrepreneurs'
future; throughout the paper, several bankruptcy games are analyzed, but at the core of
each of them is a nancial renegotiation game that resembles Chapter 11 in the balance of
lenders' and entrepreneur's rights; on the one hand the entrepreneur's right to ask for the
opening of bankruptcy proceedings in front of a court and devise a restructuring plan, on
the other hand the lenders' power to approve or reject the plan.
My aim is to compare the impact on investment decisions of a \soft" bankruptcy game
with respect to a benchmark case in which liquidation follows automatically in a case of
insolvency. This benchmark case is designed to capture the main characteristics of relatively
\tough" bankruptcy codes. In the pre-reform regimes of Italy, Germany and France the
resolution of bankruptcy proceedings exhibited a clear bias towards the liquidation of the
distressed company (see Brouwer (2006)). Moreover, in Italy the old bankruptcy law pre-
scribed that the bankrupt entrepreneur's access to new credit had to be preceded by a long
phase of recovery and this limited the chances to obtain new liquidity in the aftermath of
a default. Finally, in the United Kingdom, where the procedure is creditor-oriented, Franks
and Sussman (2005) show that lenders inhibit debt renegotiations to avoid strategic default.
These pieces of evidence testify that \tough" procedures do distinguish from \soft" legal
codes in two important ways: they discourage (ex-ante and ex-post) renegotiation and have
a clear inclination towards liquidation.
The short-termism result is derived in two steps. Firstly, I prove that lenders' behavior is
characterized by limited commitment under \soft" bankruptcy. Indeed, if bankruptcy is de-
signed by the law as pure nancial renegotiation, then it reduces the room for entrepreneur's
punishment in case of bad performance, because the lender would be tempted to allow con-
tinuation when this is protable. This mechanism is borrowed from the literature on the
\soft budget constraint" problem,5 but in this model it leads to the opposite result that
softening the budget constraint generates short-termism. If the bankrupt entrepreneur nds
new funds to carry on the project during the phase of nancial restructuring, existing lenders
are tempted to approve the project's continuation and renegotiate the prescription of termi-
nation contained into the initial contract. On the one hand, this increases ex-post eciency
because investors improve recovery rates, but on the other hand it decreases ex-ante e-
ciency because the prospect of renegotiation raises the agency rent that investors need to
bear to restore entrepreneur's incentives.
Secondly, I show that the problem of limited commitment produces the choice of short-
5This literature highlights the costs to a principal from the lack of commitment to remain tough with an
agent. See the seminal paper by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and Kornai et al. (2003).
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term projects. To induce appropriate incentives, the lender must reduce the repayment he
requires in the nancial contract and such reduction may make the project ex-ante unprof-
itable. Consequently, the entrepreneur would choose projects that are not subject to the risk
of bankruptcy, and deliver positive results early on, in order to get funded.6
In the paper, I analyze the robustness of the short-termism mechanism and present
four additional results. The rst is that the bias towards the achievement of short-term
results may be oset if the bankrupt entrepreneur undertakes a process of technological
restructuring. In the extension with bankruptcy and technological restructuring, the two
con
icting forces triggered by the \soft budget constraint" eect are put in contrast. Firstly,
the one proposed by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and von Thadden (1995), where it
is shown that hardening the budget constraint may bring to an end valuable, but slow,
projects. Secondly, the one put forward by this model, where I show that softening the
budget constraint also causes an increase of agency costs. The result of this extension is that
the long-term investment is chosen if the probability that a low outcome is caused by adverse
shocks is high enough. Otherwise, and if the moral hazard problem is relatively severe, the
short-termism bias still arises.
The second additional result regards the eect of the degree of nancial markets' com-
petition on investments: in a context with monopoly lending, I show that the short-termism
problem is further reinforced with respect to the environment with competitive nancial
markets. In the case with competitive lending, the entrepreneur is able to fully squeeze
the net value of the long-term project and therefore, the project is always undertaken if
implementable. Instead, the monopoly lender must take into account entrepreneur's agency
rent when comparing projects' protability and as such, the rent increases in the \soft"
bankruptcy framework to make the long-term project unprotable, independently from re-
covery rates.
The third result is that the existence of collateral alleviates the soft-budget constraint
problem and facilitates the choice of the long-term project. Intuitively, collateral increases
recovery rates in the event of project's failure and reduces the rent that the entrepreneur can
extract by misbehaving. The fourth result consists in showing that by introducing a threat
of management substitution in case of poor performance, the lender can restore investment's
6The mechanism by which short-termism arises in this model is dierent than the one in Diamond (2004).
Diamond (2004) shows that in weak legal environments and with multiple lenders, short-term debt is the
contract that allows a creditor to minimize the deadweight loss that he would suer from a run on a borrower
by the other lenders. In other words, Diamond (2004) shows that holding the right to neglect refunding,
and keep the budget constraint tight, a lender is less exposed to the negative externality imposed by other
lenders when these require an early stage repayment.
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eciency. As for the case with collateral, the threat of turnover reintroduces a stick that
the lender can use to punish the manager in place of the refunding decisions.
Several pieces of empirical evidence support my conclusions. The rst, and more impor-
tant, is due to John et al. (2008), in which it is shown that strong creditor rights induce
rms' insiders and managers to choose more valuable investment projects by hampering the
opportunities of rent extraction generated by opportunistic conduct. The second is in a
number of empirical analyses showing that risk-premiums and short-term lending are posi-
tively correlated with bankruptcy law degree of \leniency" (see Blume et al., 1980; Corbett,
1987; Poterba and Summers, 1995; Qian and Strahan, 2007). The third is in Bharath et
al. (2007), where it is shown that, consistently with the results of the extension with man-
agement turnover, the replacement of the incumbent management in Chapter 11 is steadily
increased in the last 20 years, leading to a more ecient development of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.7
The article proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 gives a short introduction to Chapter 11,
Section 1.3 compares my ndings with those established in related papers and Section 1.4
presents the main model. In Section 1.5, I discuss the benchmark case in which the lender can
commit to the optimal initial contract with the entrepreneur and liquidates the rm in case of
project's failure, while in Section 1.6 I relax the assumption of full commitment and study the
eects of \soft" bankruptcy. Section 1.7 proves that the main result carries over even if the
entrepreneur is allowed to undertake a process of technological restructuring in bankruptcy.
In Section 1.8, I solve the model under the assumption of monopolistic lending. Section
1.9 and Section 1.10 analyze two extensions in which the lender can, respectively, pledge
collateral and threat to substitute the incumbent entrepreneur in bankruptcy. Section 1.11
discusses the empirical predictions and the policy conclusion of the paper. Finally, Section
1.12 concludes.
1.2 Chapter 11
In the United States, Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy law provide the federal
discipline that regulates corporate insolvency procedures. Chapter 7 governs the phase of
liquidation, while Chapter 11 governs the process of nancial restructuring. They are both
carried out under the oversight of specialized bankruptcy courts.
Chapter 11 ultimate target is to protect a bankrupt rm from outsiders' pressure while it
is coping with a process of rehabilitation. Chapter 11 prescribes a system of countervailing
7See Section 1.11 for a more detailed discussion on model's testable predictions and policy conclusion.
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rights aimed at protecting both creditors' and debtors' interests. On the debtors' side is the
provision that allows the entrepreneur to le unilaterally for Chapter 11, at the prospect
of potential default. Entry into Chapter 11 opens the Debtor-in-Possession (or DIP) phase,
during which the entrepreneur has the right to stop payments to existing investors (automatic
stay) and devise a restructuring plan to be submitted to creditors by a given period of time.8
During the Debtor-In-Possession phase, the entrepreneur can also search for new funds and in
order to facilitate this, Chapter 11 prescribes that the investors willing to nance bankrupt
rms are privileged in the reimbursement of their claims at the end of the restructuring
process - i.e., they can be repaid before (even senior) existing investors.
Creditors have two important rights in Chapter 11: rst, they can propose an alternative
plan to the entrepreneur's and second, they vote on the restructuring project in a ballot
disciplined by a system of qualied majorities.9 In fact, by rejecting the plan, creditors can
reverse the restructuring procedure into a Chapter 7 liquidation process.
In the model, I compare the impact of several renegotiation environments in bankruptcy
over ex ante investment choices. More specically, the rst \soft" bankruptcy game studies
the eects on investments of a nancial renegotiation game designed following the rights that
Chapter 11 grants to contracting parties. Particular emphasis is given to two of them: the
right that the entrepreneur has to unilaterally le for bankruptcy, search for new funds and
devise a restructuring plan, and the right that lenders have to vote on the same plan. In the
second \soft" bankruptcy game, I look at the interplay between nancial renegotiation and
economic restructuring; there, the bankrupt entrepreneur can both renegotiate with creditors
and undertake a process of economic reorganization, two important features of real Chapter
11 cases. In the third \soft" bankruptcy game, I analyze the outcome of nancial renegotiation
under the assumption of imperfect capital markets; the objective is to understand the eects
of the introduction of a \soft" procedure in economies where banks have strong bargaining
power. In the fourth and fth \soft" bankruptcy games, I enlarge nanciers' strategy space
at the initial funding stage: rst, by looking at a game in which collateral can be pledged,
then by introducing a clause by which lenders can re the entrepreneur and substitute her
in bankruptcy.
8The deadline is set by law at 120 days, but the bankruptcy judge can concede extensions.
9Creditors vote on the plan by classes of seniority. More specically, an entire class of claims is deemed
to accept a plan if the plan is accepted by creditors that hold at least two-thirds in amount and more than
one-half in number. A vote of acceptance by a class binds all creditors in the class.
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1.3 Related Literature
Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) has been the rst to show how inecient decisions over
bankrupt rms' continuation distort ex ante corporate investments. In this literature, how-
ever, the work that is particularly close in spirit to this one is Bebchuk (2002). Bebchuk
(2002) analyzes how the Absolute Priority Rule (APR hereafter) deviations that character-
ize Chapter 11 proceedings in
uence equity-holders choice between two investment projects,
one riskier than the other.10 Bebchuk (2002) shows that equity-holders may be tempted
to choose the risky project because in failure states they are able to secure a positive rent
from Chapter 11 negotiations. However, Bebchuk (2002) implicitly assumes that the credi-
tors are unaware of the type of investment projects available to the equity-holders. Instead,
in this model I assume that a lender can observe and verify the investment plan that the
entrepreneur undertakes, and designs the optimal contract as to induce her to choose the
most protable one. Consequently, I derive the investment strategy choice as a function of
the optimal equilibrium contracts and study how the same choice changes with the type of
bankruptcy.
An important strand of the literature designs \soft" bankruptcy as an information rev-
elation process in which the economic viability of the rm is examined. This literature
emphasizes the trade-o between the excessive liquidation caused by \tough" procedures
and the excessive continuation generated by \soft" procedures.11 For example, White (1994)
investigates the role of bankruptcy as a ltering device in a model with adverse selection and
highlights the way bankruptcy can distort liquidation/continuation decisions. I take a dier-
ent modeling approach by focusing on the agency costs caused by moral hazard and limited
commitment in lenient procedures. The costs generated by moral hazard induce the parties
to write a contract that prescribes termination in case of project's failure. The problem of
limited commitment associated to \soft" codes, though, weakens this threat and forces the
lender to grant a higher monetary transfer in order to restore entrepreneur's incentives.
This Chapter is also related to the literature that studies the \soft budget constraint"
problem. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and von Thadden (1995) investigate the relation-
ship between the \soft budget constraint" problem and investments' time horizon, concluding
10The APR determines the order of creditors' claims reimbursement in bankruptcy. It states that creditors
who have secured their loans have seniority over other creditors, and, therefore, have the right to be paid
back rst.
11This trade-o has also in
uenced the debate over the design of the optimal bankruptcy reform. See Hart
(1995), chapter 7, for a comprehensive discussion on this topic.
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that hardening the budget constraint may induce short-termism in investment behavior.12 In
these papers, it is shown that neglecting the refunding of projects that yield a low outcome in
the short-term hinders the implementation of both bad projects, and slow, but good, projects
that are able to generate very high gains only in the long-run. Clearly, this is not ecient
if the higher protability of long-term projects osets the losses caused by bad projects. I
contribute to this literature by showing that hardening the budget constraint induces long-
termism because it allows investors to keep the termination threat credible and limit the
costs associated with the problem of repeated moral hazard.
Recent theoretical and empirical contributions show that \soft" bankruptcy procedures
foster innovation and entrepreneurship. For example, Acharya and Subramanian (2009) pro-
vides empirical evidence on how \soft" codes foster innovation, Biais and Mariotti (2009)
develops a model that shows how these procedures produce positive externalities at a gen-
eral equilibrium level and Landier (2006) proves that \soft" bankruptcy stimulates en-
trepreneurial initiative. More specically, Landier (2006) develops a model where the at-
titude of capital markets towards failure is endogenous: entrepreneurship depends on the
cost of funding, which in turn depends on markets' expectations over failed entrepreneurs'
ability. Landier (2006) shows that \soft" bankruptcy rules stimulate entrepreneurship be-
cause they grant a complete debt relief to the failed entrepreneur and reduce the cost of
capital necessary to start new projects. With respect to the analysis in Landier (2006), I let
the \cost of funding" depend on the severity of the moral hazard problem, which depends
on bankruptcy law.
Finally, the main result of the paper follows from the assumption for which parties can
renegotiate the initial contract through bankruptcy: this weakens ex ante incentives but
alleviates ex post eciency loss. Therefore, like in Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), the main
focus is on the renegotiation game that is carried out between lender and entrepreneur.
However, the aim of Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) is to determine the optimal number of
creditors that is able to minimize the trade-o between entrepreneur's ex ante incentives to
default strategically and the ex post eciency costs generated by liquidation. Instead, in
this Chapter I am more concerned about the impact of renegotiation on rm's investment
plans.
12My model diers from von Thadden (1995) insofar as I assume that the lender can observe the project
chosen by the rm but cannot observe rst period prots. Moreover, I depart from Baliga and Polak (2004),
which also builds on Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) by introducing a problem of moral hazard, because
there authors employ a one-shot game to study the choice between monitored and non-monitored loans.
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1.4 The Model
The model analyses a nancing game in an environment characterized by asymmetric infor-
mation and entrepreneur's limited liability. There are two classes of risk-neutral agents in
the economy: a cash constrained entrepreneur (or borrower, she) and competing lenders.13
In what follows, I assume that each entrepreneur obtains funding from a single lender (or in-
vestor, he) and focus on a representative entrepreneur-lender pair. Moreover, market interest
rates are normalized to zero.
The entrepreneur decides the time horizon of the investment and this decision is observed
and veried by the lender. More specically, the entrepreneur can choose between two
projects: a short-term project (S) and a long-term project (L). This choice in
uences rm's
expected revenues in the following way. The short-term project is modeled as an outside
option that returns a net payo of S  0.14 The long-term project extends over up to two
periods, it requires an outlay of I > 0 to be started and a further infusion of b I > 0 to be
completed. In the rst period, project L delivers a payo equal to  > 0 in the case of
success, and zero in the case of failure. Finally, in the second period, the project generates
an expected return equal to b  > 0 independently from rst period outcome.
The protability of the long-term project is subject to two problems of asymmetric in-
formation. Firstly, the entrepreneur must decide in each period whether to exert eort or
shirk. In the rst period, the moral hazard problem is designed as in Holmstr om-Tirole
(1997). More specically, I assume that if the entrepreneur puts in eort, she would suc-
ceed with certainty and if she shirks, she would fail with certainty but gain private benets
B > 0.15 In the second period, the moral hazard problem is designed in a reduced form: the
entrepreneur requires the payment of a reward at least equal to b B > 0 to put in eort.
Secondly, I assume that the entrepreneur privately observes the project's rst period
outcome. This follows Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and is equivalent to assuming that
the lender needs to bear an innite cost to observe the true state. The main implication of
this hypothesis is that contingent contracts are not feasible in this setting. In other words,
the scope of the analysis is limited to contracts in which refunding decisions depend on the
13In fact, what follows also applies to managerial rms in which managers' interests are perfectly aligned
with equity-holders'.
14S corresponds to the net surplus yielded by project S to the agent that holds the bargaining power in
the contracting phase. This assumption allows to simplify the analysis. However, what is sucient for the
main result to hold is that project S is not subject to the risk of bankruptcy.
15This assumption allows to deliver a sharper result than with intermediate probabilities of success (failure).
I would like to remark that the nature of the results would not change assuming that the probability of success
(failure) lies into the unit interval.
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results reported at the end of the rst period by the entrepreneur.16
Time-line and cash 
ow of the game are given in Figure 1.1.
[FIGURE 1.1 ABOUT HERE]
The entrepreneur holds all the bargaining power at the contracting stage: she makes a
take-it-or-leave-it oer to the lender that species the project she wants to carry out and
the contract that would implement it.17 If the lender accepts the oer, he provides initial
funding and the project is started. The class of contractual mechanisms I focus on are
composed by two instruments: a per period repayment from the entrepreneur to the lender
and project's continuation decisions. The repayment required in the rst period is denoted
by R, while the transfer required in the second period is denoted by b R. Lenders' decisions
over project continuation are denoted by j = f0;1g, with j = ;0, and depend on rst
period revealed payo: if the entrepreneur reports  (zero), the project is refunded when
 = 1 (0 = 1), terminated otherwise (j = 0, with j = ;0). Entry into bankruptcy takes
place when the entrepreneur reports a nil payo, because in that case she cannot meet the
initial contract's requirements. The implications for the rm of the entrance in bankruptcy
depend on bankruptcy code. In Sub-section 1.4.1, I will be more specic on how the game
develops in bankruptcy states.
I introduce three parametric assumptions.
Assumption 1
i:  > B;
ii:  > I;
iii: b    b I   b B > 0.
Assumption 1:i implies that, in the rst period, entrepreneur's truthful revelation constraint
is more binding than the one related to eort provision.18 Assumption 1:ii implies that the
long-term project has positive net present value in the rst period, Assumption 1:iii implies
that the long-term project has positive pledgeable income in the second period.19
16It is important to remark that here project's payo is function of a decision over eort provision, therefore,
it is not randomly determined. This implies that the game is not a signaling game of the Gale and Hellwig
(1989) type.
17Clearly, the way project S is modeled implies that the relative contract just species how S is split.
18This assumption greatly simplies the solution of the maximization problems in the model without loss
of generality.
19By pledgeable income I mean the surplus delivered by the project net of the cost related to the investment
allotment and private benets.
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The optimal mechanism that implements strategy L is found by solving, by backward
induction, for the sequential incentive problems in t = 2 and t = 1. The equilibrium concept
I shall employ is the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPE).
1.4.1 The \Soft" Bankruptcy Game
Renegotiation takes place in bankruptcy and is compliant to bankruptcy code's prescriptions.
This implies that bankrupt entrepreneurs are allowed to renegotiate the termination clause
only under the mechanisms provided by the law. In particular, in insolvency states, the
following \soft" bankruptcy game takes place.
1. The entrepreneur searches for new funds on competitive nancial markets.
2. If the entrepreneur nds a new lender, this lender makes her an oer.
3. In the case of oer acceptance, the rst period lender (or old lender) must decide either
to agree on the continuation plan or reject it. More specically, such a decision is the
outcome of an ultimatum game in which the old lender has all the bargaining power
and makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer to the agent. This oer species the payo that
the lender requires to allow project continuation and is denoted by ^ r.
4. If the entrepreneur accepts the old lender's oer, the rm continues its activity and the
second period time structure is the same as in case of continuation out of bankruptcy.
Otherwise, the rm is shut down and the entrepreneur is dismissed.
Notice that the cash 
ow structure of the game and the assumptions on the moral hazard
problems are the same independently from whether the entrepreneur is in bankruptcy.
Two further points must be stressed. Firstly, the lender that provides new liquidity in
the second stage of the renegotiation game must not be necessarily dierent from the rst
period one. Indeed, in both cases the model would deliver the same type of results.20
Secondly, the choice to structure the renegotiation phase as an ultimatum game implies
that the allocation of the bargaining power determines the equilibrium outcomes. I assume
that the old lender has all the bargaining power in bankruptcy. This hypothesis may seem
limiting because it does not capture the interactions that take place among creditors and
debtors under the supervision of the bankruptcy judge in a real Chapter 11. However,
20It is worth noticing that the empirical evidence provided by Daihya et al. (2003) on Chapter 11 Debtor-
In-Possession funding contracts conrms that bankrupt rms do receive money from both investors with
whom they already have a lending relationship and new investors.
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weakening old lender's bargaining power would only reinforce my conclusions. In fact, the
model shows that even when the initial lender holds the power to decide whether to enforce
the contract or not (asking for a huge value of ^ r, for instance), he may eventually accept
renegotiation.21
1.4.2 First Best
Analyze rst the scenario in which the entrepreneur is not cash constrained and there is
no problem of moral hazard. I assume that in these circumstances the long-term project
generates a net present value higher than the one attached to the short-term project and
therefore determines the value of the rm in the rst best scenario.
   I + b    b I > S: (FB)
In what follows, it is rst presented how the contracting game changes when the moral
hazard problems are introduced into the analysis and then when the problem of limited
commitment is accounted for.
1.5 Optimal Contract with Full Commitment
In this section, it is derived the equilibrium contract that the lender may want to propose
to the entrepreneur under the assumption of full commitment. With respect to the rst
best scenario, I introduce the problem of repeated moral hazard. Therefore, the constraints
related to entrepreneur's private decisions on eort provision and payo revelation must be
taken into account. Nevertheless, thanks to full commitment, the bankruptcy code does not
aect the investment strategy choice because at the interim stage, no matter what the law
prescribes, the lender sticks to the contract signed at the outset and imposes liquidation on
the rm.
Lemma 1 presents the equilibrium of the contracting game.
Lemma 1
Under full commitment, two scenarios can arise:
21In relation to this feature of the game, it is interesting to remark that during Chapter 11 voting phase
the bankruptcy judge can \cram-down" a restructuring plan, even against old lender's will, if she/he believes
that the plan preserves rm's value as a going concern. Explicitly introducing this into the renegotiation
game would further exacerbate the \soft-budget constraint problem" highlighted in this Chapter, since it
would increase entrepreneur's outside option during negotiations.
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i: If b    b I < I, project S is chosen by the entrepreneur, the lender breaks even and the
entrepreneur takes S. Finally, project S is implemented if the lender accepts the oer.
ii: If b    b I  I, the entrepreneur oers CFC to the lender.
C
FC  fR = I; b R = b Ig; f = 1;0 = 0g:
Consequently, borrower's utility under project L at equilibrium, denoted UFC, is given by
U
FC =    I + b    b I > 0 (1.1)
and the lender breaks even in expectation. Finally, if the lender accepts the oer, project L
is implemented.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Contract CFC induces the rst best outcome if the true telling constraint is satised; it
can be implemented by a sequence of standard short-term debt contracts that require the
repayment of a xed amount at the end of each period and a refunding decision at the interim
period.
CFC prescribes that if the entrepreneur does not report  the rm is not refunded (0 = 0)
and is put in liquidation (since 0 < R). In other words, even in a setting with positive second
period expected value, it is optimal to terminate the project and push the rm to liquidation.
Moreover, the assumption of competitive nancial markets implies that the entrepreneur is
able to squeeze all the value of project L, hence the rst best is attained when L is chosen.
Finally, the protability of the long-term project is not aected by bankruptcy because
renegotiation is not allowed under full commitment.
1.6 Optimal Contract with Limited Commitment
In this section, I present how the contracting game changes under the assumption of limited
commitment. The departure from full commitment implies that lender's ability to enforce
the optimal contract depends on bankruptcy law. If the procedure is \soft", the bankrupt
entrepreneur has the right to search for new lenders and the old lender has the power to
permit or prevent continuation. I show that the lender allows continuation because this
makes recovery rates improve; consequently, a tension arises between ex-post and ex-ante
eciency, which determines the resulting investment strategy.
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Lemma 2
Under limited commitment, two scenarios can arise, depending on the value of project L
expected pledgeable income in the second period:
i: If b    b I   b B < I, project S is chosen by the entrepreneur, the lender breaks even and
the entrepreneur takes S. Finally, project S is implemented if the lender accepts the
oer.
ii: If b    b I   b B  I, the entrepreneur oers CLC to the lender.
C
LC  fR = I; b R = b I; ^ r = Ig; f = 1;0 = 1g:
Borrower's utility under CLC, denoted ULC, is:
U
LC =    I + b    b I > 0:
The lender breaks even in expectation. Finally, if the lender accepts the oer, project L is
implemented.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 1
Limited commitment reduces the scope for the implementation of the long-term project L.
Proof. The proof follows by comparing the conditions for the implementation of CFC and
CLC outlined in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
Proposition 1 shows that \soft" bankruptcy procedures may cause a bias toward short-
termism in rm's investments. The intuition for this result is as follows. On the one hand,
a lenient procedure reduces the instruments available to cope with entrepreneur's moral
hazard. On the other hand, it allows for an improvement of recovery rates in the case of
rst period insolvency. Indeed, once the assumption of full commitment is relaxed, it is not
rational to the old lender, at the interim stage, to refuse any nite rent from renegotiation,
even if this comes at the cost of loosening the refunding decisions. This is a well known
principle borrowed from the literature on mutually advantageous renegotiation,22 and is
here employed to study the impact on the investment choice in the presence of renegotiation
in bankruptcy.
22The general problem is analyzed by Fudenberg and Tirole (1990), instead Gromb (1994) applies it to
debt contracts in a setting that draws on Bolton and Scharfstein (1990).
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The bankruptcy game employed reverses the bargaining power allocation with respect to
the initial contracting stage, in which it is the entrepreneur to hold all the bargaining power.
However, this assumption does not reinforce the result of the paper. If the entrepreneur
was to hold all the bargaining power at the renegotiation stage, then the equilibrium of
the investment game would never feature the choice of the long-term project because the
entrepreneur would squeeze project's net present value in full and the lender would never
retrieve I through the recovery rates.
The main nding is that, unless the lender is able to fully recover the initial outlay, the
exacerbation of the agency costs caused by the relaxation of the termination threat is not
oset by the transfer ^ r required by the lender to permit continuation in bankruptcy. In
other words, the entrepreneur would always have incentive to divert rst period prots and
project L would not be protable from the lender's viewpoint.
The result that tightening the termination threat allows for the implementation of more
valuable projects is supported by the empirical analysis in John et al. (2008). Indeed, John
et al. (2008) claims that strong creditor protection induces rms' insiders and managers
to choose more valuable investment strategies by hampering their rent extraction behavior.
This conclusion, and the intuition behind, is consistent with the results of this section.
Further evidence to the short-termism outcome is in the studies that look at nancial
conditions set by investors at the contracting stage. In particular, Qian and Strahan (2007)
shows that stronger creditor protection is correlated with bigger interest rates and longer
term nancing.
1.7 Bankruptcy and Technological Restructuring
The model in Section 1.4 does not take into account that restructuring in bankruptcy may
also give a second chance to ventures in diculties to restore economic viability. In particular,
there I forego the impact that a technological restructuring process would impart on rm's
value. This is an important feature of Chapter 11 and it is particularly important if failure
is caused by exogenous circumstances, like an adverse shock.
In this extension, I design the investment game to give the bankrupt entrepreneur the
power to re-establish the venture's protability following a rst period project failure or after
a negative shock that fully depletes rst period project value. In this way, I contrast the two
con
icting forces triggered by the \soft budget constraint" eect: the one put forward by
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and von Thadden (1995), where it is shown that hardening
the budget constraint may bring to an end slow and good projects and the one put forward
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by this Chapter, where I show that softening the budget constraint also causes the increase
of agency costs.
The goal of this section is to compare the results of a \soft" bankruptcy game with
technological restructuring to the case in which bankruptcy is \tough". More specically, I
want to understand to what extent the chances for the long-term strategy to be selected at
equilibrium increase with renegotiation and restructuring.
The outcome of this extension is a trade-o in which, on the one hand, restructuring
enables the attainment of a higher net value of the long-term project but, on the other
hand, the \soft budget constraint" problem intrinsic to renegotiation puts at risk long-term
project's implementation.
I modify the structure of both the investment game and the \soft" bankruptcy game with
respect to Section 1.4. Firstly, I assume that the long-term project is subject to a shock that
may spoil its value and that this shock may happen with probability 1   .23
Secondly, I assume that in the second period the expected payo returned by the long-
term project is perfectly correlated with the outcome of the rst period, equal to b  in
the case of success and zero in the case of a nil rst period outcome. However, under the
\soft" bankruptcy law, the entrepreneur undertakes a restructuring process that increases
the payo of the project to b  after a negative shock or a rst period project failure. The
restructuring process succeeds with certainty and its outcome is publicly observable.24
Thirdly, in the framework with \soft" bankruptcy and restructuring, I follow the approach
of the costly state verication literature by assuming that the lender can perfectly observe
the outcome of the project in the rst period, by sending the entrepreneur to bankruptcy
and paying a xed cost K.25 In other words, in the spirit of Gale and Hellwig (1985), I am
relaxing the assumption for which the true state is observable at an innite cost. Therefore,
in the case with \soft" bankruptcy and restructuring, the contract species a decision rule,
denoted by pj 2 f0;1g, with j = ;0, according to which the rm can be put in bankruptcy
23This hypothesis allows for the enrichment of the analysis in an interesting fashion. Indeed, in absence
of such shock, restructuring would be feasible only after rst period failure, which, given the moral hazard
problem design of Section 1.4, happens only in case of rst period shirking. This means that restructuring
would just increase the rents attached to continuation in bankruptcy and make the long-term project even
less valuable in the case of renegotiation in bankruptcy.
24Here I am assuming that the restructuring project does not require any implementation cost and this
has two implications: the rst is that the entrepreneur is always willing to undertake restructuring and the
second is that the payo of the restructured project is the same as following rst period success. I would
like to remark that introducing a restructuring cost does not change the nature of the results presented in
the following of this section.
25Also, the lender can observe whether the entrepreneur has been hit by the shock.
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and the project's payo veried, depending on the rst period revealed outcome. Moreover,
the contract denes the payments required in bankruptcy - Rb
 and Rb
0-, and the payments
required out of bankruptcy - R and R0.
Finally, consistently with the main model, the legal framework determines to what extent
parties can commit to enforce the initial contract and verify the true outcome of the project.
More specically, if bankruptcy is \soft" the opening of the restructuring phase naturally
implies that parties can commit to the implementation of the policy of state verication
stipulated into the contract and sink the disclosure cost K.26 At the same time, \soft"
bankruptcy implies that the enforcement of the refunding decisions depends on the outcome
of the renegotiation phase.
In particular, the new timing of the \soft" bankruptcy game is as follows:
1. The lender observes the true outcome at cost K.
2. The entrepreneur searches for new funds on competitive nancial markets.
3. If the entrepreneur nds a new lender, this lender makes her an oer.
4. In case of oer acceptance, the entrepreneur undertakes the technological restructuring
process.
5. The old lender must decide either to agree to the continuation plan or reject it. The
old lender and the entrepreneur play an ultimatum game in which the former has all
the bargaining power and makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer to the rm. Such an oer
species the payo that he requires to allow the project's continuation, indexed ^ rj,
with j = ;0.
6. If the entrepreneur accepts the old lender's oer, the rm continues its activity and
the second period time structure is the same as in the case of continuation out of
bankruptcy. Otherwise, the rm is shut down and the entrepreneur is dismissed.
Second period eort decision in bankruptcy is modeled as out of bankruptcy, while the new
payo distribution is in Figure 1.2. Finally, the parametric hypotheses into Assumption 1
hold also in this section. However, Assumption 2 below is introduced.
26Note that under the costly state verication approach, parties need to commit to the bankruptcy policy
specied in the contract, because otherwise they would never be willing to sink the true state disclosure cost
K ex post. Indeed, as remarked by Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), if the entrepreneur expects the policy
to be carried out, she always reports the cash 
ow's exact realization. In turn, the lender, anticipating that
the truth is always communicated, would not have incentive to undertake the verication policy.
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Assumption 2
b    b I   b B > K.
[FIGURE 1.2 ABOUT HERE]
Assumption 2 introduces an upper bound to verication costs, K, and it implies that
long-run project's second period expected pledgeable income is not depleted after paying K.
1.7.1 Optimal Contract under \Tough" Bankruptcy
In this section, it is derived the contract that lender and entrepreneur sign when bankruptcy
(and technological restructuring) is not allowed: this framework corresponds to the one in
which parties cannot renegotiate the original deal at the interim stage. Lemma 3 presents
the equilibrium of the contracting game.
Lemma 3
Denote by CNR the equilibrium contract that implements the long-term investment strategy
L in absence of \soft" bankruptcy and technological restructuring. CNR species that:
C
NR  fR = R
NR  I=; b R = b Ig; f = 1;0 = 0g:
CNR can be implemented if rst period limited liability,
  I=;
the incentive constraint related to eort provision,
   I + (b    b I)  B; (1.2)
and the truth-telling constraint,
b    b I   I=  0;
are satised. Then, borrower's utility, denoted UNR, is equal to:
U
NR =    I + (b    b I)
and the lender breaks even in expectation. Finally, long-term project L is chosen at equilib-
rium if:
   I + (b    b I)  S: (1.3)
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Proof. See Appendix C.
The risk of a negative shock increases the repayment required in the rst period by the
lender, and this has two implications. Firstly, rst period limited liability, the incentive
constraint and the truth-telling constraint may not hold. Secondly, the value generated by
the long-term project is smaller than in the full commitment case of Section 1.5.
1.7.2 Optimal Contract under \Soft" Bankruptcy and Restruc-
turing
If bankruptcy allows the entrepreneur to restructure the rm in case of an adverse shock
or a rst period failure, there are two con
icting forces that in
uence the contracting game
outcome and project choice. On the one hand, as shown in Section 1.6, renegotiation in
bankruptcy increases the agency costs attached to the implementation of project L. On the
other hand, technological restructuring can raise the value of the same project and make
it more protable to the entrepreneur. Lemma 4 presents the optimal contract and the
conditions that determine project's choice in this framework.
Lemma 4
In a setting with \soft" bankruptcy and technological restructuring, two cases must be distin-
guished.
(i) If b   b I   b B  K < I, recovery rates are not enough to recoup the initial investment's












0 = R0 = 0; b R = b I
o
;
fp = 0;p0 = 1g; f = 1;0 = 1g; f^ r = 0; ^ r0 = b    b I   b Bg:
CR can be implemented if rst period limited liability
 
I   (b    b I   b B   K)(1   )

and the incentive constraint related to eort provision,
   I + (b    b I   b B)   (1   )K  B; (1.4)
are satised. Then, borrower's utility, denoted UR, is equal to:
U
R =    I + (b    b I)   K(1   );
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and the lender breaks even in expectation. Finally, the long-term project L is chosen
at equilibrium if:
   I + (b    b I)   K(1   )  S: (1.5)
(ii) If b  b I  b B K  I, recovery rates allow for the recoupment of the initial investment's
value. In this case, the optimal contract, CR
s , species that:
C
R
s  fR = I;R
b
 = R0 = R
b
0 = 0; b R = b Ig;
fp = 0;p0 = 1g; f = 1;0 = 1g; f^ r = 0; ^ r0 = I + Kg:
CR
s can be implemented if the incentive constraint related to eort provision,
( + K)  B;
is satised. Then, borrower's utility, denoted UR
s , is equal to:
U
R
s =    (1   )K + (b    b I   I);
and the lender breaks even in expectation. Finally, long-term project L is chosen at
equilibrium if:
   (1   )K + (b    b I   I)  S:
Proof. See Appendix D.
Focusing on the case in which b    b I   b B   K < I,27 the optimal contract species
putting the entrepreneur in bankruptcy and verify the project's outcome only if a nil payo
is reported (p0 = 1, p = 0). Moreover, the entrepreneur never lies at equilibrium, as she
communicates to have zero cash only if she is hit by a negative shock.
1.7.3 Bankruptcy, Technological Restructuring and Short-termism
Proposition 2 compares the main features of CNR and CR, the optimal contracts presented in
Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, respectively.28 This allows us to study how the short-termism result
presented in Proposition 1 fares when the entrepreneur is entitled to implement a project of
technological reorganization in bankruptcy.
27I discuss this case in more detail because it is the one in which the short-termism result arises in the
main model.
28Again, notice that I am focusing on the results under b    b I   b B   K < I.
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Proposition 2
With respect to the case with \tough" bankruptcy, \soft" bankruptcy with technological re-
structuring has three eects:
(i) The utility of the entrepreneur increases, UR > UNR.
(ii) The contractual payment required in the rst period decreases, RR < RNR.
(iii) There exists a threshold   < 1 such that:
8  >   
b    b I   b B   K
b    b I   K
The incentive constraint related to eort provision is more binding.
Therefore, if  lies below  , the long-term project is chosen by the entrepreneur in a setting
with \soft" bankruptcy and restructuring.
A trade-o emerges at equilibrium. The main benets of \soft" bankruptcy and re-
structuring are two. The rst is that that the value of the long-term project increases at
equilibrium and this raises the chances of it being chosen by the entrepreneur. The second is
that the rst period transfer required by the lender is smaller, because the lender takes into
account that in bankruptcy he will extract a positive rent from the second period (through
the recovery rates). Consequently, the rst period limited liability condition is more likely
to hold under \soft" bankruptcy.29
However, comparing the expressions of the incentive conditions related to the eort choice
evaluated at the optimal contracts, it emerges that, for high values of , such constraint is
more binding in the case with \soft" bankruptcy and restructuring. In other words, when a
nil outcome is less likely to be caused by unfortunate events, that is, if (1   ) < (1    ),
avoiding a \soft" stance in bankruptcy allows for the improvement of entrepreneur's incen-
tives. Instead, for low values of  the long-term project can be implemented.
Example. I now construct a simple example putting Proposition 2 to work: more
specically, I provide a framework in which the trade-o between the con
icting forces above
can lead to inecient investment decisions.
First of all, the set of critical values of sigma at which the relevant conditions in Lemma
3 and Lemma 4 hold are pinned down.
29A third benet associated to \soft" bankruptcy is that the entrepreneur never lies along the equilibrium
path, while in the case with \tough" bankruptcy this happens only if the truth-telling condition is satised.
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The values that satisfy the rst period limited liability, incentive constraint and truth-



















b    b I + 
In particular, if   maxfNR
LL ;NR
IC ;NR
TT g then the long-term project can be undertaken in
the case with \tough" bankruptcy.
Instead, the values that satisfy the rst period limited liability and incentive constraint
in the case with renegotiation and restructuring, denoted respectively by R
LL and R
IC, are




I   (b    b I   b B   K)




B + I   (b    b I   b B   K)
 + K
In this case, project L can be undertaken if   maxfR
LL;R
ICg.
Without loss of generality, I introduce the following restrictions on the parameters of the
model:
(a) b    b I =  = 2I (b) B = b B (c)  > 1=2 (d) S = 0
Restriction (a) implies that that the expected payo of the project in the second period is
bigger than that of the rst period. This is equivalent to assuming that project L is able to
generate very high gains only in the long-term. Restriction (b) implies that the moral hazard
problem is equally severe in the rst and in the second period. Restriction (c) introduces
an upper bound to the probability of being hit by an adverse shock, equal to 1    and
restriction (d) implies that the short-term project leads to a nil payo to the entrepreneur.
Moreover, in this setting, for Assumption 2 to hold it must be that    B   K > 0. The
following result holds.
Corollary 1
If 2B > , \soft" bankruptcy with technological restructuring reduces the scope for the im-
plementation of the long-term project, L.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Corollary 1 shows that the short-termism result holds in this example provided the moral
hazard problem is severe enough and conditions (a)-(d) are satised (in particular, if the
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probability of the adverse shock is low enough). Indeed, under these conditions, in a non-
empty range of values of , project L cannot be implemented in the framework with \soft"
bankruptcy and technological restructuring, but it can be undertaken in the framework with
\tough" bankruptcy. The entrepreneur chooses the short-term project in a legal framework
with renegotiation and restructuring, instead it would choose the long-term project (and
earn a positive payo) in the framework without renegotiation and restructuring. Like in
the main model, short-temism is caused by the exacerbation of the repeated agency problem.
1.8 Monopoly Lender
In this section, I solve the model in Section 1.4 in a framework with a monopoly lender. In
other words, in the following it is assumed that there is no competition on nancial markets
in the rst period, so that the lender is a monopolist to the borrower. Even though this
hypothesis is at odds with a major part of the corporate nance literature, this case has
a policy relevance because it is consistent with the nancial markets' competitive environ-
ments of countries like Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, where banks hold a strong
bargaining power vis- a-vis rms.30
The twist introduced with respect to the set-up in Section 1.4 consists of assuming that it
is the rst period lender who holds all the bargaining power and makes a take-it-or-leave-it
oer to the entrepreneur at the contracting game stage. The oer consists of a contract
that species per period expected repayments, termination decisions and type of investment
project. The reversal of the bargaining power also implies that the lender squeezes all of the
net value of project S, S. Finally, notice that, in bankruptcy, the entrepreneur has access
to competitive nancial markets when searching for funding in the second period, as in the
game of Sub-section 1.4.1.31
The result of this extension is analogous to the one with competitive nancial markets,
30With particular regard to the United Kingdom, this section is able to study the results of a renegotiation
environment analogous to the one that characterizes the London Approach, a widespread practice adopted
by British rms' management to implement the process of debt reorganization with creditors (typically
big banks) out of the court. The London Approach consists in informal negotiations between a distressed
entrepreneur and her lenders and it develops in two distinct phases that closely resemble a Chapter 11: in
the rst, a consortium of investors agree on a \standstill" that relieves the entrepreneur from the obligation
to pay back her debts and in the second parties negotiate on a plan of nancial restructuring.
31This assumption is consistent with the approach followed in Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), which stud-
ies a funding game in which rst period lender has full bargaining power at the contracting and renegotiation
stage, while creditors intervening at the interim stage are left with zero expected surplus.
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even if at the cost of imposing one further assumption on the parameters of the model.
Assumption 3
 > b B > I.
Assumption 3 implies that the payment required at the end of the rst period by the
equilibrium contract does not violate the rst period limited liability constraint, but is bigger
than the initial investment cost, I, thus making bankruptcy a real concern. In the following,
I solve for the optimal contracts under full and limited commitment using Assumption 1 and
Assumption 3.
1.8.1 Optimal Contract with Full Commitment
Lemma 5 presents the equilibrium project choice under the hypothesis of full commitment.
Lemma 5
Denote by CFC;m the equilibrium contract that implements the long-term investment strategy
L under full commitment and monopolistic lending. CFC;m species that:
C
FC;m  fR = b B; b R = b    b Bg; f = 1;0 = 0g:
At CFC;m, lender's utility, denoted V FC;m, is equal to:
V
FC;m = b    b I   I > 0:
Entrepreneur's utility, UFC;m, is equal to . Finally, the lender oers CFC;m to the en-
trepreneur if and only if:
V
FC;m = b    b I   I  S: (1.6)
The project is started if the entrepreneur accepts.
Proof. See Appendix F.
The value generated by project L to the lender is smaller than in the rst best because
of the repeated moral hazard problem. Consequently, while under competitive nancial
markets and full commitment project L is always chosen by the rm if it is implementable,
here it is started only if condition (1:6) holds. In other words, the long-term project may not
be undertaken, even when it is implementable, when implementation becomes too costly.
The rationale for this result is as follows. In Section 1.4, the entrepreneur holds all the
bargaining power and therefore, she is able to fully squeeze the net value of the long-term
project. Instead, here the lender holds the bargaining power and must take into account
entrepreneur's agency rent when assessing long-term project implementability.
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1.8.2 Optimal Contract with Limited Commitment
Under the hypothesis of limited commitment, I study how the possibility to renegotiate the
contract in an environment characterized by the bankruptcy game presented in Sub-section
1.4.1 aects project's choice.
Proposition 3
Under limited commitment and monopolistic lending, the long-run project L cannot be im-
plemented without violating entrepreneur's incentives.
Proof. See Appendix G.
The relaxation of the disciplining role imparted by the refunding decisions, and the
consequent increase of the reward necessary to induce the right incentives, implies that the
entrepreneur would not have incentive to divert rst period prots only if R is set to a nil
value. Clearly, this is not be feasible from the lender's viewpoint, because it would lead to
sure losses.
Overall, the result on short-termism derived under competitive nancial markets is even
reinforced under monopolistic lending: in the competitive benchmark, the long-run project
can be undertaken with limited commitment, provided recovery rates are big enough. In
this case, the project cannot be implemented independently from recovery rates' value.
1.9 Collaterized Loan and Automatic Stay
In this section, I present the results of the contracting and bankruptcy games of Section 1.6,
that is, under limited commitment, when the entrepreneur can pledge collateral, C.32 More
specically, I assume that C consists of entrepreneur's existing non-project-related wealth33
and that it can be seized by the lender in case of rst period project's failure.
The existence of C aects the implementation of the long-term project L dierently
depending on whether the procedure entitles the entrepreneur to invoke the automatic stay
of creditor's claim. If the automatic stay is not contemplated by the bankruptcy law, then
the lender can decide either to seize the collateral or to allow for project's continuation in
bankruptcy. Instead, if protected by the automatic stay, the entrepreneur has the right to
32I follow Tirole (2006), Chapter 4, in the way collateral is modeled.
33More concretely, C may consist of wealth that is too illiquid to be invested directly into the project, but
can be used as collateral, like an entrepreneur's house or rm's stock holdings in other companies.
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enter unilaterally in bankruptcy and the collateral is added to project's continuation value,
so that lender's recovery rates increase.
It has to be remarked that C cannot violate rst period limited liability constraint,
therefore one must have that the following feasibility condition holds: C   R =  I.34
To begin with, consider the case in which the procedure does not prescribe the automatic
stay of lender's claim. Then the lender may decide to seize the collateral instead of continuing
with the rescue phase in bankruptcy, provided the value of the collateral is bigger than
the project's continuation value. Accordingly, the budget constraint would be naturally
tightened. Indeed, the truth-telling constraint could be rewritten as in what follows:
   I + b    b I     C:
Hence, if the entrepreneur is able to raise an amount of collateral that satises the
truth-telling condition and the feasibility condition, project L is chosen at equilibrium. The
intuition is that, by seizing C, the lender can implement a particularly harsh punishment in
case of failure, even harsher than in the full commitment scenario. Remarkably, this type
of lender's conduct in failure states is consistent with the evidence in Franks and Sussman
(2005), which nds that in the presence of highly collaterized debt a senior lender is more
likely to seize the collateral instead of commencing the rescue process.
If the procedure prescribes the automatic stay, then the collateral is used by the en-
trepreneur in addition to the income generated by project's continuation in bankruptcy.
Therefore, in this case, the value of ^ r increases to minfb    b I   b B + C;Ig, so that if the
entrepreneur is able to raise C such that b    b I   b B + C  I and the feasibility condition is
satised, then the truth-telling constraint holds and project L is chosen at equilibrium.
Concluding, in both scenarios collateral increases the scope for the implementation of
the long-term project. However, only in the case without automatic stay the \soft budget
constraint" problem is xed, as in that case the lender is entitled to decide whether to seize
the collateral and stop project continuation independently from the procedure.
Proposition 4
Under limited commitment, collateral facilitates the choice of the long-term project L. However,
the \soft budget constraint" problem is solved thanks to collateral only if the legal procedure does
not prescribe the automatic stay of lender's claim.
34This condition is obtained by substituting into the limited liability constraint the optimal value of R,
which results from a binding lender's participation constraint using the assumption of competitive nancial
markets.
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The result in Proposition 4 is consistent with the ndings in the empirical investigation
by Berger et al. (forthcoming); there the authors document that the use of collateral is
inherently related with lenders' need to x the problems caused by asymmetric information
in the relationship with entrepreneurs. Moreover, the result in Proposition 4 is delivered
by focusing on a lender-borrower couple. The analysis could be enriched by looking at a
model with multiple lenders and analyzing whether the same results would carry over (see
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) and Bergl of et al. (forthcoming) for frameworks with multiple
lenders), but this out of the scope of this Chapter.
1.10 Management Turnover
In this section, I study the eect of the threat of management replacement on the investment
choice. It is presented a game in which the lender can write on the nancial contract signed
at the outset of the game a clause that allows him to substitute the incumbent entrepreneur
in case of bankruptcy. In this framework, the bankruptcy game played by parties at the
intermediate stage is structured as in what follows.
1. The lender searches for a new entrepreneur and decides whether to re the old en-
trepreneur.
2. The entrepreneur in charge searches for new funds on competitive nancial markets.
3. If a new lender is found, this makes an oer to the entrepreneur.
4. In the case of oer acceptance, the old lender must decide either to agree on the
continuation plan or reject it. More specically, such a decision is the outcome of
an ultimatum game in which the old lender has all the bargaining power and makes
a take-it-or-leave-it oer to the agent. This oer species the payo that the lender
requires to allow project continuation and is denoted by ^ r.
5. If the entrepreneur accepts the old lender's oer, the rm continues its activity and the
second period time structure is the same as in case of continuation out of bankruptcy.
Otherwise, the rm is shut down and the entrepreneur is dismissed.
The lender has a clear interest in requiring entrepreneurial turnover in the nancing
contract and then exert the clause if the rst period is claimed to generate a nil payo; this
action is ecient because reintroduces a threat that motivates appropriate behavior from
the entrepreneur in the rst period.
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However, a necessary condition that has to be satised for the turnover clause to restore
eciency is that the new entrepreneur in charge must be able to preserve the value of the rm
in the second period. Indeed, if the net pledgeable income generated by the new management
in the second period would be negative, then, at the interim stage, the lender would not
substitute the old entrepreneur. A condition that may impede a protable turnover in the
case of SMEs is that the old entrepreneur holds a know-how that is crucial for the venture to
be viable.35 Instead, as far as managerial rms are concerned, it is important that the market
for managers is lively enough for the lender to nd a suitable substitute at the bankruptcy
stage.
Proposition 5
Under limited commitment and management turnover, if the pledgeable income generated by the
rm under the new management is positive, then the threat of management substitution leads to
the choice of the long-term project L.
The conclusion of this section is that management turnover has the potential of restoring
an ecient investment choice at the cost of hiring a new entrepreneur/manager that is able
to preserve distressed rm's viability in the second period. This prediction is consistent with
the results of the empirical analysis in Bharath et al. (2007), in which the authors show that
management turnover in Chapter 11 has increased since 1990 and that such an increase has
been accompanied by the decrease of APR violations in Chapter 11.
1.11 Testable Predictions and Policy Recommendations
The rst testable prediction of the paper is that, by worsening the agency problem, \soft"
bankruptcy systems would generate bigger indirect costs.36 In particular, this prediction is
consistent with the evidence in Franks and Sussman (2005). Franks and Sussman (2005)
shows that in the United Kingdom banks commit to a severe stance towards debt renego-
tiations and it is argued that this is done to avoid strategic default. Consistently with this
evidence, in Section 1.6 I have shown that, unless recovery rates are not big enough to allow
for the full recoupment of the outstanding liability, then the entrepreneur would always de-
fault strategically by reporting a nil payo at the end of the rst period. In Section 1.8, it
35See Baird and Rasmussen (2002) for anecdotal evidence on this point.
36In this model, I deal with indirect costs because I show that agency costs paid by investors increase
when the entrepreneur anticipates a lenient bankruptcy procedure. Direct costs, instead, would comprise of
the expenses necessary to carry out the process of reorganization/liquidation. See Senbet and Seward (1995)
for a survey over indirect and direct costs of bankruptcy.
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has been shown that the indirect cost to the lender in terms of strategic default may be even
larger when the bargaining power is on his side, like in the case of the United Kingdom.37
The second and major prediction of the paper regards the eect that the limited com-
mitment problem characterizing \soft" procedures has on ex ante investment choices: more
specically, in my model, agency costs increase to generate a bias for short-termism. Im-
portant evidence to this nding is provided by Qian and Strahan (2007) and John et al.
(2008). The former shows that stronger creditor protection is associated with lower interest
rates and longer term lending, the latter nds that stronger creditor protection triggers more
value-enhancing investments. Interestingly, coherently with my theoretical analysis and re-
sults, John et al. (2008) claims that stronger creditor protection hampers managers' rent
extraction behavior and triggers ecient investment choices.
The main result of the model is also consistent with the evidence provided by several
empirical studies on the pressure exerted by stake-holders on American corporate executives
for the achievement of short-term objectives. More specically, the survey by Poterba and
Summers (1995) shows that American CEOs are perceived to have a time horizon consid-
erably shorter than their competitors in Europe. Also, Poterba and Summers (1995), as
well as Blume et al. (1980), provides an estimate of rms' cut-o rates that substantially
exceeds the real market discount rate. Finally, Corbett (1987) points to the dierence in
funded projects' length to show that Anglo-Saxon corporations are subject to a stronger bias
towards short-termism than their German and Japanese counterparts.
The message conveyed by this Chapter is that it is the joint rights on the entrepreneur's
side (to le unilaterally for bankruptcy, to decide on the rm's restructuring and search
for new funds) that exacerbate agency costs. Consequently, those bankruptcy reforms that
implement a system which limits the capability of the bankrupt entrepreneur to extract
rents from the distressed company during the reorganization phase, like the German one,
should be less aicted by the ineciencies I highlight. This conclusion is also corroborated
by the evidence reported in Bharath et al. (2007), where authors show that management
turnover in Chapter 11 has risen by 65% since 1990 and is observed in 37.7% of reorganization
cases in 2000. Remarkably, such an increase has been accompanied by the reduction of APR
violations in Chapter 11. This piece of evidence bears witnesses to a growing in
uence exerted
by creditors in Chapter 11, at the expenses of the bankrupt management. The section in
which the impact of management substitution on investments is analyzed rationalizes these
37Franks and Sussman (2005) also shows that in the presence of highly collaterized debt a senior lender is
more likely to seize the collateral instead of commencing the rescue process, which is a conduct in line with
the outcome of Section 1.9, the extension of the model with collateral.
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results, showing that tightening the termination threat can reduce the indirect costs of \soft"
bankruptcy.
A further important policy suggestion I put forward is that the phase of rm's restructur-
ing under court's supervision should be designed to make the entrepreneur work to restore
rm's economic viability, because this would alleviate the problem of investments' ine-
ciency. Indeed, I prove that if nancial renegotiation is accompanied by venture's techno-
logical restructuring, then the entrepreneur is more likely to choose the long-term project.
1.12 Conclusion
I employ a model with repeated moral hazard in which an entrepreneur can choose between
a long-term and a short-term project: the former is more valuable than the latter but is
subject to the risk of bankruptcy. Crucially, at the core of the \soft" bankruptcy game I
propose is a renegotiation game that gives to the entrepreneur the right to start a process
of nancial restructuring.
The main insight of the paper is that, under a \soft" procedure, the implementation
of the optimal nancing contract is subject to a problem of \soft budget constraint" for
which the lender is tempted to renegotiate the termination clause and let the entrepreneur
continue if recovery rates increase. In a nutshell, the basic mechanism put forward in the
benchmark bankruptcy game goes as follows. The \soft" bankruptcy procedure is modeled
by requiring the liquidation plan in the nancial contract to be sub-game perfect. Thus,
the lender cannot commit to liquidating the rm after the non-payment of the initial claim
if there is a positive benet to be captured from second period production. This weakens
or eliminates the ability of the contract to solve the moral hazard and truthful revelation
problems embedded in the rst period production and implies that if there is not sucient
rents in the second period it may be optimal for the entrepreneur to select the short-term
project.
I analyze the robustness of the short-termism result, show that it holds in an environment
with monopolistic lending and if the law allows the bankrupt entrepreneur to devise a plan
of technological restructuring (on top of the one of nancial restructuring). In particular,
in the extension with bankruptcy and technological restructuring, bankruptcy allows the
entrepreneur to undertake a process of economic reorganization after a rst period low out-
come. Such low outcome can be caused either by opportunistic behavior or by an adverse,
exogenous shock. The resulting equilibrium features short-termism when the moral hazard
problem is particularly harsh. However, it also features the choice of the ecient investment
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project if the likelihood of the exogenous shock is high enough. I look at a variant of the
main model with collaterized loan, where it is shown that the soft-budget constraint problem
may be alleviated when the entrepreneur can pledge collateral, and at one with management
turnover, where it emerges that by threatening to substitute the incumbent management the
lender can induce the ecient investment choice. The rationale behind both results is that
a new punishment device is introduced into the model that compensates the lender for the
inecacy of the refunding decision.
Although not directly related, this model can be employed to understand the possible
consequences of the rescue plan decided by main western countries to counteract the nancial
crisis that aected the international banking system in the fall of 2008. In an eort to inject
trust in the nancial markets, governments have guaranteed to intervene and protect major
banks against the risk of failure. In this Chapter, I highlight that the likely eect of such a
lenient policy is to increase the pressure exerted by investors for short-run corporate results,
unless it is not accompanied by the turnover of the incumbent management found liable.38
38Particularly suggestive is the following quotation by the United Kingdom Prime Minister Gordon Brown,
commenting on the necessity to introduce stronger regulation concerning banks' management rewarding
schemes: \We are leading the world in sweeping away the old short-term bonus culture of the past and
replacing it with determination that there are no rewards for failure and rewards only for long-term success".
The Guardian, 10th February 2009.
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1.13 Appendix A
In this section, I derive the optimal contract that implements the long-term investment
project L under the assumption of full commitment.
max
fR;b Rgf;0g
   R + (b    b R)




 + 0(b    b R) (TT)
B + 0(b    b R) (IC)
0 (ePC)
R   I + (b R   b I)  0 (lPC)
   R  0 (LL1)
b    b R  0 (LL2)
(;0) 2 f0;1g (FC)
The entrepreneur maximizes her utility subject to three incentive constraints: the truth-
telling constraint (TT), the incentive constraint related to eort provision (IC), and her
participation constraint (ePC). Also, the entrepreneur takes into account the lender's par-
ticipation constraint (lPC), rst and second period limited liability constraints, (LL1) and
(LL2), and the feasibility conditions (FC).
Conditional on project continuation, in the second period, perfect competition drives the
repayment required by the lender to b I, so that b R = b I. This implies that the entrepreneur is
the residual claimant and gets the all net present value generated by the project, which is
equal to b    b I.
The optimal contract is completed by rst period repayment and lender's refunding de-
cisions. First of all, notice that due to Assumption 1:i, the only relevant incentive constraint
is (TT). Then, nancial markets' perfect competition implies that rst period repayment,
R, is equal to I. Finally, the problem can be simplied by setting 0 = 0 and  = 1, the
entrepreneur is not rewarded if she reveals 0, while she is refunded if she reveals : both
simplications improve entrepreneur's incentives, the latter also increases entrepreneur's ex-
pected utility. Therefore, at the equilibrium, constraint (TT) can be rewritten as
   I + b    b I   () b    b I   I  0;
while the lender earns zero prots. Denote by CFC the optimal contract that implements
strategy L. CFC is given by:
C
FC  fR = I; b R = b Ig; f = 1;0 = 0g;
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at which entrepreneur's utility is equal to:
U
FC =    I + b    b I > 0:
In order to implement L, the entrepreneur oers CFC to the lender, and, if b    b I   I  0
and the latter accepts the deal, the project is started. 
1.14 Appendix B
The optimization problem is as in what follows.
max
fR;b Rgf;0g
   R + (b    b R)




 + 0(b    b R)   ^ r (TT)
B + 0(b    b R)   ^ r (IC)
0 (ePC)
R   I + (b R   b I)  0 (lPC)
   R  0 (LL1)
b    b R  0 (LL2)
(;0) 2 f0;1g (FC)
To begin with, ^ r reduces the rent that the entrepreneur obtains when she reveals a nil
payo and the rm is in bankruptcy. Then, two scenarios must be distinguished. If the
entrepreneur reveals , she is not in bankruptcy and, by perfect competition, the required
payment in the second period, b R, is equal to b I.
If the rm is in bankruptcy, the game presented in Sub-section 1.4.1 takes place. More
specically, if the entrepreneur nds a new lender, this makes her an oer at which the
entrepreneur is residual claimant and the new lender breaks even in expectation. Conse-
quently, conditional on oer acceptance, second period expected pledgeable income is equal
to b    b I   b B > 0. However, before the project is implemented, the old lender must agree
on continuation.
The old lender has monopoly power in the ultimatum game with the entrepreneur: he
makes her an oer consisting in the value of ^ r required to allow continuation. In particular,
the initial lender asks at least the minimum value between the pledgeable income of the
project and the value of the outstanding liability, that is, the old lender oers either ^ r >
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minfb   b I   b B;Ig or ^ r = minfb   b I   b B;Ig. In the former case, the lender would implicitly
enforce the ex ante optimal contract, because the entrepreneur would not be able to repay
and parties' payos would be zero at the end of bargaining. In the latter case, the oer is
feasible and would permit the old lender to improve recovery rates.
At the SPE of the bargaining game, the old lender asks for ^ r = minfb    b I   b B;Ig and
the entrepreneur accepts. Consequently, recovery rates increase and the refunding decisions,
f;0g, become ineective (that is,  = 0 = 1). Using the results derived so far, the
truth-telling constraint can be rewritten as:
   I + (b    b I)   + (b    b I)   minfb    b I   b B;Ig;
Hence, one has that:
i: If b    b I   b B < I, project S is chosen by the entrepreneur, because the truth-telling
constraint is not satised.
ii: If b    b I   b B  I, the entrepreneur oers CLC to the lender.
C
LC  fR = I; b R = b I; ^ r = Ig; f = 1;0 = 1g:
Borrower's utility under CLC, denoted ULC, is:
U
LC =    I + b    b I > 0
and the lender breaks even in expectation. Finally, if the lender accepts the oer, project L
is started. 
1.15 Appendix C
The optimization problem follows.
max
fR;b Rgf;0g
[   R + (b    b R)]




[ + 0(b    b R)] (TT)
B (IC)
0 (ePC)
R   I + (b R   b I)  0 (lPC)
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   R  0 (LL1)
b    b R  0 (LL2)
(;0) 2 f0;1g (FC)
First of all, perfect competition on nancial markets implies that the payment required
in the second period is equal to b I. Moreover, as for Lemma 1, the refunding decision in case
of success and no adverse shock is equal to one, while the refunding decision associated to
a nil outcome is equal to zero. Then, lender's zero prot condition implies that rst period
transfer is equal to I=. Consequently, (TT), (IC) and (LL1) can be rewritten, as:
(b    b I)   I  0 (TT)
   I + (b    b I)  B (IC)
   I  0 (LL1)
Denote by CNR the optimal contract that implements strategy L in the case without bankruptcy
and technological restructuring. CNR is given by:
C
NR  fR = R
NR  I=; b R = b Ig; f = 1;0 = 0g;
at which entrepreneur's utility is equal to:
U
NR =    I + (b    b I):
Provided the limited liability condition, the incentive constraint and the truth-telling con-
straint are satised, the entrepreneur oers CNR to the lender, and project L is started
if
   I + (b    b I)  S:

1.16 Appendix D
In this section, I derive the optimal contract that implements the long-run investment project
L in the case with bankruptcy and technological restructuring. The optimization program
is given by
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 + ^ r)   (1   p)R]+
+ (1   )[ p0(Rb
0 + 0^ r0)   (1   p0)R0] + [ + (1   )0](b    b R):
[   p(Rb
 + ^ r)   (1   p)R] + (1   )[ p0(Rb
0 + 0^ r0)   (1   p0)R0] +
+[ + (1   )0](b    b R) 
(
B   p0(Rb




0+0^ r0 K)+(1 p0)R0]+[+(1 )0](b R b I)  I (lPC)
(
Rb
  R0 8(p = 1;p0 = 0); Rb
0  R 8(p0 = 1;p = 0)
R = R0 = R if p = p0 = 0
(IC2)
(
   R  0 R0  0
   Rb
  0 Rb
0  0
(LL1)
b    b R  0 (LL2)
(;0) 2 f0;1g
(p;p0) 2 f0;1g
K is the cost that must be sunk to retrieve the true outcome in bankruptcy and the couple
(p;p0) determines the bankruptcy policy: if pj = 1, with j = ;0, then the contract
requires that the rm is put in bankruptcy and the true outcome is monitored at the cost
K. Rb
, ^ r, Rb
0 and ^ r0 characterize the payments and recovery rates required in bankruptcy
as function of the rst period outcome, while R and R0 denote the payments required out
of bankruptcy.
First of all, I can rewrite the problem setting  = 0 = 1, as in Section 1.6.39
Moreover, all transfers must satisfy rst and second period limited liability conditions.
However, with respect to the problem in Section 1.6, I also need to take into account the set
of incentive compatibility constraints (IC2). These make sure that the transfers required out
of bankruptcy do not depend on the revealed outcome, otherwise the entrepreneur would lie
as to avoid the bigger repayment. Similarly, the payments required in bankruptcy must be
smaller than those out of bankruptcy, otherwise the entrepreneur would report the outcome
that entails a lower repayment.
39In Section 1.6, I prove that, in absence of commitment, the assumption of second period positive pledge-
able income implies that the refunding decisions play no role whatsoever.
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In case a nil outcome is reported, the rm is always put in bankruptcy (p0 = 1), and
verication costs K paid by the lender, because otherwise the entrepreneur would claim to
have zero cash and repay nothing. Conversely, the optimal contract must feature p = 0:
if the outcome is high, the entrepreneur can repay the amount specied in the contract
(provided limited liability is satised).
Then, before solving for the optimal contractual payments, together with the bankruptcy
policy that makes sure that the true outcome is revealed by the entrepreneur, I can make
a number of simplications. By invoking the assumption of perfectly competitive nancial
markets, I can set b R = b I and (lPC) binding, moreover, (LL1) implies that R0 = Rb
0 = 0.
As for ^ r0, in analogy to Section 1.6, this is given by minfb    b I   b B;I + Kg: at the
bargaining game with the entrepreneur, the old lender formulates an oer at which he gets
the minimum between the full value of the project in the second period and the allotment
invested to start the project and verify the true state. Finally, denote by RR = R the value
that solves a binding (lPC).
In what follows, I rst present the case in which recovery rates (net of K) are smaller
than rst period investment's value I, then the one in which recovery rates in bankruptcy
allow to fully recoup I.
Case ^ r0 < I + K
If ^ r0 = b    b I   b B < I + K, the lender breaks even in expectation if:
R
R =
I   (b    b I   b B   K)(1   )

> I:
Using the results I have derived so far, condition (IC1) can be written as:
   I + (b    b I   b B)   (1   )K  B
Denote by CR the optimal contract that implements strategy L in the case with bankruptcy












0 = R0 = 0; b R = b I
o
;
fp = 0;p0 = 1g; f = 1;0 = 1g; f^ r = 0; ^ r0 = b    b I   b Bg:
CR can be implemented if rst period limited liability,
 
I   (b    b I   b B   K)(1   )

;
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and the incentive constraint related to eort provision,
   I + (b    b I   b B)   (1   )K  B;
are satised. Then, borrower's utility, denoted UR, is equal to:
U
R =    I + (b    b I)   K(1   ):
The lender breaks even in expectation. Finally, the entrepreneur oers CR to the lender and
the long-run project L is started if:
   I + (b    b I)   K(1   )  S:
Case ^ r0 = I + K
If ^ r0 = I + K  b    b I   b B, the optimal contract is given by
C
R
s  fR = I;R
b
 = R0 = R
b
0 = 0; b R = b Ig;
fp = 0;p0 = 1g; f = 1;0 = 1g; f^ r = 0; ^ r0 = I + Kg:
CR
s can be implemented if the incentive constraint related to eort provision,
( + K)  B;
is satised. Then, borrower's utility, denoted UR
s , is equal to:
U
R
s =    I + (b    b I)   (1   )K:
and the lender breaks even in expectation. Finally, the entrepreneur oers CR
s to the lender,
and the long-run project L is started if:
   (1   )K + (b    b I   I)  S:

1.17 Appendix E
In this section, I want to show that in a non-empty range of values of , the implementation
of the long-run project is put at risk by renegotiation in bankruptcy.
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First of all, by using restrictions (a) (c), one can easily show that NR
LL = NR
TT = 1=2 >
R
LL. In other words, the truth-telling constraint and the limited liability condition hold in
the case with \tough" bankruptcy, as well as the limited liability condition in the case with
\soft" bankruptcy and restructuring. Then, the only relevant conditions are the incentive
constraints.
The value of NR
IC and R
IC lies above 1=2 under the conditions set up in Corollary 1.
Indeed, if  < 2B, then NR
IC > 1=2 and R

















Solving for such inequality, one has that:
2(B + =2) + 2(K    + B) > ( + K)(B + =2) )
2(K    + B) > (K   )(B + =2) )
(   K)(B + =2) > 2(   K)   2B )
(   K)(3=2   B) < 2B )
(3=2   3B) < K(3=2   B)
The left-hand side of the last inequality is negative if  < 2B, which completes the proof of
Corollary 1. 
1.18 Appendix F
In this section, I derive the optimal contract that implements the long-run investment project
L under the assumption of full commitment and monopolistic lending.
max
fR;b Rgf;0g
R   I + (b R   b I)




 + 0(b    b R) (TT)
B + 0(b    b R) (IC)
0 (ePC)
R   I + (b R   b I)  0 (lPC)
   R  0 (LL1)
40Also, NR
IC < 1 (given that  > B by Assumption 1), while R
IC may be bigger than 1 if  < 4B=3.
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b    b R  0 (LL2)
(;0) 2 f0;1g (FC)
If the entrepreneur is solvent in the rst period, in the second period the lender rewards
her with b B, as to induce eort and extract b R   b I = b    b I   b B. Conversely, if insolvent in
the rst period, the entrepreneur is put in liquidation.
By Assumption 1:i, the only relevant incentive constraint is (TT), moreover, this con-
straint is binding at equilibrium, otherwise the lender could always protably increase R
without violating (TT). As in Appendix A, then, one can set 0 = 0 and  = 1 and
consequently have that R = b B > I. The optimal contract, denoted CFC;m, follows:
C
FC;m  fR = b B; b R = b    b Bg; f = 1;0 = 0g:
Lender's utility, given by project L pledgeable income, and denoted by V FC;m, is equal
to:
V
FC;m = b    b I   I > 0:
Entrepreneur's utility, UFC;m, amounts to . Therefore, at equilibrium, if V FC;m >
S the lender oers CFC;m to the entrepreneur and the long-term project is started if the
entrepreneur accepts. 
1.19 Appendix G
The optimization problem is the same as in Lemma 5. If the entrepreneur is solvent at the
end of the rst period, the reward that the old lender promises to the entrepreneur in the
second period is equal to b B. In this way, he induces eort and generates b   b I   b B. In case
of bankruptcy, instead, the renegotiation game presented in Sub-section 1.4.1 takes place.
If the entrepreneur nds a new lender, the assumption of competitive nancial markets
in the renegotiation phase drives new lenders' expected surplus to zero, while makes the
entrepreneur the residual claimant. Therefore, second period expected pledgeable income in
bankruptcy is the same as out of bankruptcy and equal to b    b B   b I > 0.
Before the project is implemented, the old investor must agree on continuation. The old
lender has monopoly power in the ultimatum game with the agent and makes an oer to
the rm consisting in the value of ^ r required to allow continuation. More specically, the
old lender can oer either ^ r > b    b I   b B or ^ r = b    b I   b B. In the former case, the lender
would implicitly enforce the ex ante optimal contract, because the entrepreneur would not
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be able to repay. In the latter case, the oer is feasible and would permit the old lender to
improve recovery rates. At the SPE of this game, the old lender asks for ^ r = b    b B   b I,
which is what he would have been able to extract from the project in case of refunding, and
the entrepreneur accepts. Consequently, the refunding decisions, f;0g, become ineective




R   I + b    b I   b B
   R + b B =  + b B (TT)
R   I + b    b I   b B  0 (lPC)
   R  0 (LL1)
Clearly, a binding (TT) is violated at any strictly positive value of the rst period repay-
ment, R. 
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Figure 1.2: Model with \Soft" Bankruptcy and Restructuring, Cash Flows
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Technology Adoption in Standard
Setting Organizations:
A Model of Exclusion with
Complementary Inputs and Hold-up
2.1 Introduction
Voluntary Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) are consortia of industry operators de-
voted to the achievement of an agreement on the rules that dene the design of a nal
product or process. The theoretical literature has recently increased its attention towards
the functioning of standard setting bodies (see Lerner and Tirole (2006), Choi et al. (2007),
and Farrell and Simcoe (2009)), and the empirical work by Rysman and Simcoe (2008) con-
rms their relevance by showing that they play a crucial role in leading to a bandwagon
process among adopters.1
The SSOs tend to emphasize the consensus that would characterize their decisions. How-
ever, strategic considerations among their participants can be intense and several pieces of
evidence show that strong competitive tensions in
uence the procedure of standard choice,
eventually leading to judicial disputes. These disputes mainly arise from the con
icting in-
terests that operators with dierent business structures try to put forward in the process of
standard certication (see Sherry and Teece (2003), DeLacey et al. (2006), Feldman et al.
1Rysman and Simcoe (2008) documents that patents disclosed in SSOs receive up to twice as many
citations as other patents in the same sector.
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(2009) and Schmalensee (2009)).
This Chapter focuses on the con
ict between two categories of rms: vertically integrated
operators (like IBM and Nokia), which dominate many standard setting consortia, and
pure developers of new technologies (like Rambus and Qualcomm). These rms participate
to SSOs with strikingly dierent objectives. Integrated organizations mostly aim at the
important economic benets that derive from coordination among industry participants.
Consequently, they have a clear interest in paying low rates for standard's technologies while
competing on the product market. Instead, IPR developers raise most of their revenue
from the technology licensing market. They are primarily interested in having a patented
technology into a new standard, because this can help them raise a long stream of licensing
revenue.
I propose a framework to analyze the incentives that rms in SSOs have to employ
patented technologies into their production process. The issue is addressed by studying how
market competition and licensing decisions interact with technology adoption. Consequently,
the model encompasses two markets: the technology licensing market (or upstream market)
and the product market (or downstream market). Moreover, I conduct a welfare analysis to
assess the adoption choices that would maximize total welfare.
The game involves two vertically integrated rms and a pure upstream rm. Each rm
holds a patented technology; the rst vertically integrated rm holds an \essential" tech-
nology, whilst the second integrated rm holds a technology that competes with the one
of the upstream rm for the employment in the production of a nal good. To make the
con
ict between these two rms more interesting, it is assumed that the technology of the
pure innovator is more ecient.
I do not impose that the use of the same bundle of inputs, or technology platform, is
mandatory to industry's participants. Thus, two types of scenario can arise from the adop-
tion decision: either operators agree on the employment of the same platform (\technology
standard" case), or they decide to use dierent platforms (\competing platforms" case). The
latter outcome captures a situation in which the standardization eort fails and is far from
being purely theoretical, because multiple technologies can coexist, for instance, when users'
network externalities are not particularly strong.2
Like in most SSOs, in the model licensing takes place after the adoption of a certain
technology by industry's operators in their production process; thus a standard hold-up
problem arises. To x the contractual ineciency caused by the hold-up problem, vertically
2An important example is the wireless telephony, where handsets based on dierent chips' technologies
are marketed (Gandal et al. (2003)).
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integrated rms can exchange respective technologies by signing cross-licensing agreements.
However, these deals are not possible with the pure upstream rm, because it is not active
on the product market. Accordingly, the results of the welfare analysis are aected by the
balance between the eciency of the upstream rm's technology and the ineciency that
characterizes its licensing contracts.
The trade-o that determines manufacturers' choice to use the technology of the stand-
alone rm and the outcome of the welfare analysis is as in what follows. On the one hand, the
employment of the independent upstream rm's input allows integrated companies to use a
more ecient technology for the production of the nal good. On the other hand, it allows the
stand-alone rm to exploit monopoly bargaining power over its patented technology (because
of the hold-up problem).
The model delivers the pattern of integrated rms' technology adoption as function of two
parameters: the one that measures the eciency of the independent licensor's technology
and the one that captures the cost-savings generated by SSO's support of a unique standard.
More specically, if the benets generated by standardization are large, then vertically inte-
grated rms cross-license their own patents, adopt a common technology standard and forgo
the independent rm's input eciency. Instead, the smaller are the standardization benets
(and the more is the specialized rm ecient), the more likely is that an equilibrium with
competing platforms emerges on the product market.3
The intuition is simple and has to do with the balancing of the two forces in the trade-o
above: as the advantages from having a standard increase, the integrated companies have a
growing interest in signing an agreement that allows them to share respective rents. Instead,
as the advantages from having a standard decrease, the benets of using the specialized
rm's technology become relatively more important, up to overcome the hold-up problem.
Under the welfare point of view, I show that the trade-o between the productive e-
ciency of the upstream rm technology and the contractual eciency of cross-licensing may
give rise to an inecient market outcome: this happens when integrated operators choose
a standard with their own techs although a social planner would adopt a standard with the
vertically-specialized rm technology.
Three main assumptions are made concerning the composition and the functioning of the
ideal certication body. The rst assumption is that two vertically integrated rms and one
3Also Cabral and Salant (2009) and Farrell and Simcoe (2009) show that a scenario with competing plat-
forms can arise at equilibrium, although their analysis is based on dierent underpinnings. More specically,
Cabral and Salant (2009) argues that a unique standard causes a problem of free-riding that reduces the
incentives to invest on R&D with respect to a market structure with competing technologies, whereas in
Farrell and Simcoe (2009) competing standards are the outcome of a war of attrition.
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upstream rm populate the representative organization. A framework with a majority of
vertically integrated entities is able to capture the con
ict between integrated rms and pure
innovators. Moreover, it is able to replicate SSOs' environment in several situations and in
particular in two antitrust cases that have been for a long time under the scrutiny of antitrust
authorities in the US and Europe: the FTC v. Rambus case and the EC v. Qualcomm
case. In both cases major vertically integrated rms were among the plaintis and accused
upstream developers of keeping a misleading conduct during the phase of standard denition.
The second assumption is that it is vertically integrated rms that decide which technolo-
gies are included into the standard. This modeling choice is based on the evidence arising
from the SSOs operating in the information and communications technology sector, where
vertical integration is a pervasive phenomenon. Standardization bodies in this industry are
commonly founded by manufacturers with the intent of controlling the development of a
particular technology and avoid mis-coordination among vendors.4 Clearly, being in the
pool of founding members allows these rms to play a crucial role in the phase of standard
denition.
Further evidence regarding manufacturers' decision power arises from the two organiza-
tions involved in the Qualcomm and Rambus cases mentioned above. Gandal et al. (2003)
remarks that in ETSI, the SSO of the Qualcomm case, the voting rule allowed even a small mi-
nority of operators to impose the adoption of their favorite standard conguration.5 JEDEC,
the SSO of the Rambus case, was mostly composed by vertically integrated manufacturers
that, consequently, could strongly in
uence the composition of a standard.6
The third assumption is that licensing negotiations take place after downstream manufac-
turers choice and adoption of a specic technology, in compliance with most of the standard
denition processes undertaken in technology certication consortia.7 The main implication
4Updegrove (1993) provides a detailed analysis of the strategic motivations that lead manufacturers to
push for the formation of standardization consortia. Blind and Thumm (2004) documents that technology-
users, rather than technology-developers, are in the majority in formal standardization processes. Also, Blind
and Thumm (2004) provides an empirical analysis of the incentives behind patenting and participation to
standardization decisions that conrms the con
ict between the business models of large companies and
small technology-developers.
5Indeed, ETSI rules required a majority of 71 percent for standard approval but with a voting weighting
system based on European turnover; this favored European producers, and many of these were vertically
integrated (for example, Nokia and Sony-Ericsson were in ETSI).
6The evidence gathered by the FTC in the Rambus case bears witness to the vast presence of integrated
rms in JEDEC (In the Matter of Rambus Inc., Docket No. 9302).
7A remarkable exception is VITA, which switched in 2006 to a policy that requires the owners of patented
technologies to disclose the maximum royalty rates and provide binding written license declarations at several
Tarantino, Emanuele (2010), Three Essays in Industrial Organization and Corporate Finance 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/230622.1. INTRODUCTION 55
of this assumption is that licensing rms whose technology has been employed have full
monopoly power on the determination of the royalty rate (which gives rise to the hold-up
problem).
An important impediment to the implementation of an ex-ante licensing policy is the risk
that SSOs' participants undertake anticompetitive coordinated practices, which would be
punished by antitrust authorities. In an extension to the basic model, I analyze the optimal
technology choice by using a negotiation environment that fullls with the implementation of
FRAND agreements' reasonableness requirement.8 In other words, there I assume that the
holders of substitute patents compete for the employment by producers and set royalty rates
before manufacturers commit to the adoption of a specic technology. The result is that
early licensing decisions induce integrated companies to design the standard more eciently.
The game is solved by assuming that active licensors sell technologies by means of royalty
rates. Indeed, Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2008) documents that linear royalties are used by a
vast majority of patent pools' members to license-out their technology. Under linear pricing,
licensing decisions are in
uenced by two strategic eects, the Cournot eect and the raising
rival's costs eect,9 whose impact is discussed in the analysis of the adoption cases.
To assess the robustness of the main results to the assumption on the contractual form,
I solve the model under two-part taris, in which case manufacturers' technology adoption
choices only depend on the hold-up problem. Indeed, two-part taris contracts are not
aected by the Cournot eect and the double marginalization problem (implying that they
are more ecient than royalty rates).10 In analogy to the setting with linear pricing, the
result of the game with two-part taris is that if the standardization advantages are large,
specied points during the standard development process.
8The licensors that participate to SSOs are often required to commit to license their technologies on
Fair Reasonable And Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms in case of adoption by manufacturers. A patent
holder commitment to license to any interested party on FRAND terms implies that each licensee can obtain
a license at the royalty rate established by the patent holder and is not put in comparative disadvantage
with respect to other licensees. Choi et al. (2007) provides a survey of the SSOs that require rms to comply
with FRAND agreements.
9The former eect is caused by the complementarity between the technologies required to produce the
nal good. Indeed, when pricing their technology independently licensors do not take into account the
negative externality they exert on downstream rms (Cournot (1838)). The latter eect is related to the
incentive that the downstream competing vertically integrated rms have to increase their rivals' costs as to
push them out of the market (Salop and Scheman (1983, 1987)).
10Wang (1998) compares the protability of licensing contracts with linear royalties and xed fees for a
monopolist licensor that also competes in a downstream duopoly. Although my work shares some analogies
with Wang (1998), I am not interested in the optimality of the type of licensing contracts but rather in
whether producers' optimal technology choice changes with the type of licensing contract.
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then integrated rms adopt their technologies into the standard and cross-license respective
patents. Otherwise, competing platforms are employed. Finally, the inecient exclusion of
the pure innovator arises also in the framework with two-part taris.
2.2 Policy Implications and Discussion of the Results
The main policy implication of the model is that cross-licensing agreements may be inecient.
Scholars in the law and economics literature have often stressed the benecial role of cross-
licensing on the level of royalty rates (e.g., Shapiro (2001)). However, it has been overlooked
that cross-licensing may also lead to the exclusion of the enterprises that are not in the
position to participate to cooperative licensing agreements (like pure innovators), and such
exclusionary practice would be welfare-detrimental if pure innovators are more ecient. The
implication is that, if the technology of an excluded upstream rm is ascertained to be
superior,11 then antitrust authorities should cautiously assess a defense argument based on
the pro-ecient eects of cross-licensing by integrated organizations.
Under the normative point of view, the model suggests that standard setting consortia
should adopt a policy of early-licensing commitments to kill the hold-up problem and allow
integrated companies to design the standard eciently. This result provides an argument
in support of the idea that SSOs' participants should be left free to discuss the royalties
on patented technologies before a specic standard conguration has been decided. So
far, this kind of policy has received a timid support by SSOs (as well as little attention
by the theoretical literature), especially because of members' fear of antitrust authorities'
intervention. My model shows that competition agencies should also be concerned by the
possibility that late licensing decisions would lead to inecient market outcomes.
The model also delivers two clear and intuitive testable predictions regarding the pattern
of SSOs' technology adoption choices. An SSO dominated by integrated rms is expected to
sponsor a technology standard if standardization's benets are strong. For example, this result
is consistent with the employment of the IEEE 802.11n Wi-Fi protocol as industry standard.
The IEEE 802.11n protocol is the standard for wireless communications among electronic
devices (like laptops, smart-phones and PDAs); clearly, had con
icting protocols emerged on
the marketplace, the important network externalities generated by a standardized technology
for wireless communications would have not been exploited and the diusion of the same
technology would have been seriously inhibited. This clearly provided manufacturers with
11The technical studies carried out by the FTC in the Rambus case provide a clear example of the
techniques that can be used to establish technological eciency.
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the right incentives to achieve coordination.
If standardization is less eective in terms of scale economies, either in production or in
demand, then the model predicts that manufacturers' standardization eort is more likely to
fail, leading to competing technology platforms. This result is consistent with the evidence
in the telecommunications industry, where, as documented by Gandal et al. (2003), the
CDMA2000 and the WCDMA (or UMTS) technologies, two incompatible platforms, do
coexist on the market.
The CDMA2000 is employed on the US market and is an upgrade of the CDMA tech-
nology; moreover, both the CDMA and the CDMA2000 have been developed by Qualcomm
(a pure innovator). The WCDMA was adopted by ETSI, an SSO dominated by integrated
companies that decides on technology standardization in the European telecommunications
industry. The WCDMA is a variation of the CDMA2000 platform that is largely incompati-
ble with it. As claried by Cabral and Salant (2009), the incompatibility between CDMA2000
and WCDMA implies that chipsets meant to work on one platform would not easily work on
the other one. However, from the point of view of a user in this industry the costs of multiple
incompatible standards are insignicant, because universal access to each other handset is
not threatened by incompatibility; this implies that network eects (if any) are not hindered
by manufacturers' mis-coordination.
The Chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.3 compares my ndings with those estab-
lished in related works. Section 2.4 presents the model, Section 2.5 solves the game under
contracts with linear royalties and Section 2.6 studies the impact of a policy of early-licensing
commitments on adoption choices. In Section 2.7, I analyze technology adoption under dif-
ferent specications of model's framework and in Section 2.8, I test the robustness of the
results by employing two-part taris contracts. Finally, Section 2.9 concludes.
2.3 Related Literature
This Chapter analyzes the scope for \exclusionary eects" in the choice of a technology
platform by looking at how technology adoption interacts with licensing decisions and prod-
uct market competition. In Schmidt (2008) and Schmalensee (2009) it is investigated the
interdependence of pricing decisions between upstream innovators, downstream producers
and integrated entities, however they do not analyze technology adoption and do not study
the extent to which cross-licensing can lead to upstream (inecient) exclusion.12
12Schmalensee (2009) focuses on the analysis of the strategic pricing decisions taken by integrated rms
and vertically-specialized operators, and then on the pricing schemes that may solve the hold-up problem.
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The mechanism for which the stand-alone rm is excluded from the standard shares
some analogies with the one in Bernheim and Whinston (1998) and Segal and Whinston
(2000), where contracting externalities may give rise to anticompetitive outcomes. Indeed,
in my model, the independent rm's tech is not employed because of the externality exerted
on the holder of the essential technology (rm 1 in the model) by the bias in favor of cross-
licensing of the other integrated rm (rm 2), and by the fact that the upstream rm does
not participate to the adoption decision.13
Bloch (1995) studies a problem of coalition formation by using a model in which the
initiator of an association proposes a cooperative agreement to his product-market competi-
tors. The equilibrium of the model is one where coordination eorts fail, because competing
associations always form. My model diers from Bloch (1995) insofar as I provide an anal-
ysis of the technology choice adopted by a given organization and the welfare consequences
associated with it.
The article is also related to the literature on patent pools' formation. Lerner and Ti-
role (2004) studies an all-or-nothing patent pool formation problem. In that paper, it is
developed a framework in which the degree of patents' complementarity is the equilibrium
outcome of a game in which licensing decisions are constrained either by demand forces or
strategic forces. Instead, I am interested in the analysis of the con
icts between holders
of competing technologies for a given degree of complementarity, to understand whether
inecient holdouts may arise at equilibrium.
Finally, the contribution of the Chapter to the literature on vertical integration is twofold:
the rst consists in analyzing the incentive that vertically integrated rms have to exclude
an independent rm that operates on the upstream market if inputs are complementary and
because of the danger of hold-up, instead the received literature has typically focused on
settings with substitute intermediate goods (see Rey and Tirole (2007)). The second con-
sists in investigating whether cross-licensing can cause inecient exclusion on the upstream
market.14
Schmidt (2008) proves that, compared to a situation in which only vertically integrated rms are active, the
presence of pure upstream innovators triggers royalty rates' and nal output's decrease: this result is driven
by the incentive that vertically integrated rms have to raise the cost of the inputs sold to downstream
rivals (the \raising rival's cots" problem). Schmidt (2008) concludes that cross-licensing agreements between
vertically integrated rms can alleviate this problem.
13Indeed, could the upstream rm compensate rm 2 for the prot loss suered when the latter does not
cross-license with rm 1, then the adoption of the stand-alone rm's technology would emerge as technology
standard.
14Most of the economic literature on licensing has studied the anticompetitive eects imparted by upstream
pricing decisions on the downstream market. More specically, Rey and Salant (2009) analyzes the impact
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2.4 The Model
There are 3 rms: rm 1 and rm 2 are vertically integrated, rm 3 is a stand-alone upstream
rm. Each rm owns a patented technology, indexed by : two of them are substitute, namely
technologies 2 and 3, the third, 1, is perfect complement to the other two.
Upstream rms bear a nil marginal cost and can choose among two pricing schemes
to license out their technology: independent licensing or cross-licensing. Cross-licensing is
modeled by assuming that active licensors maximize joint prots, moreover cross-licensing
can only take place between vertically integrated rms because rm 3 does not operate
downstream.
To produce the nal good each manufacturer needs 1 and only one between 2 and 3.
This assumption limits the scope of the analysis to two alternative platforms, P(1;2) and
P(1;3), and makes the con
ict between 2 and 3 more compelling. The framework of the
model is given in Figure 3.1.
[FIGURE 3.1 ABOUT HERE]
Downstream, vertically integrated rms compete in quantities and produce an homo-
geneous good. The choice between P(1;2) and P(1;3) is taken by manufacturers in a
non-cooperative manner, by comparing own prots under dierent platform specications.
More specically, four cases are possible: two in which both integrated rms employ the
same inputs, so that a technology standard (S) arises, and two in which they employ dier-
ent inputs, so that two competing platforms (CP) coexist on the marketplace.
The technology adoption choice aects the value of the marginal cost of production.
Indeed, nal good's production process requires the payment of a marginal cost c 2 (0;1)
on top of the fees paid to acquire upstream inputs. However, if manufacturers adopt the
same platform, or standard, then they pay a marginal cost equal to c, with  2 (0;1).15
Furthermore, technology 3 is superior to technology 2; indeed, if a rm uses 3 instead of 2,
then its marginal cost is discounted by  2 (0;1).
of alternative licensing policies by owners of essential IPRs on downstream competition. Lin (1996) shows
that rms can use xed fee licensing agreements to collude on the product market. Analogously, Eswaran
(1994) proves that cross-licensing constitutes a device that facilitates collusion among downstream horizontal
competitors.
15This formalization can be interpreted as a reduced form of a richer model where joint adoption leads to
scale economies, either in production or in demand.
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1c + (1   1)c if rm i adopts P(1;2)
1c + (1   1)c if rm i adopts P(1;3)
With i = 1;2 and 1 being an indicator function given by:
1 =
(
1 if a standard (S) is chosen
0 if two competing platforms (CP) are chosen
[TABLE 2.1 ABOUT HERE]
Consumers have inverse demand P(Q), where Q is the total industry output. Assume
for simplicity that P(Q) is linear and given by maxf0;1 Qg. Demand linearity makes sure
that the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the game exists and is unique.
Finally, side payments are not allowed in this model. Side payments would take the form
of conditional contracts in which parties specify before the adoption of a technology what
type of transfers they would carry out depending on the same choice. Agreements of this sort
can be ruled out invoking the following sorts of argument. First of all, having a contingent
nature the parties may be tempted to renegotiate them ex post. Secondly, rational agents
may design them to collude on the product market, so that, like other forms of horizontal
agreements, they are typically treated as per se unlawful by antitrust authorities.
2.5 Linear Pricing: Equilibrium analysis
In this section, the results of the analysis carried out assuming that rms set licensing
agreements by means of linear pricing and public contracts are presented.
In what follows, wjk indicates the royalty rate set by rm j to rm k, with j;k = 1;2
and j 6= k. Instead, w31 = w32 = w3 is the fee set by rm 3 to both 1 and 2; in other words,
rm 3 cannot discriminate among downstream rms.16 Finally, rm 1 (rm 2) internalizes
the cost of using 1 (2) in the production process.
The timing of the game follows.
1. Technology Choice Stage: downstream rms choose a production technology and sink
a xed investment cost equal to I.
16This hypothesis is consistent with the non-discriminatory requirement that rms in SSOs must comply
with when agreeing on FRAND commitments. In Section 2.7, I show that if one would relax this assumption
the main results of the model still go through.
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2. Pricing Scheme and Royalty Setting Stage: upstream rms whose technology is adopted
downstream choose the pricing scheme (independent licensing/cross-licensing) and the
royalty rate. Consequently, each downstream rm decides whether to pay the royalty
rate (and produce) or give up production.
3. Product Market Competition Stage: active rms set quantities.
By sinking I, the downstream units commit to rm-specic investments and set up the
equipment necessary to carry out nal good's production. In what follows, it is assumed that
the xed cost I is big enough to make the technology choice irreversible once the licensing
stage is reached and let the hold-up problem arise.
The model is solved by backward induction and the equilibrium concept employed is
the Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPE). I rst present the two frameworks in which
vertically integrated rms jointly employ P(1;2) or P(1;3), i.e. the cases in which a
standard arises as outcome of the technology adoption phase. I denote these two cases as
S2 and S3, respectively. Then, I discuss the scenarios that feature the adoption of two
competing platforms: the one in which rm 1 adopts P(1;3) and rm 2 adopts P(1;2),
which is denoted by CP32, and the one in which rm 1 adopts P(1;2) and rm 2 adopts
P(1;3), denoted by CP23.
The analysis will be conducted under the following parametric assumption:
Assumption 4
 >  (c)  maxf0;(7c   3)=4cg.
Assumption 4 implies that in the cases with competing platforms the dierence between
the marginal costs borne by producers is small enough. Consequently, if market monopo-
lization arises at equilibrium it is not due to the cost savings generated by the employment
of 3, the pure upstream rm's technology.
2.5.1 Adoption of P(1;2) as Technology Standard- \S2"
To begin with, I derive the optimal quantities set by rm 1 and rm 2 for given royalties,
then I compute the equilibrium royalty rates.
At the competition stage, each downstream rm maximizes:
max
qj0
j = [1   qj   qk   wkj   c]qj + qkwjk
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With j;k=1,2, j 6= k. The equilibrium is characterized by:
8
> > > > > > > <












At this stage, two sub-cases must be distinguished: the one in which rm 1 and rm
2 license their technologies independently (independent licensing) and the one in which
licensing decisions are taken cooperatively (cross-licensing).
Independent Licensing
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@qS2
j
@wjk | {z }












wjk = 0: (2.2)
If rm j raises wjk it trades o the higher revenue generated downstream (partly due to
the raising rival's costs eect) with the lower upstream revenue caused by rm k's output
contraction downstream. Linearity leads to:
wjk(wkj) =
5(1   c)   wkj
10





21 = 5(1   c)=11:
Plugging this value in (2.1), under the joint employment of P(1;2) and independent
licensing one has the results in Table 2.2. In particular, active rms' prots are equal to S2
1 =
S2
2 = 14(1   c)2=121 and the consumer surplus is given by CS = Q2=2 = 8(1   c)2=121.
[TABLE 2.2 ABOUT HERE]
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At the licensing equilibrium of the game in which vertically integrated rms price their
technologies non cooperatively, royalties are determined by two eects: the Cournot eect
and the raising rival's costs eect. The former is caused by the complementarity between the
technologies in the standard and the latter is due to the fact that both vertically integrated
rms act as monopoly inputs' providers to their product market's rival.
Cross-licensing
Cross-licensing is modeled in the following way. Vertically integrated rms maximize joint
prots by setting a royalty rate WCL = w12 + w21 that implements the monopoly outcome
on the product market.
Using QS2 from (2.1), upstream rms solve:17
Q
S2(WCL) =











Then, symmetry leads to wS2
12 = wS2
21 = W S2
CL=2 = (1   c)=4.
Cross-licensing allows rms to x the raising rival's costs and double marginalization
eects bringing royalties down to the monopoly level (W S2
CL=2 = (1   cJ)=4 < wS2
jk = 5(1  
cJ)=11). Downstream rms split the monopoly's prot and raise S2 = (1   cJ)2=8 each.
Moreover, the consumer surplus is equal to CS = Q2=2 = (1   c)2=8 > 8(1   c)2=121, so
that cross-licensing is benecial to consumers as well.
Comparing the results in Table 2.2, it is clear that the equilibrium licensing scheme when
vertically integrated rms jointly adopt a standard with technology 1 and technology 2 is
cross-licensing. Indeed, each rm strictly prefers the cooperative agreement to the non-
cooperative one, as S2
j = 14(1   cJ)2=121 < (1   cJ)2=8 = S2.
2.5.2 Adoption of P(1;3) as Technology Standard - \S3"
If vertically integrated rms adopt a standard that displays technology 1 and technology
3, then both benet from the greater eciency of 3. Moreover, rms are asymmetric at
the upstream level, because rm 2 does not license its technology downstream and needs
17Analogously, one can show that the same result holds by explicitly solving for the maximization problem






2 = [1   QS2(WCL)   c]QS2:
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to acquire externally 1 and 3. Finally, licensing rms 1 and 3 cannot cross-license their
technologies, because rm 3 does not operate downstream.
At the product market competition stage, rm 1 solves:
max
q10




2 = [1   q1   q2   w3   w12   c]q2:
The results at equilibrium are:
8
> > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > :
qS3
1 (w12;w3) = 1 c w3+w12
3
qS3














S3(w12;w3))   w3   c]q
S3
1 (w12;w3) + q
S3
2 (w12;w3)w12:























The optimal value of w12 is determined by the tradeo triggered by an higher royalty
rate on downstream and upstream revenues. More specically, the rst term is related to
the raising rival's costs eect, it is positive and acts only at the expenses of rm 2.
Invoking linearity, rm 1 upstream reaction function is equal to:
w12(w3) =
1   w3   c
2
: (2.4)
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Clearly, the raising rival's costs eect does not play any role for rm 3, because it does
not operate on the product market. Using linearity, one nds that the reaction function of
rm 3 is given by:
w3(w12) =
2(1   c)   w12
4
: (2.5)














Table 2.3 summarizes the results of this section. In particular, S3
3 = 6(1   c)2=49 >
S3
1 = 4(1   c)2=49 > S3
2 = 0 and the consumer surplus is equal to CS = Q2=2 =
2(1   c)2=49.
[TABLE 2.3 ABOUT HERE]
The equilibrium of the game in which rm 1 and rm 3 price their technologies non
cooperatively features a monopoly of rm 1 downstream. This is because, with respect to
the case of joint adoption of P(1;2), rm 2 loses a device to face rm 1 competition on the
product market (namely, the possibility to price an input of rm 1).
2.5.3 Competing Platforms: rm 1 uses P(1;3) and rm 2 uses
P(1;2) - \CP32"
At the product market competition stage, rm 1 solves:
max
q10




2 = [1   q1   q2   w12   c]q2:
Firm 2 employs its own technology, then the marginal cost it pays is equal to c. Instead,
Firm 1 employes 3, thus the marginal cost c is discounted by the parameter . The reduced
form equilibrium results associated with the maximization problems above are given in the
following.
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8
> > > > > > > > > > > <





















1 = [1   Q
CP32(w12;w3)   w3   c]q
CP32
1 (w12;w3) + q
CP32
2 (w12;w3)w12




= [1   Q
















Firm 1 takes into account the fact that by raising the value of w12 it can exert a negative
externality on rm 2 and reduce its product market share. By linearity, rm 1 upstream
reaction function is equal to:
w12(w3) =
5   c(4 + )   w3
10
: (2.8)


















In this case, rm 3 can exert its monopoly power only at expenses of rm 1 because rm
2 employs its own technology. Using linearity, one nds that the reaction function of rm 3
is equal to:
w3(w12) =
1   c(2   1) + w12
4
: (2.9)
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The expressions in (2.10) must be employed in (2.7) to compute rms' payos. The
results of this section are in Table 2.4 .
[TABLE 2.4 ABOUT HERE]
Remarkably, under Assumption 4 rm 2 produces a positive amount on the market
for the nal good; this is because, by using 2 instead of 3, rm 2 is not sti
ed by the
raising rival's costs eect and it is only rm 1 to be held-up by rm 3. More specically,
if  2 [ (c);(9c + 2)=11c), then qCP32
1 > qCP32




2.5.4 Competing Platforms: rm 1 uses P(1;2) and rm 2 uses
P(1;3) - \CP23"
To start with, it is important to stress that this scenario does not emerge as Nash equilib-
rium of the adoption game in the linear pricing case and is here presented for the sake of
completeness.
At the product market competition stage, rm 1 solves:
max
q10




2 = [1   q1   q2   w3   w12   c]q2 + q1w21:
The reduced form equilibrium results of the maximization problems above are as in what
follows:
8
> > > > > > > > > > > <




















1 = [1   QCP23(w12;w21;w3)   w21   c]qCP23
1 (w12;w21;w3) + qCP23
2 (w12;w21;w3)w12:
Tarantino, Emanuele (2010), Three Essays in Industrial Organization and Corporate Finance 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/2306268 CHAPTER 2. EXCLUSION WITH COMPLEMENTARY INPUTS AND HOLD-UP




= [1   Q
















Using linearity, rm 1 upstream reaction function is equal to:
w12(w21;w3) =
5   c(1 + 4)   4w3   w21
10
: (2.12)
Dierently from case CP32, in case CP23 rm 2 licenses 2 to rm 1. In particular, rm




2 = [1   QCP23(w12;w21;w3)   w12   w3   c]qCP23
2 (w12;w21;w3) + qCP23
1 (w12;w21;w3)w21:




= [1   Q
















Thus, in this case the royalty rates of both rm 1 and rm 2 are in
uenced by the raising
rival's costs eect. The reaction function of rm 2 is given by:
w21(w12;w21;w3) =
5   c( + 4)   w3   w12
10
: (2.13)


















Firm 3 exerts its monopoly power at expenses of rm 2, because rm 1 employs the
technology licensed by 2. The reaction function of rm 3 is equal to:
w3(w12;w21;w3) =
1   c(2   1)   2w12 + w21
4
: (2.14)
Solving for fw12;w21;w3g from (2.12), (2.13) and (2.14), one can derive the following
equilibrium expressions:
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8
> > > > > > > <














The equilibrium expressions in (2.15) must be employed in (2.11) to compute rms'
payos. Table 2.5 summarizes the results of this section.18
[TABLE 2.5 ABOUT HERE]
Under Assumption 4, rm 1 and rm 2 produce a positive amount on the market for the
nal good (that is, qCP23
1 > 0 and qCP23
2 > 0).
2.5.5 Technology Choice
In the rst stage of the game, vertically integrated rms choose the technology platform they
employ for the production of the nal good.
Proposition 6
Assume that side payments are not allowed and that the choice of the technology is taken by
vertically integrated rms, then the unique Nash equilibrium of the adoption game features:
i: The employment of P(1;2) as technology standard (S2) if   ~ (c;);
ii: The employment of competing platforms (CP32) if  > ~ (c;).
18In case CP23, rm 1 and rm 2 may cross-license respective technologies, however it turns out that a
cooperative agreement cannot be reached if one rules out side payments. First of all, the sum of integrated
rms' prots can be rewritten as in the following:
CP23
1 + CP23
2 = [1   QCP23]QCP23   cqCP23
1   (w3 + c)qCP23
2
Hence, one could rewrite above expression as function of WCL and see that the ideal monopolist would
set WCL (and share it between rm 1 and rm 2) as to let the rm with the cheaper technology be active on
the product market. In other words, one integrated rm would raise positive prots and the other would be
made worse o with respect to independent licensing. Consequently, without side payments, a cooperative
agreement cannot be found in case CP23.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
The main result of Proposition 6 is that the case with technology 3 into the standard
(S3) is not an equilibrium of the technology adoption game. This outcome is determined
by the basic trade-o outlined in the Introduction: from the point of view of rms 1 and 2,
cross-licensing preserves rents, instead contracting with pure developers is ecient but leads
to rent dissipation (because of hold-up). The result in Proposition 6 shows that if  is small
the former eect prevails and if  is large the latter eect prevails.
More specically, on the one hand, if the cost-savings generated by having a technology
standard are suciently important, then the employment of 2 is a dominant strategy to
rm 2 and the Nash equilibrium is determined by the choice of rm 1. Firm 1 employs
technology 2 (and cross licenses with 2) if the value of  is small, instead, as  increases,
the adoption of competing platforms becomes more protable for rm 1.
On the other hand, if the cost-savings generated by having a technology standard become
less important, then the use of P(1;3) is more attractive to rm 2 and the employment of
P(1;2) is not a dominant strategy anymore. However, rm 2 still anticipates that in the
case of a joint adoption of P(1;3) it would be sti
ed by the raising rival's costs and hold-up
eects. Consequently, if rm 1 would choose P(1;3) then rm 2 would reply by employing
its own technology.
Therefore, at equilibrium, either a standard with P(1;2) is chosen or there are compet-
ing platforms, with rm 1 employing P(1;3) and rm 2 employing P(1;2).
2.5.6 Welfare Analysis
The welfare analysis is conducted by assuming that a benevolent planner decides the tech-
nology to be employed by comparing the value of social surplus associated with the four
cases of adoption (S2,S3,CP32,CP23). Hence, the following game is solved:
1. Technology Choice Stage: the benevolent planner chooses a production technology.
2. Pricing Scheme and Royalty Setting Stage: upstream rms whose technology is adopted
downstream choose the pricing scheme (independent licensing/cross-licensing) and the
royalty rate. Consequently, each downstream rm decides whether to pay the royalty
rate (and produce) or give up production.
3. Product Market Competition Stage: active rms set quantities.
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In other words, this analysis provides the outcome of a game in which the technology
choice is taken by disregarding the strategic interactions that determine the equilibrium of
the adoption game in Proposition 6. However, the planner still takes into account both the
impact that the employment of a particular technology has on rms' choices at the licensing
and product market stages, and the hold-up problem. The result of the game above is in
what follows.
Lemma 6
Assume that the choice of the technology is taken by a benevolent planner, then at the equi-
librium she would employ:
i: P(1;2) as technology standard (S2) in:
f(;)j  2 (0;  (c;))g r f(;)j  2 (  (c;);minf (c;);1g)g;
ii: P(1;3) as technology standard (S3) in:
f(;)j  2 ( (c;);1)g r f(;)j  2 (maxf (c;);    (c;)g;1)g;
iii: Competing platforms (CP32) in:
f(;)j  2 (  (c;);minf (c;);1g)g [ f(;)j  2 (maxf (c;);    (c;)g;1)g.
Proof. See Appendix B.
There are three relevant areas: the joint adoption of P(1;2) maximizes total welfare
for low values of  and the joint employment of P(1;3) maximizes total welfare for high
values of . However, if  is big enough the employment of P(1;3) by rm 1 and P(1;2)
by rm 2 (CP32) can generate a value of surplus bigger than the cases of standard adoption
(S2 and S3).
Using the results of Proposition 6 and Lemma 6, one can derive the following proposition.
Proposition 7
There is a wedge between the adoption choice taken by integrated entities and the one of the
social planner; in this wedge, the exclusion of rm 3 from the standard employed by vertically
integrated organizations is inecient.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 7 shows that the trade-o between the technological eciency of the upstream
rm input and the contractual eciency of cross-licensing can lead to a technology choice
that is sub-optimal from the total welfare point of view. This is because, when the advantages
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from adopting a standard and the cost savings due to the employment of the specialized rm
are suciently large, vertically integrated rms may prefer to cross-license their technologies
while a benevolent planner would adopt a standard with 3.
2.5.7 A Numerical Example
Here it is presented a numerical example that illustrates the results above. More specically,
it is assumed that the marginal cost of production c is equal to 1=2.
[FIGURE 2.2 ABOUT HERE]
For c = 1=2 the value of  (c) in Assumption 4 is equal to 1=4, hence, in the gure, the
relevant range of values of  is given by (1=4;1).
The panel (a) of Figure 2.2 presents the outcome of the adoption game and the panel (b)
presents the results of the welfare analysis. Panel (c) shows the area of total exclusion of
P(1;3) (marked by T) and two areas of partial exclusion, P3 and P2. In P3 the adoption
of P(1;3) as technology standard is ecient but an equilibrium with competing platforms
arises. Instead, in P2 the adoption of P(1;2) as technology standard is more ecient than
the equilibrium with competing platforms.
2.6 Ex-ante Licensing Policy
In the time-line of the game with linear pricing, active licensors set royalty rates after being
employed by manufacturers; this choice grants monopoly power in the negotiations' phase
to the licensors whose technology is adopted. In this section, I study the SPE of a game
in which the royalty rate stage precedes technology choice and adoption, and let rm 2 and
rm 3 compete for the employment of their technologies.
The timing of the new set-up follows.
1. Licensing Scheme and Royalty Setting Stage: upstream rms set the royalty rate and
the licensing scheme (independent licensing/cross-licensing).
2. Technology Choice Stage: downstream rms choose the technology.
3. Product Market Competition Stage: active rms set quantities.
This time-line reproduces the results of an auction carried out between the technologies of
rm 2 and rm 3 at the competitive conditions prevailing before the adoption phase. In other
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words, in this framework it is analyzed what consequences would have the implementation
of a policy of early licensing commitments on the choice of the technology, so to replicate
the eects of FRAND agreements' reasonableness requirement implementation.19
Proposition 8
Assume that active licensors set royalty rates before their technologies have been employed
by manufacturers, then the equilibrium of the adoption game features the employment of
P(1;3) as technology standard (S3) and is ecient.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Proposition 8 shows that the hold-up problem crucially tilts the licensing negotiations
between rm 1 and rm 3 (the pure innovator). Indeed, the twist in the timing changes the
incentives of rm 3 when pricing its technology, instead, the best agreement that rm 2 can
aim at reaching with rm 1 does not depend on the timing of the negotiations and consists
in cross-licensing respective patents. However, in the set-up of this extension, rm 3, being
more ecient, can match the oer of rm 2 and convince rm 1 to employ 3.
The resulting normative policy implication is that SSOs members should be allowed to
talk about royalties when they choose among the technologies to include in a standard,
because this would solve the hold-up problem and lead to a more ecient decision.
2.7 Technology Adoption in Alternative Frameworks
The model shows that the adoption of P(1;2) as technology standard depends on the
protability of cross-licensing and the severity of the hold-up problem. Based on this, one
can analyze SSO adoption choices in dierent frameworks.
2.7.1 N vertically integrated rms
If the set-up would include N vertically integrated rms, then the per-rm prots generated
by cross-licensing would decrease as N increases. Therefore, it would be more dicult to
sustain an equilibrium featuring the joint employment of P(1;2).
19Reasonableness requires that licensing decisions taken before technology adoption must be consistent
with those decided after technology's employment by manufacturers, so to avoid excessive royalties due to
the lack of competitive alternatives.
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2.7.2 N stand-alone upstream rms
If it were the number of upstream rms endowed with the ecient technology to increase,
then the scope for the exclusion of rm 3 would remain because the hold-up problem does not
depend on the number of upstream rms but rather on the timing of technology adoption.
2.7.3 Price competition with dierentiated products
In a framework with price competition the main results of the model would stay the same.
Indeed, the upstream operations of the integrated rms could keep up the protability of an
agreement featuring the joint adoption of P(1;2) and cross-licensing by setting royalty rates
equal to the monopoly price and so implementing the monopoly outcome on the downstream
market.
2.7.4 Set-up with one vertically integrated rm
Assume that the framework would embed integrated rm 2 facing the competition of a stand-
alone downstream rm, D1, and that 1 and 3 are provided by two upstream stand-alone
rms, indexed by U1 and U3. In this modied setting, the protability for D1 of using the
technologies of rm 2 and rm U1 would greatly reduce.20 Indeed, now D1 cannot cross-
license with rm 2, moreover it would be subject to the raising-rival's costs incentive of
integrated rm 2 and the hold-up of rm U1. Therefore, it is expectable that the payo
of U1 when it employs P(1;2) with rm 2 is squeezed by rm 2 and U1, so to make the
employment of 2 less protable to D1 than in the main model.
2.7.5 Stand-alone rm 3 can discriminate
In case S3, rm 3 cannot discriminate between rm 1 and rm 2, but this assumption is not
crucial for the exclusion of rm 3 from the technology standard. Indeed, given that at the
licensing stage its technology has already been adopted, were rm 3 free to discriminate it
would let rm 1 be monopolist and squeeze as much as possible its downstream rent through
the royalty rate. Therefore, the scope for the employment of 3 would further shrink.
20Notice that rm 1 would be in a strategic position analogous to the one of rm 2 in case S3 of the main
model. There, the prot of rm 2 is nil.
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2.7.6 Acquisition of rm 3 by integrated operators
Assume a merger stage is introduced into the game at which integrated rms can take over
rm 3. There are two cases to be distinguished, depending on whether the merger stage
precedes or follows the technology adoption stage.
If rm 3 merges with vertically integrated rms before the production technology is
chosen, then rm 3 would join the deciding coalition and, clearly, the adoption of platform
P(1;3) would emerge at equilibrium. However, if the merger stage would be the rst stage,
followed by the technology choice, the licensing game and the product market stage, then
the hold-up problem would still aect the results of the technology adoption stage leading
to the same qualitative results as in the main model.
2.8 Two-part Taris
In this extension, upstream rms use two-part taris to license-out their technology to down-
stream rms. It is important to remark that contracts by means of two-part taris are more
ecient than those with linear pricing because they are not aected by the double marginal-
ization problem. Therefore, if the exclusionary result arises in this setting it is entirely caused
by the hold-up eect.
The timing of the game follows:
1. Technology Choice Stage: downstream rms choose the technology.
2. Licensing Scheme and Royalty Setting Stage: upstream rms whose technology is
adopted downstream make a public take-it-or-leave-it oer to downstream rms, con-
sisting of a tari, indexed by Tij = wijqj+Fij, and a scheme (independent licensing/cross-
licensing) at which they license-out their technologies. Consequently, each downstream
rm decides whether to pay the fee (and produce) or give up production.
3. Product Market Competition Stage: active rms set quantities.
Firms pay the due tari after the product market competition stage and under the
protection of a limited liability constraint for which they cannot pay more than the prots
they raise on the market. Therefore, rst rms negotiate over the licensing contracts, then
they decide to produce and carry out the payment of the taris they agreed upon initially.
Without loss of generality, I assume that upstream rms make sequential oers, so to
solve the problems of coordination intrinsic to the settings with complementary inputs; more
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specically, this assumption rules out those cases in which the sum of the oers exceeds the
prot of a downstream rm.
In what follows, I use  to indicate the rent generated by the product market, as opposed
to , which indicates total prots.
Like in the model with linear prices, I assume that downstream production requires the
payment of a marginal cost c 2 (0;1) and that the employment of a standard generates a
cost-saving measured by  2 (0;1). The adoption of 3 reduces the cost borne by downstream
manufacturers by  2 (0;1). Finally, Assumption 4 holds in this setting as in the model with
royalty rates.
2.8.1 Adoption of P(1;2) as Technology Standard
If integrated rms choose P(1;2) as technology standard, at the product market competi-
tion stage the equilibrium values are the same as in equations (2.1) in the model with linear
prices.
In particular, c = (1   c)2=9 denotes the value of the per-rm Cournot prot and
m = (1   c)2=4 the one of the monopoly prot at w12 = w21 = 0.
Lemma 7 presents the equilibria of the licensing game when rm 1 and rm 2 set T12 and
T21 non-cooperatively.
Lemma 7
Under independent licensing and technologies 1 and 2 in the standard, the Nash equilibria
of the licensing game are as in what follows:
i: Firm j oers wjk = (1   c)=2 and Fjk = 0, rm k oers wkj = 0 and Fkj = m.
Alternatively, rm j and k oer wjk = wkj = 0, Fjk = Fkj = m: in both cases rm j
is in, rm k is out, but extracts all downstream prots from rm j. Moreover, j = 0,
k = m.
ii: Firm j and k oer wjk = wkj = 0, Fjk = m and Fkj 2 [c;m), at which rm j is out
and rm k is in. In this case, j = m, k = 0.
Proof. See Appendix E.
At a Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative licensing game, one of the two rms is
out of the market but takes rival's downstream prot through the xed fee. Unfortunately,
though, multiple equilibria imply that it is not possible to determine whether it is rm 1
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or rm 2 to get the full monopoly prot. In order to get rid of this limitation, I assume
that each upstream rm in the SSO has an equal probability of being rst in approaching
downstream rms. This implies that, in expected terms, vertically integrated rms share




Under cross-licensing, rms set their fees cooperatively, but behave non-cooperatively at the
production stage. The best deal that vertically integrated rms can negotiate upon is one
at which they equally share the monopoly rent.
Lemma 8
Under cross-licensing and technologies 1 and 2 in the standard, at equilibrium rms write
the following agreement: rm j oers wjk = 0 and Fjk = m=2, whilst rm k oers wkj =
(1 c)=2 and Fkj = 0. At this agreement, rm k is the monopolist and transfers half of the
monopoly rent to rm j.
At the cooperative equilibrium, rm j stays out of the market, rm k is monopolist
and transfers half of the downstream rent to rm k at the payment stage. Cross-licensing
and independent licensing deliver the same total prot to vertically integrated rms under
two-part taris. Thus, in this framework, the decision over the standard is not aected by
cross-licensing.21
2.8.2 Adoption of P(1;3) as Technology Standard
In case of joint adoption of platform P(1;3), the product market competition stage equi-
librium values are the same as in (2.3).
Here, c = (1   c)2=9 is the per-rm prot under Cournot competition and m =
(1   c)2=4 is the prot under monopoly at w12 = w3 = 0.
Lemma 9 presents the equilibrium taris in case S3.22
Lemma 9
At a Nash equilibrium, rm 3 oers w3 = 0 and F3 = m. Firm 1 sets either w12 = 0 and
21Clearly, this holds if in the independent licensing case analyzed above rms have an equal probability
of being rst in making the oer. Otherwise, in the extreme case in which one rm is always the rst,
independent licensing and cross-licensing would imply a rather dierent prots' allocation.
22In analogy to the model with linear pricing, I am also assuming that rm 3 cannot discriminate between
rm 1 and rm 2.
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F12  m   F3 or w12 = (1   c)=2 and F12 = 0. In both cases, S3
j = 0, with j = 1;2,
S3
3 = m and either rm 1 or rm 2 would be the downstream monopolist.
Proof. See appendix F.
Lemma 9 shows that under the adoption of standard P(1;3), if rms license their
technologies by means of two-part taris then the hold-up problem is so severe that the
stand-alone upstream rm is able to fully squeeze integrated rms' prots.
2.8.3 Competing Platforms: rm 1 uses P(1;3) and rm 2 uses
P(1;2)
The equilibrium values at the product market competition stage when rm 1 uses P(1;3)
and rm 2 uses P(1;2) are the same as in (2.7).
Therefore, at w12 = w3 = 0, if rm 1 would be the monopolist its prot would be equal
to m
1 = (1 c)2=4. If rm 2 would be the monopolist, then m
2 = (1 c)2=4. In the case of
duopoly, an asymmetric Cournot would arise on the market, with associated payos given
by c
1 = (1   2c + c)2=9 and c
2 = (1   2c + c)2=9.
Lemma 10 presents the equilibrium license fees in scenario CP32.
Lemma 10
At equilibrium, rm 1 sets w12 = 0 and rm 3 sets w3 = 0. Moreover, the fee of rm 3 is
given by F3 = c





2 = 0 and CP32
3 = c
1.
Proof. See appendix G.
Firm 3 anticipates that if the fee it sets is too high then rm 1 would stay inactive. Firm
1 replies foreclosing the downstream market, which yields the surplus between the monopoly
rent and the Cournot prot.
2.8.4 Competing Platforms: rm 1 uses P(1;2) and rm 2 uses
P(1;3)
The equilibrium values at the product market competition stage in case CP23 are given in
(2.11).
If w12 = w3 = 0, were rm 1 to be the monopolist then its prot would be equal to
m
1 = (1   c)2=4, instead, if rm 2 would be the monopolist then m
2 = (1   c)2=4. The
per-rm Cournot prots are given by c
1 = (1   2c + c)2=9 and c
2 = (1   2c + c)2=9.
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Independent Licensing
Lemma 11 presents the Nash equilibrium of the licensing game in which all three rms set
their taris non-cooperatively.
Lemma 11
At an equilibrium of the licensing game, rms set w21 = wl = wn = 0, F21 > m
1 , Fl + Fn 2
[0;c], with l;n = 3;12 and l 6= n. Therefore, rm 2 gains CP23
2 = m
2   c
2, instead rm 1
and rm 3 get c
2=2 each.
Proof. See Appendix H.
In this case, like in case CP32, rm 1 and rm 3 anticipate that by setting an aggregate
fee above the Cournot prot of rm 2, this would have incentive to stay inactive. Therefore,
they let 2 operate as monopolist and get its Cournot rent. As in Lemma 7, the problem
of coordination between rm 1 and rm 3 is solved by assuming that thay have an equal
probability to be the rst in contracting with rm 2, so that each gets c
2=2 in expectation.
Cross-licensing
Under cross-licensing, rm 1 and rm 2 set their fees cooperatively but behave non-cooperatively
at the production stage. The cooperative agreement is accepted by rms 1 and 2 if both are
not made worse-o than in the non-cooperative equilibrium.
The vertically integrated rms could agree on a deal that lets rm 2 be active as mo-
nopolist and transfer part of the rents to 1 through the fee. In this case, cross-licensing
would generate the same amount of total prot as in the independent licensing equilibrium,
the integrated organizations would still be held-up by rm 3 and rms 1 and 2 would not
improve with respect to the independent licensing case. Indeed, for the integrated rms to
improve with respect to the independent licensing equilibrium it must be that the share of
the rent left to rm 3 reduces. However, a protable reply by rm 3 would be to ask a huge
fee and break down the cooperative agreement.
2.8.5 Technology Choice and Welfare Analysis with Two-part tar-
is
Proposition 9 presents the results of the adoption game's equilibrium analysis under public
licensing contracts and two-part taris.
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Proposition 9
Assume that side payments are not allowed and that the choice of the technology is taken by
vertically integrated rms, then the unique Nash equilibrium of the adoption game features:
i: The employment of P(1;2) as technology standard if:
  ~ TT(c;):
ii: The adoption of competing platforms (CP23) if:
 > ~ TT(c;):
Proof. See Appendix I.
With two-part taris, vertically integrated rms employ respective technologies if  is
low, otherwise a scenario with competing platforms arises.
Two remarks must be done. The rst is that the adoption of P(1;3) is constrained
ecient, so that the inecient and total exclusion of rm 3 emerges also with two-part
taris. The second is that, dierently from the game with linear pricing, as  rises above
~ TT(c;) here the Nash equilibrium of the adoption game features case CP23, in which rm
1 uses 2 and rm 2 uses 3. This happens because for a given adoption of 3 by rm 2, rm
1's best reply is to avoid the hold-up eect and squeeze part of rm 2's downstream rent
through the fee.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the results of a numerical example in which it is assumed that the
marginal cost of production c is equal to 1=5.
[FIGURE 2.3 ABOUT HERE]
For c = 1=5 the value of  (c) is zero, so that the relevant range of values of  is given by
the all unit interval. In Figure 2.3, the area marked by T is the one in which rms 1 and
2 adopt standard P(1;2) and exclude rm 3's technology. Instead, area CP is the one in
which integrated rms adopt competing technology platforms.
2.9 Conclusion
In this Chapter, I studied the incentives that SSOs' vertically integrated rms have to employ
patented technologies into their production process. The model develops on the idea that a
Tarantino, Emanuele (2010), Three Essays in Industrial Organization and Corporate Finance 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/230622.9. CONCLUSION 81
pure innovator endowed with market power can hold up vertically integrated rms through
the sale of an intermediate good. Integrated organizations can choose between two inputs,
among which the one provided by the vertically-specialized rm is superior.
The contracting environment employed resembles the one of SSOs in several aspects and
in particular in the assumption for which parties negotiate over the royalty fees after down-
stream manufacturers' choice and adoption of a certain technology. This timing gives a strong
bargaining power to upstream suppliers whose technology is employed for the production of
the nal good and generates the hold-up problem.
The outcome of the welfare analysis shows that by cross-licensing their patents, integrated
organizations may ineciently exclude the pure innovator's superior technology. Moreover,
the model rationalizes the pattern of SSOs' technology adoption in major sectors of the
information and communications technology industry.
In the extension with two-part taris the outcome of the technology adoption game is
aected by the incentive that a pure upstream rm with market power has to expropriate
the downstream rent of an integrated organization via the provision of a complementary
input. In Chapter 3, the analysis of this eect (and the protability of vertical integration)
is analyzed in greater detail.
Finally, an important policy conclusion of the Chapter is that, to kill the hold-up problem,
rms in SSOs should be allowed to talk about royalties when they choose among competing
technologies. Indeed, as shown in the section where a framework with ex-ante licensing
is studied, the resulting choice by manufacturers features standard's ecient design. This
supports the initiatives by SSOs like VITA, which recently moved towards a policy that
requires the owners of patented technologies to disclose the maximum royalty rates and
provide binding written license declarations at several specied points during the standard
development process.
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2.10 Appendix A
The analysis can be greatly simplied by searching for the dominant strategy of rm 2. More
specically, if one compares S2
2 with CP23
2 then it turns out that the adoption of P(1;2)









c2(52   10 + 14) + 9(1   2c)
81
()





c2(52   10 + 14) + 9(1   2c)
9c
:
~ ~ (c;) is decreasing in c and increasing in , moreover if c  :32 then ~ ~ (c;)  1 inde-
pendently from the value of .23
If the employment of P(1;2) is a dominant strategy for rm 2, then the Nash equilibirum
is found by studying the choice of rm 1. In particular, rm 1 compares S2
1 with CP32
1









c2(902   110 + 127)   2c(35 + 72) + 107
1681
()
  ~ (c;) 
41   4
p
c2(902   110 + 127)   2c(35 + 72) + 107
41c
:
With ~ (c;) < ~ ~ (c;), indeed
~ (c;)   ~ ~ (c;) < 0 ()
h
c(8 + 13)   21
ih
c(95   74)   21
i
> 0
holds true for all c and  into the unit interval. Summarizing, if  2 (~ (c;); ~ ~ (c;)] the
Nash equilibrium features the adoption of P(1;3) by rm 1 and P(1;2) by rm 2 (CP32).
Instead, if  2 (0; ~ (c;)] the Nash equilibrium features the adoption of P(1;2) by rm 1
and rm 2 (S2).
[TABLE 2.6 ABOUT HERE]
For  above ~ ~ (c;) the adoption of platform P(1;2) is not a dominant strategy to rm




2 = 0; furthermore,
given that ~ ~ (c;) > ~ (c;), one has that CP32
1 > S2
1 . Hence, rm 2 employs P(1;3) if
23The fact that ~ ~ (c;)  1 for c  :32 implies that the analysis of the Nash equilibrium for  above ~ ~ (c;)
is relevant only if c > :32.
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rm 1 chooses P(1;2), instead, rm 2 adopts P(1;2) if rm 1 uses P(1;3). At the same
time, if rm 2 chooses P(1;2), then rm 1 chooses P(1;3) and if rm 2 chooses P(1;3),
then rm 1 decides by comparing S3
1 and CP23
1 . In this latter case, it turns out that S3
1
is bigger than CP23
1 for  > ~ ~ (c;).24
Summarizing, if  > ~ ~ (c;) the Nash equilibrium of the technology adoption game is at
CP32, instead case S3 does not arise at equilibrium. 
2.11 Appendix B
In the following, it is analyzed the choice of the benevolent planner for given results of the
second and third stage of the game. In particular, the planner decides by comparing the
social surplus generated by the four cases of technology adoption.
First of all, it is useful to establish a result that simplies the analysis below: the total
welfare generated by case CP23 is smaller than the one associated with case CP32. Indeed,




[c(8 + 13)   21][c(1;627   1;156)   471]
272;322
> 0 8c; 2 (0;1):
Consequently, in the following I can focus on cases S2, S3 and CP32. S2 is more ecient

















 (c;) is decreasing in c and increasing in , moreover  (c;)  1 for all c 2 (0;:19] and
 2 (0;1).
Now I check whether case CP32 delivers a bigger total surplus than S3 and S2 above
and below  (c;), respectively. In particular, by using the standard quadratic formula for
 and taking the root whose value lies into the unit interval, it turns out that S2 is more







c2(1392   138 + 131)   4c(31 + 35) + 132
1681
()





c2(1392   138 + 131)   4c(31 + 35) + 132
123c
:
24The proof of this last step is not presented here because not essential to the result that S3 does not
emerge as Nash equilibrium of the adoption game, but can be provided by the author if requested.
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  (c;) is decreasing in c and increasing in .







c2(1392   138 + 131)   4c(31 + 35) + 132
1681
()





c2(1392   138 + 131)   4c(31 + 35) + 132
123c
:
   (c;) is increasing in c for all c 2 (:43;1) and decreasing in  if 1 >  >  (c) > 0.
The function that generates the locus of points in which   (c;) and     cross  (c;) is the
same. Indeed, after simple algebra manipulations one nds that:
  (c;) =  (c;) =    (c;) ()
c
2(139
2   138 + 131)   4c(31 + 35) + 132 =







The function c() along which   (c;) and    (c;) cross  (c;) is obtained by solving
(2.16), which is a quadratic equation in c whose coecients are functions of . Applying the
quadratic formula and taking the root that lies below  c() = 3=(7   4),25 one has that the
relevant solution to (2.16) is given by cW():
cW() =
0:552 + 0:177   0:5042   0:662(1   )
p
(0:005 + )(1:359 + )
(1:237   )[0:942   (0:993   )]
:
The function cW() is convex in ; in particular, it is decreasing in  for all  2 (0;:22)
and increasing for all  2 (:22;1). Furthermore, cW(0) =  c(0) = :43, cW(:22) = :33 and
cW(1) =  c(1) = 1. Hence,   (c;) and    (c;) do not cross  (c;) if c  :33, they cross  (c;)
twice if c 2 (:33;:43] and once if c 2 (:43;1). The graph of cW() is in Figure 2.4.
[FIGURE 2.4 ABOUT HERE]
 (c;)    (c;) and  (c;)     (c;) if the following holds:
c
2(139
2   138 + 131)   4c(31 + 35) + 132 






25 c() is the inverse of  (c) and  (c) is the lower bound of  specied in Assumption 4.
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and above inequality is satised for all c  cW().26 The characterization of the areas of
constrained maximum welfare follows. To start with, one has that:
8c 2 (0;:33),  2 (0;1),  (c;) >   (c;) >    (c;)
Above  (c;), CP32 is more ecient than S3 because  (c;) lies above    (c;).27 Below
 (c;), S2 is more ecient than S3, however CP32 is more ecient than S2 into the interval
(  (c;);  (c;)). Thus, the planner would decide as in what follows:
i: If  2 (0;   (c;)], then TSS2 is bigger than TSS3 and TSCP32 and the planner would
adopt P(1;2) as technology standard;
ii: If  2 [  (c;);1), then TSCP32 is bigger than TSS2 and TSS3 and the planner would
adopt competing platforms.
Instead, for c 2 [:33;1) the three functions of interest ( (c;);   (c;);    (c;)) cross each
other at least once. In particular, one has that,
8c 2 [:33;:43) 9 (^ 1;^ 2) 2 (0;1) s:t:
  (c;) <  (c;) 8 2 (0;^ 1) [ (^ 2;1) and    (c;) >  (c;) 8 2 (^ 1;^ 2);
8c 2 (:43;1) 9 ^  2 (0;1) s:t:
  (c;) <  (c;) 8 2 (^ ;1) and    (c;) >  (c;) 8 2 ( ;^ ):
Hence, for c 2 [:33;1) the areas of (constrained) maximum welfare are as in what follows:
i: TSS2 is bigger than TSS3 and TSCP32 in:
f(;)j  2 (0;  (c;)]g r f(;)j  2 (  (c;);minf (c;);1g)g;
ii: TSS3 is bigger than TSS2 and TSCP32 in:
f(;)j  2 [ (c;);1)g r f(;)j  2 (maxf (c;);    (c;)g;1)g;
iii: TSCP32 is bigger than TSS2 and TSS3 in:
f(;)j  2 (  (c;);minf (c;);1g)g [ f(;)j  2 (maxf (c;);    (c;)g;1)g.
The characterization of the ecient cases above determines the choice of the benevolent
planner, moreover it embeds the case with c smaller than :33 as a special case, in which
 (c;) is bigger than    (c;) and   (c;), and the set in which S3 is more ecient than CP32
is empty.
26Notice that the coecient attached to the squared term, equal to (1392   138 + 131), is positive for
 2 (0;1).
27Remind that case S3 is more ecient than CP32 only if  lies below    (c;).
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2.12 Appendix C
To prove that the total exclusion of 3 from the standard can be inecient, it has to be shown
that the area in which  (c;) lies below ~ (c;) is not empty for some values of c and . If
this is the case, the adoption of P(1;3) as technology standard (S3) is more ecient than
the Nash equilibrium featuring the joint employment of P(1;2) (S2). More specically,
~ (c;)   (c;) ()
c
2(90









Like in the proof of Lemma 1, the function c() along which  (c;) crosses ~ (c;) is
obtained by solving a quadratic equation in c whose coecients are functions of . Applying
the quadratic formula and taking the root that lies below  c() = 3=(7 4) one has that the
function that solves (2.17) with an equality is given by cN():
cN() =
0:9899   (0:3188 + 0:3889)   0:3602(1   )
p
(0:0514 + )(8:7475 + )
(1:2374   )[1:4111   (1:2222   )]
:
Moreover, (2.17) is satised for all c  cN().28 The function cN() is convex in ; in
particular, it is decreasing in  for all  2 (0;:22) and increasing for all  2 (:22;1). Also,
cN(0) =  c(0) = cW(0) = :43, cN(:22) = :38 > cW(:22) = :33 and cN(1) =  c(1) = cW(1) = 1.
Hence, cN() lies above cW(). The graphs of cN() and cW() are in Figure 2.5.
[FIGURE 2.5 ABOUT HERE]
Summarizing, there is a wedge between the area in which S3 is more ecient than S2
and the one in which S2 is employed by vertically integrated rms; more specically, such
wedge arises for c > :38. Also, the fact that cN() lies above cW() implies that this wedge
lies (at least partly) in the area in which S3 is more ecient than CP32. Indeed, for any
c > :38, the value of  in which  (c;) crosses    (c;) and   (c;) is dierent than the one in
which  (c;) crosses ~ (c;) (in particular, it is strictly bigger if c > :43). All this implies
that the area of inecient total exclusion of P(1;3) is not empty. 
28Indeed, the coecient attached to the squared term, given by (902 110+127), is positive for  2 (0;1).
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2.13 Appendix D
Solving the game backwards, the equilibrium values at the product market competition stage
when integrated rms choose P(1;2) are the same as in (2.1), those in case of joint adoption
of P(1;3) are given in (2.3) and those related to the cases with competing platforms are in
(2.7) and (2.11).
At the royalty setting stage, rm 1 sets a monopoly royalty rate, to push rm 2 out
of the market. Instead, rms 2 and 3 compete for the adoption by manufacturers. Firm
2 can oer to rm 1 to cross-license their technologies, however, in this case rms 1 and
2 are not symmetric; rm 2 is constrained by the oer that rm 3 can make to 1 for the
employment of 3. Consequently, the agreement in this case cannot consist of equally sharing
the monopoly prot, instead rm 2 accepts to let rm 1 squeeze all the rents from using
technology standard P(1;2), so to increase the chances for the adoption of its technology.
Analogously, in all other cases perfect competition between 2 and 3 leads to an equilibrium
in which rm 3 leaves manufacturers just indierent between using 2 and 3.
[TABLE 2.7 ABOUT HERE]
In all cases, rm 1 would be the monopolist and rm 2 would be left with a nil payo. In
particular, if P(1;3) would be the technology standard then rm 1 would raise (1 c)2=4
and if P(1;2) would be the technology standard then rm 1 would raise (1   c)2=4. In
the case with competing platforms CP32 rm 1 would obtain a payo equal to (1   c)2=4,
and in the case with competing platforms CP23 rm 1 would gain (1   c)2=4.
Finally, by assuming that indierence is broken in favor of the more ecient technology
one has the result in the proposition, i.e., P(1;3) is adopted as technology standard at
equilibrium. 
2.14 Appendix E
To start with, notice that were rm j to set wjk > 0 it would raise the royalty rate to kick k
out of the market and be monopolist. Then, the best reply by k would be to set Fkj = m
and get rm j's downstream rent.
Instead, were wjk = wkj = 0, in order to determine the equilibria of the licensing game,
I analyze rm k's best response to the xed fee Fjk set by rm j.29 There are two relevant
29Due to symmetry, the rm j's best response will be analogous.
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thresholds: the Cournot prot, indexed by c, and the monopoly prot, indexed by m.
Consequently, three cases must be considered.
1. If 0 < Fjk < c rm k would always be active. More specically, were it to set Fkj > c,
it would be a monopolist and attain prot equal to m Fjk > 0. Instead, were k to set
Fkj = c, it would be duopolist and obtain prot equal to 2c Fjk > 0. Therefore, the
best response by k to Fjk < c is to set Fkj > c, at which k would earn k = m Fjk.
This is optimal because m > 2c. If Fkj > c, rm j would stay out of the market
and earn j = Fjk.
2. If c  Fjk < m rm k would be active only if monopolist, instead it would not nd it
protable to produce if duopolist. In particular, were rm k to set Fkj > m, it would
be a monopolist and gain m   Fjk. If k would set Fkj = m, it would stay out of the
market, but it would fully extract j's monopoly prot. Finally, k may set Fkj < m,
at which it would be out and have incentive to raise its fee further. Therefore, the best
response by k to c  Fjk < m is to set Fkj = m, at which j would be the monopolist
and k would squeeze all its prot, gaining k = Fkj.
3. If Fjk  m, rm k is out of the market, independently from the fee it sets. Therefore,
k's optimal response is to set Fkj = m, stay out, but extract all downstream revenue
from the rival.
Equilibrium. Under independent licensing and technologies 1 and 2 in the standard the
Nash equilibria of the licensing game are given by:
i: wjk = (1   c)=2;wkj = 0, Fjk = 0;Fkj = m and wjk = wkj = 0, Fjk = Fkj = m:
at these equilibria rm j is in, rm k is out, but extracts all downstream prots from
rm j. Moreover, j = 0;k = m.
ii: wjk = wkj = 0 and Fjk = m;Fkj 2 [c;m), at which rm j is out and rm k is in. At
this equilibrium, j = m, k = 0. However, k does not have any incentive to deviate
if and only if when it sets Fkj = m it anticipates that the continuation equilibrium is
such that S2
k = 0.
Finally, notice that there does not exist any equilibrium where wkj = wjk = 0 and
Fjk < c, Fkj > c, as the best reply to Fkj > c would be to set Fjk = m. 
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2.15 Appendix F
First of all, notice that by a standard argument, rm 3 sets w3 = 0 not to distort rm 1's
production decisions and tamper downstream rent. Now, if rm 1 sets w12 as to monopolize
the downstream market it would have all its downstream rent extracted by 3 through the
xed fee.
Instead, if w12 = w3 = 0, rm 1 and rm 3 would compete over the xed fee. In the
following, I present the best responses of rm 1 to the fee set by rm 3.
1. If 0 < F3 < c, rm 1 would always be active. The royalty setting game sees rm
1 competing with rm 3. Two responses are possible by 1: the rst would be to
set F12 > c   F3, at which rm 2 would not operate, the second would be to set
F12  c   F3, at which both rms would be active. In the former case rm 1 would
gain m   F3, rm 2's payo would be nil and rm 3 would extract F3 from 1. In
the latter case, the prot of rm 1 would be equal to c   F3 + F12 = 2c   2F3 = 0,
those of rm 2 would be given by c  F3  F12 = 0, instead rm 3 would extract 2c.
Clearly, 1's best response is to set F12 > c F3, operate as monopolist and gain prot
1 = m   F3 > 0.
2. If c  F3 < m, rm 1 would be active only if monopolist. Setting F12 > m   F3,
rm 1 would force rm 2 to stay out of the market and gain m   F3, instead rm 3
would extract F3 from 1. Otherwise, setting F12 = m  F3, rm 1 would stay out and
extract 2's prot, rm 2, although monopolist, would be left with zero prots, rm 3
would gain F3 from 2. Therefore, rm 1 optimal response is to x F12  m   F3, at
which either 1 or 2 would be monopolist, but rm 2 would make zero prot in any
case, rm 3 would get 3 = F3 and rm 1's payo would be equal to 1 = m   F3.
3. If F3  m, rm 1 and rm 2 stay out of the market. Therefore, all rms would earn
zero prot.
Equilibrium. First notice that it is a dominant strategy for rm 3 to set F3 = m   ,
with  > 0, small. Consequently, it is an equilibrium for rm 1 to set either w12 = 0 and
F12 = m   F3 or w12 = 0 and F12 > m   F3 or w12 = (1   c)=2 and F12 = 0: in the rst
case, 1 would let 2 be a monopolist, but extract all 2's prot (net of F3, of course), in the
second and third cases, 1 would be a monopolist. However, in all three cases the payo of 1
would be given by S3
1 = , instead S3
2 = 0 and S3
3 = F3 = m   . Finally, by focusing
on  equal to zero one has the results in the Lemma.
Tarantino, Emanuele (2010), Three Essays in Industrial Organization and Corporate Finance 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/2306290 CHAPTER 2. EXCLUSION WITH COMPLEMENTARY INPUTS AND HOLD-UP
Remark. One may nd counterintuitive that rm 3 takes all the industry prot and rm
1, which has a complementary technology, takes none, and also wonder whether there exist
other equilibria where rm 1 is able to extract a part of the industry surplus. In fact, this
never occurs. Suppose there is a candidate equilibrium where rm 1 sets F12 = km and
rm 3 sets F3 = (1   k)m, with k 2 (0;1].30 At this equilibrium, rm 3 would obtain a
payo equal to F3 = (1   k)m, but it would have an incentive to deviate and set F
0
3 = m.
If F12 = km;F
0
3 = m, rm 2 would never produce because it would not be able to recover
the cost of the fees, even if rm 1 does not produce. Instead, if rm 1 produces it will not
have to pay the fee for the use of technology 1, so there is a continuation equilibrium where
rm 1 sells and rm 2 does not and rm 1 transfers all the monopoly prot to rm 3 through
the fee. This shows that the unique equilibrium consists in the one identied above where
rm 3 extracts all the monopolistic rents from the industry. 
2.16 Appendix G
Like in case S3 (see Lemma 9), the royalty setting game sees rm 1 competing with rm 3.
However, rm 2 now does not employ technology 3.
Firm 3 sets w3 = 0 at equilibrium, not to distort rm 1's operations downstream. If rm
1 replies by setting w12 as to monopolize the downstream market it would have all its rent
extracted by 3 through the xed fee.
Instead, if w12 = w3 = 0, then rm 1 and rm 3 would compete over the xed fee. In the
following, I present the best responses of rm 1 to the fee set by rm 3 at w12 = w3 = 0.
1. If 0 < F3  c
1, rm 1 would always be active. The possible responses by 1 follow. The
rst would be to set F12 > c
2, at which rm 2 would not operate. The second would
be to shed c
2 by , positive and negligible, be active with 2 on the product market and
squeeze its Cournot prot.31 In the former case rm 1 would gain m
1  F3 = m
1  c
1,
rm 2's payo would be nil and rm 3 would extract F3 from 1. In the latter case, the
prot of rm 1 would be equal to c
1  F3 +F12 = c
1 +c
2  c
1, the one of rm 2 would
be given by c
2  F12 = 0, instead rm 3 would get F3. The best response of 1 is to set
F12 > c







30In the continuation equilibria, either rm 1 is the monopolistic supplier, gaining m  (1 k)m = km,
or rm 2 is the monopolistic supplier, with rm 1 gaining km. In both cases 3 = (1   k)m.
31Notice that a third one would be to set F12 < c
2, but then 1 would have incentive to raise the fee further.
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2. If c
1 < F3  m
1 , rm 1 would be active only if monopolist. Setting F12 > m
2 , rm 1
would force rm 2 to stay out of the market and gain m
1   F3, instead rm 3 would
extract F3 from 1. Otherwise, setting F12 = m
2  , rm 1 would stay out and extract
2's prot, and rm 2, although monopolist, would be left with a zero payo. Therefore,
rm 1 optimal response is to x F12 = m
2  , at which rms' payos are 1 = m
2  ,
2 =  and 3 = 0.
3. If F3 > m
1 , rm 1 would always stay out of the market. If rm 1 would set F12 > m
2 ,
then rm 1 and rm 2 would be out of the market. Instead, if 1 would set F12 = m
2  ,
1 would stay out and extract rm 2's prot thorough the fee. Clearly, 1's best response
is to set F12 = m
2   , at which 3 and 2 would be left with nothing.
Equilibrium. At equilibrium, rm 1 sets w12 = 0 and rm 3 sets w3 = 0. Moreover, the
fee of rm 3 is given by F3 = c
1 and rm 1 replies by setting F12 as to push rm 2 out of








In case CP23, all three rms are active upstream: rm 1 licenses 1 to rm 2, rm 2 licenses
2 to rm 1 and rm 3 licenses 3 to rm 2.
Like in Lemmata 9 and 10, rm 3 sets w3 = 0. If w12 = 0, were rm 2 to set a positive
value of w21 then it would try to monopolize the downstream market. In this case, rms 1
and 3 would equally share m
2 .32
If w21 were nil and rm 1 would reply by setting a positive value of w12, then it would
be rm 1 that tries to monopolize the downstream market. However, in this case it is rm
2 that gets the entire rent from 1, equal to m
1 .
Now, if w21 = w12 = 0, rms 1, 2 and 3 would compete over the value of the xed
fee. Below, I analyze rm 2 best response to the xed fees Fn and Fl set by 3 and 1, with
l;n = 3;12 and l 6= n.
1. If 0  Fl  c
2 and 0  Fn  c
2  Fl, then 2 is always active. Firm 2 can reply setting
F21 = c
1, then both vertically integrated rms would be active downstream and rm 2
would gain 2 = c
2  Fl  Fn +F21 = c
1.33 If rm 2 would set F21 > c
1, then it would
32Here, I am using the assumption for which rm 1 and rm 3 have equal probability of being rst in
approaching rm 2, as in case S2.
33Notice that if rm 2 would set a fee smaller than the Cournot rent, it would have incentive to raise it
further.
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be monopolist and get m
2   c
2. Thus, the best response of rm 2 is to set F21 > c
1.
Indeed, it can be shown that m
2 > c
2 +c
1 under Assumption 4. At this response, the
rm that sets Fl gets l 2 [0;c
2] and the rm that sets Fn gets n 2 [0;c
2   Fl]. The
coordination problem that arises in this case is again solved by assuming that rm 1
and rm 3 have an equal probability to be the rst in contracting with rm 2, like in
Lemma 7, so that each rm gets c
2=2 in expectation.
2. If 0  Fl  c
2 and c
2 < Fn  m
2  Fl, then 2 is active only if monopolist. Thus, rm 2
can reply setting F21 = m
1  , with  positive and negligible, let rm 1 be monopolist
and get m
1 . Instead, if rm 2 would set F21 > m
1 , it would be monopolist and gain
m
2   Fl   Fn = 0. Hence, the best response of rm 2 is to set F21 = m
1   , let 1 be
the monopolist and squeeze its downstream prot.
3. If c
2 < Fl  m
2 and c
2 < Fn  m
2   Fl, then 2 is active only if monopolist. The
analysis carries over as in the previous case, thus rm 2's best response is to set
F21 = m
1    and let 1 be the monopolist.
4. If c
2 < Fl  m
2 and Fn > m
2   Fl, then rm 2 is always out. Consequently, rm 2
would let rm 1 be active as monopolist and squeeze its downstream prot.
Therefore, under w21 = w12 = 0, it is a dominant strategy to rm 1 and rm 3 to set Fl
and Fn such that Fl + Fn 2 [0;c], because for a bigger aggregate fee the best response of
rm 2 would be to stay inactive and get rm 1 prot by setting F21 = m
1  . Consequently,
at an equilibrium with w21 = w12 = 0, rm 2 is monopolist and gains m
2   c
2, instead rm
1 and rm 3 equally share the Cournot prot of rm 2.
The last case to consider is the one at which w21 > 0 and w12 > 0. In this case, by using
the results in Appendix A of the model with linear price and using w3 = 0, one has that:
w12(w21) =
5   c(4 + 1)   w21
10
; w21(w21) =
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1 positive under Assumption 4. Consequently, the prots of rm 1 and rm 2



















Finally, by following the same procedure as in the case with w21 = w12 = 0, one would
nd that here the xed fees would be such that rm 2 gets w
1 instead rm 1 and rm 3
equally share w
2 . Indeed, either rm 1 or rm 3 do not have incentive to deviate because
by setting a higher fee rm 2 would stay inactive, let rm 1 be the monopolist and squeeze
its prot. At the same time, rm 2 does not deviate and sets a higher fee on rm 1 because,
given w12 = wCP23
12 > 0, its prot under monopoly is smaller than the sum of w
1 and w
2 .34
Equilibrium. The equilibrium in case CP23 is one at which w21 = w12 = w3 = 0, F21 > m
1 ,




instead rm 1 and rm 3 get c
2=2 each. Notice that rms 1 and 2 do not have incentive to
unilaterally deviate and set wij > 0 (with i 6= j and i;j = 1;2) because they would be left
with a nil payo. Also, the case in which both w21 and w12 are positive is not an equilibrium
because rm 1 would have incentive to deviate, set w12 = 0 and gain m
2 =2 > w
2 =2. 
2.18 Appendix I
The adoption of P(1;2) as technology standard emerges at equilibrium if the following
condition holds (see Table 2.8):
[TABLE 2.8 ABOUT HERE]
34The prot of a monopolist rm 2 at w12 = wCP23
12 is equal to [(9 + c   10c)=33]2.
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[1   c(2   )][5   c(7   2)]
36
()





[1   c(2   )][5   c(7   2)]
3c
:
Otherwise, both rms have incentive to deviate from an equilibrium featuring the joint
employment of 2. In particular, if  > ~ TT(c;) strategy P(1;3) becomes weakly dominant
to rm 2 and case (CP23) emerges as Nash equilibrium of the adoption game. 
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2.19 Tables and Figures






Table 2.2: Results under the joint adoption of P(1;2)
Independent Licensing Cross-licensing
wjk 5(1   c)=11 (1   c)=4
qj 2(1   c)=11 (1   c)=4
Q;P(Q) 4(1   c)=11;(7 + 4c)=11 (1   c)=2;(1 + c)=2
CS 8(1   c)2=121 (1   c)2=8
1;2;3 14(1   c)2=121;14(1   c)2=121;0 (1   c)2=8, (1   c)2=8, 0
Total Welfare, TS 36(1   c)2=121 3(1   c)2=8
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Table 2.3: Results under the joint adoption of P(1;3)
wS3
12;wS3
3 2(1   c)=7;3(1   c)=7
qS3
1 ;qS3
2 2(1   c)=7;0
QS3;P(QS3) 2(1   c)=7;(5 + 2c)=7




3 4(1   c)2=49;0;6(1   c)2=49
Total Welfare, TSS3 12(1   c)2=49

































Total Welfare, TSCP32 4
c2(1392 138+131) 4c(31+35)+132
1681



































Total Welfare, TSCP23 c2(412 52+56) 30c(2+)+45
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Table 2.7: Adoption game under early licensing commitments
Firm 2
P(1;2) P(1;3)
P(1;2) (1   c)2=4;0 (1   c)2=4;0
Firm 1
P(1;3) (1   c)2=4;0 (1   c)2=4;0
Table 2.8: Adoption game with Two-part taris
Firm 2
P(1;2) P(1;3)
P(1;2) (1   c)2=8;(1   c)2=8 [1   c(2   1)]2=18;(1   c)2=4   (1   2c + c)2=9
Firm 1
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Joint work with Markus Reisinger
3.1 Introduction
The combination of complementary inputs is a pervasive characteristic of the production
process in many industries. Downstream rms usually purchase several intermediate goods
from the respective wholesale markets and employ them to produce their nal products. As
extensively discussed in the introduction to Chapter 2, in the information and communi-
cations sector many products are based on technological standards and require the use of
multiple specialized inputs that are produced by dierent rms. In addition, high technology
products can often only be produced when having access to multiple patents that are owned
by dierent IP holders. All these inputs|and patents|are perfect complements. Another
example is the supermarket industry. Here shopping costs on the consumer side induces
them to bundle their purchases. This creates a complementarity in the demand of several
goods which requires supermarkets to supply a large number of them.
In these industries vertical integration is also a prevalent feature. In the communication
industry several handset makers like Nokia or Sony Ericsson develop and produce some
parts of their handheld devices on their own, while stand alone rms hold essential patents
for other technologies, e.g., Qualcomm for transmission of data packages. This can also
be observed in the computer manufacturing industry, where manufacturers produce several
inputs on their own but buy their microprocessors from Intel and AMD, rms that do not
105
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produce computers themselves. Also, supermarket chains often oer private label consumer
products but buy other products from specialized rms that are not active in the distribution
industry.
Thus, the question arises what the consequences of vertical integration for consumers
and welfare are and under which conditions rms nd it protable to integrate given that
complementary inputs are required. Surprisingly, although the need of two or more essential
inputs is widespread, the received literature so far has almost exclusively focussed on the case
where manufacturers need only one input. In particular, the theory of harm behind vertical
integration and the resulting conclusions on antitrust policy are based on settings where only
input is needed. A prominent idea behind this theory is that with downstream competition
it can be dicult for a dominant upstream rm to achieve monopoly prot since it cannot
commit to restrict its output to the monopoly level. However, via vertical integration,
the rm can foreclose its downstream rivals, thereby reducing output and rendering vertical
integration protable but anticompetitive. This idea of raising rivals' costs is brought forward
by Salop and Scheman (1983, 1987), Hart and Tirole (1990), McAfee and Schwartz (1994)
and is also discussed in the recent survey by Rey and Tirole (2007).1
The aim of this Chapter is to ll the aforementioned gap in the literature, i.e., we provide
a model with complementary input producers that exert market power vis-a-vis downstream
rms but also face competition from producers of substitute goods. In this framework,
we assess the protability and the consequences of vertical mergers. We show that the
eects arising from vertical integration in an industry with complementary inputs are largely
distinct from those characterizing a model with only substitute intermediate goods, even
though they share some similarities. On the one hand, in analogy to the case with substitute
inputs, an integrated rm may aim at weakening the position of its downstream rivals via
increased input prices (foreclosure motive). On the other hand, since the downstream market
power of the merged rm increases through integration, the integrated chain may be more
vulnerable to an expropriation conduct by other inputs' producers. This leads the integrated
rm to lower its wholesale price to the downstream rival to be able to extract more prot
from it via the xed payment. Thus, the anticompetitive eect of vertical integration is
diminished. Vertical integration is nevertheless protable because of an information eect:
the downstream unit of the integrated rm now observes the wholesale price at which its
1Notice that the use of the term foreclosure to identify such a conduct may be misleading. The legal
denition of foreclosure is relatively broad and includes all the strategic practices undertaken by a rm to
limit the competitive pressure it faces on the market. Instead, here the term foreclosure is used for the
specic practice of excessive pricing at the expenses of a competitor(s).
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rival competitor bought the input and can optimally react on it via its downstream price.
Finally, if the expropriation conduct of the complementary input producer is very large,
vertical integration is unprotable and rms stay separated. Therefore, in a model with
complementary inputs the incentives to integrate and foreclose the downstream market are
threatened by the expropriation behavior undertaken by suppliers of other essential and
complementary intermediate goods.
More specically, our framework embeds two upstream rms that provide perfectly com-
plementary products. Each input supplier competes with an alternative and less ecient
source (or bypass alternative), and formulates secret oers to downstream rms by means
of contracts with two-part taris. On the downstream market, two rms compete and need
both intermediate goods to produce the nal good. Finally, suppliers serve downstream rms
on order and the latter produce the output good.
In this framework, we obtain the following results. First, we show that foreclosure emerges
at equilibrium only if the integrated rm is not \too ecient", that is, if the cost advantage
over the second source is not too large. If a wholesale rm is not much more ecient than its
bypass alternative, then, once integrated, the prot that it can extract from the downstream
market via foreclosure is not overly large and the expropriation problem it faces from the
complementary input provider is not a big concern. Thus, foreclosure is the optimal strategy
and, in this case, our model is consistent with the conclusion that vertical integration leads
to foreclosure.
However, as the eciency of an upstream rm over its bypass alternative rises, the expro-
priation conduct that it would suer under integration becomes a bigger concern. This is the
case because, since market power is on the side of the upstream rms, the complementary
input producer extracts as much prot as possible from the integrated rm and is only con-
strained by the second source for the respective input. Consequently, the merged company
prefers to shield part of the rents it can squeeze from the downstream market by lowering the
wholesale price it sets to its downstream competitor and levying a higher xed fee. There-
fore, foreclosure is no longer necessarily the optimal strategy for the integrated rm. In
particular, we show that the fear of this expropriation conduct can lead the integrated rm
to set the whole price to its competitor only slightly above marginal costs, thereby rendering
vertical integration much less anticompetitive than previous literature would predict. The
question arises why vertical integration occurs in the rst place if the expropriation conduct
is large and wholesale prices are similar as without integration. The reason is that there is
a genuine information advantage eect retained by the integrated organization that is not
present if a rm stands alone. This is that the downstream unit of the integrated rm knows
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if its downstream competitor has bought from its upstream division or from the inecient
source; hence, it can taylor its downstream quantity to the competitor's decision and be
more aggressive if the competitor purchases from the bypass alternative at higher costs. Via
that it can squeeze more prot from the competitor through the fee.2
Finally, we also show that rms may abstain from integration since it is less protable
than staying separated. This occurs if the expropriation conduct of the complementary
input supplier is particularly eective. Interestingly, this result occurs if an upstream rm is
\particularly ecient", i.e., its cost advantage over the bypass alternative is large. Indeed,
when highly ecient, an upstream rm can extract a lot of prot from the downstream
market if it stays independent. Instead, if the upstream rm integrates, it internally trades
the input at marginal costs, whereby losing its power to extract prots from the downstream
unit. To the converse, the provider of the second essential input can now fully exploit
its power and extract more prots from the integrated chain. This prediction is opposite
to the one delivered by the received literature, which concludes that vertical mergers are
particularly protable for very ecient rms, see e.g., Rey and Tirole (2007).
Our results are consitent with two recent antitrust cases in the information and commu-
nication technology: the FTC v. Rambus case and the EC v. Qualcomm case. Rambus and
Qualcomm are stand-alone upstream rms active in the development of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (IPRs). Qualcomm has been accused by Nokia and other vertically integrated
rms, which produce handsets and develop IPRs, to have infringed its obligation to nego-
tiate prices on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms. Strictly speaking, vertically
integrated rms accused Qualcomm to charge an excessive royalty rate for the licensing of
IPRs that are essential to the UMTS technology.3
In 2006, the FTC found Rambus guilty of manipulating the works in JEDEC, the Stan-
dard Setting Organization that was deciding on the specication of the SDRAM standard.4
Interestingly, from the facts of this case emerges that Micron, IBM and other vertically
integrated rms claimed that they would have strongly opposed the inclusion of Rambus
2This eect is also present in a framework with just one input, in which foreclosure is the unique equi-
librium. However, it is never eective there because the raising rivals' costs strategy brings the wholesale
price to a value at which the xed payment required by the integrated rm is nil. In our framework, instead,
as the concerns for the expropriation conduct rise, the wholesale price set by the integrated chain decreases
and the xed fee it sets increases.
3See EC MEMO/07/389, 01/10/2007.
4The FTC alleged that the deceptive conduct kept by Rambus allowed the rm to include some of its
patented technologies in the nal version of the standard. See In the Matter of Rambus Inc., Docket No.
9302.
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technology into the standard.
Summarizing, in both cases vertically integrated rms are threatened by stand-alone
upstream suppliers that hold essential inputs for downstream production technology, a result
that is consistent with the predictions of our model and that aects the conclusions on vertical
mergers that are important for antitrust policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next Section provides an overview
over the related literature. Section 3.3 sets out the model and Section 3.4 analyzes the case
without integration. Section 3.5 provides the analysis and the results of the case with a
vertical merger. In Section 3.6 we discuss an extension with public oers and Section 3.7
concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
The problem of a dominant upstream rm to be unable to commit to the monopoly quantity
when selling via multiple competing downstream rms was rst pointed out by Hart and
Tirole (1990) and is summarized in the survey by Rey and Tirole (2007). In their frame-
work upstream rms' oers are made by means of secret contracts and downstream rms
adopt passive beliefs to infer the oers received by their competitors when they face out-
of-equilibrium oers. In these circumstances, the dominant upstream rm comes across a
Coasian commitment problem that limits its ability to extract full monopoly prot and the
unique equilibrium is characterized by Cournot quantities, price and prots. We take the
same approach as in Rey and Tirole (2007) when modeling the structure of the contracting
game between upstream and downstream rms. Consequently, the same commitment prob-
lem arises in our framework. Instead, the crucial twist of our framework compared to Rey
and Tirole (2007) consists in the presence of producers of complementary inputs, which are
rivals in extracting the surplus from downstream manufacturers.
The role of manufacturers' beliefs has been highly debated by the literature on vertical
restraints. More specically, the paradox inherent to the commitment problem was inves-
tigated later by O'Brien and Shaer (1992), McAfee and Schwartz (1994) and Marx and
Shaer (2004). The general conclusion from these papers is that via vertical integration the
dominant rm is able to restrict its quantity thereby moving closer to the monopoly level,
which renders vertical integration protable but highly anticompetitive.
An important assumption in these settings is that manufacturers have perfect information
on the marginal cost of the intermediate goods' suppliers. White (2007) relaxes this hypoth-
esis and introduces incomplete information about upstream rms' costs. She nds that even
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in a context with incomplete information it is still necessary to specify the downstream rms'
beliefs concerning out-of-equilibrium oers made by wholesale rms. She also shows that
with upstream marginal costs' uncertainty, vertical integration can result in high-cost types
selling to downstream rms at lower prices than they would set if vertically separated, and
this result is partly due to the kind of equilibrium selection employed.5
Baake, Kamecke, and Normann (2004) also show that vertical integration may enhance
eciency and makes it socially preferable to non-integration. In Baake, Kamecke, and Nor-
mann (2004) an upstream monopolist can publicly commit to a capacity level before formu-
lating its oers to manufacturers. In this way, the monopolist can partly solve the Coasian
conjecture problem, commit to underinvest in capacity and produce at a level that can even
be below the monopoly output. Thus, vertical integration can deliver a pro-competitive
outcome as output increases to the monopoly level.
The mechanism that leads to non-foreclosure in our model is markedly dierent from the
above two papers. In particular, we show that due to the complementary input provider
the integrated rm may have no incentive to engage in foreclosure, but sets the wholesale
price to downstream rivals only slightly above marginal costs, while in the papers above
foreclosure is still optimal but the monopolist produces even less when being unintegrated.
In addition, vertical integration is always protable in these papers while this is no longer
true when complementary inputs are important.
There are several other papers that analyze the eects of vertical integration in dierent
set-ups. For example, Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990) or Chen (2001) consider the case of
Bertrand competition between upstream producers with public oers in linear prices. They
determine under which conditions vertical integration is protable and analyze if counter
mergers can occur. Choi and Yi (2003) provide a model in which upstream rms can choose
to specialize their inputs to the needs of downstream rms and analyze the consequences
of vertical integration in this case. Riordan (1998) considers a model with a dominant rm
that has market power in a nal and an intermediate good market. He shows that vertical
integration of the dominant rm is anticompetitive due to foreclosure although production
costs of the dominant fall. In contrast to our set-up, these papers just consider a single
5The adoption of incomplete information implies that suppliers may engage in strategic signaling and
this leads to a multiplicity of equilibria. In order to eliminate equilibria that are not supported by out-of-
equilibrium beliefs, White (2007) focuses on the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion. This equilibrium features no
output distortion for the low-cost types and a downward distortion of the high-cost types' output. Conse-
quently, if the cost dierence is low enough, a high-cost non integrated rm produces less than its monopoly
output. Clearly, if high types are numerous enough, a policy that eliminates strategic signaling and restores
the incentives to set the monopoly output|like vertical integration|improves welfare.
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input and are not concerned with complementary inputs. In addition, they all show that
integrated rms have an incentive to foreclose their downstream rivals.
Finally, papers that consider the case of complementary inputs usually look at markets
where upstream rms hold essential patents that are required for the production of a nal
good, see e.g., Shapiro (2001). However, this literature is not concerned with the conse-
quences of vertical integration. The only exception is Schmidt (2007). He considers a model
in which each patent holder is monopolist for its patent while there are several downstream
rms competing on the product market. Schmidt (2007) shows that vertical integration
leads to foreclosure of rival downstream rms and to a reduction of output although the
integrated rm produces more due to double-marginalization. In Schmidt (2007), patent
holders compete via public contracts, instead we consider the case of private contracts and
allow for a richer market structure in the upstream market where a (less ecient) competitor
exists for each input. As mentioned, in this set-up we obtain starkly dierent results to the
previous literature.
3.3 The Model
There are two downstream rms, denoted by D1 and D2, that produce an homogeneous good:
to produce one unit of the output good each downstream rm needs one unit of two input
goods (or intermediate goods). In other words, the two input goods are perfect complements
and used in xed proportions for the production of the nal good. In the following, we
denote the output of rm Di by qi, i = 1;2.
Each input good i is produced by two rms, Ui and ^ Ui. Firm Ui is assumed to be more
ecient than rm ^ Ui, namely it can produce input i at a marginal cost of ci, while rm ^ Ui
incurs a marginal cost of production given by ^ ci > ci. The inecient source needs not to be
just one rm; one can also interpret it as a fringe of rms that produce the input i using a
less than ecient technology and are in perfect competition to each other. The framework
is given in Figure 3.1.
[FIGURE 3.1 ABOUT HERE]
The demand faced by the downstream rms is equal to p = P(q1 +q2) and is assumed to
be \well-behaved", in that the prot functions are (strictly) quasi-concave and the Cournot
game exhibits strategic substitutability.
The game proceeds as in the following.
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1. In the rst stage each upstream rm Ui and ^ Ui makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer to each











^ Ui xi + F
Di
^ Ui for rms ^ Ui), where xi is the input i's quantity demanded by Di. The
oer game proceeds as follows. The oers for input i and  i are made in sequential
order. This implies that rst Ui and ^ Ui simultaneously make an oer to Di and then
U i and ^ U i simultaneously make an oer. Also, U i and ^ U i observe the rst pair of
oers made by Ui and ^ Ui.6 To ensure equal bargaining power to input rms we assume
that each pair of upstream rms has equal probability of being rst.
After having observed all oers, Di decides whether (and where) to buy the interme-
diate goods, orders quantities x1 and x2 and pays the respective taris.7
2. In the second stage, each downstream rm transforms the intermediate goods into
output, observes the output of its rival and sets its price on the product market.
The equilibrium concept we employ is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Given the quantity
purchased in the rst stage, in the second stage downstream rms transform their purchased
input units to output by competing  a la Cournot.8 It is assumed that if rms purchase x1
and x2 in the viable range, it is optimal for them to transform all units into output. The
price in the second stage of the game is then given by P(q1 + q2).
As for the rst stage, the game is solved under the assumption that upstream rms supply
on order and that wholesale contracts are secret. The latter assumption implies that each Di
observes all contracts it is oered by the upstream rms, but not the taris that are oered
to D i. In particular, by using the common agency taxonomy, we restrict our attention to
a bidding game with passive (out-of-equilibrium) beliefs. The assumption of passive beliefs
implies that if a downstream rm faces an out-of-equilibrium oer by a supplier, then it
does not revise its beliefs concerning the oers made to its rival. More precisely, passive
beliefs imply that a downstream rm Di presumes that, regardless of the oer received by a
supplier, its downstream rival D i produces the candidate equilibrium quantity.9
6The assumption that U i and ^ U i observe the rst pair of oers is just for simplicity. All of our results
remain valid if the rst pair of oers is only observable to Di but not to U i and ^ U i. However, U i and
^ U i know that they are second to oer. See footnote 15 in Appendix A.
7We choose this structure because only after observing all oers Di knows if it can make weakly positive
prots. This rules out cases of mis-coordination in which the sum of the oers exceeds the prot of Di.
8Equivalently, following Rey and Tirole (2007), in the second stage downstream rms play a Bertrand-
Edgeworth game of price competition with capacity constraints  a la Kreps and Scheinkman (1983).
9See Rey and Tirole (2007) for an extensive discussion on the role of beliefs in settings with secret
contracts.
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Before solving the model, it is useful to introduce some additional notation. In particular,










m   c1   c2)Q
m:
Instead, c denotes the Cournot prot of one manufacturer if both downstream rms face a
marginal cost of production given by c1 + c2. Hence,
q
c = argmax
q f[P(q + q
c)   c1   c2]qg;

c = [P(2q
c)   c1   c2]q
c:
Moreover, we shall solve the model under the assumption that ^ ci is low enough, so that the
downstream rms' threat to buy from the alternative sources matters. In particular, we
assume that the following holds:
Assumption 5
maxqf[P(q + qc)   ^ ci   c i]qg > 0, with i = 1;2.
3.4 Set-up without Integration
In this section, we present the case where no rm is vertically integrated.
Proposition 10
The perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game exhibits the following properties:
 The equilibrium quantities are given by q1 = q2 = qc = argmaxqf[P(q+qc) c1 c2]qg.
 The per-unit price in any wholesale contract is given by w
Di
Ui = ci, i = 1;2, that is,
each upstream rm oers a per-unit price equal to its marginal cost to each downstream
rm.
 If Ui is the rst to oer, it proposes a xed fee that is given by F
Di
Ui = c maxqf[P(q+
qc)   ^ ci   c i]q to downstream rm Di.
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 If Ui is the second to oer, it proposes a xed fee that is given by F
Di
Ui = maxqf[P(q +
qc)   ci   ^ c i]q   max[maxqf[P(q + qc)   ^ ci   ^ c i]q;0] to downstream rm Di.
Proof See Appendix A.
The perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game with non-integration features the same
commitment problem that arises in Rey and Tirole (2007); both downstream rms buy the
inputs from the ecient upstream rms at marginal cost and produce respective Cournot
quantities. Since a downstream rm does not observe the contract oers to its rival and
holds passive beliefs, upstream rms cannot commit to sell the monopoly quantity.
The presence of second sources also constrains the ability of upstream rms to extract
prots from the downstream rms. From Proposition 9 it is evident that the xed fees are
larger the more ecient are Ui and U i than the bypass alternatives. If an upstream rm Ui
is the rst to propose a contract to a downstream rm, it extracts the Cournot prot from
the downstream market minus the prot that the downstream rm would get when buying
from the bypass alternative. Thus, the xed fee is increasing in i = ^ ci   ci, i.e., it is the
larger the more ecient Ui is. If instead Ui is the second to propose the contract, it must
take into account that Di can also resort to the oers of the bypass alternatives. Thus, in
this case Ui proposes as a xed fee the prot that U i had to leave minus the prot that Di
can ensure when buying from the bypass alternatives. Naturally, since Ui and U i are the
ecient rms, in equilibrium they supply to both downstream rms while ^ U1 and ^ U2 stay
inactive.
We can now move on to analyze the protability of a vertical merger between rms Ui
and Di. Before doing so we have to determine the prots that Ui and Di receive when
staying independent. From Proposition 9 it is evident that the prot of Di in case of
non-integration is given by max[maxqf[P(q + qc)   ^ ci   ^ c i]q;0]. Determining the prot
of Ui|and recognizing that Ui is the rst to oer to both downstream rms with probability




q f[P(q+qc) ^ ci ^ c i]qg;0]:
Thus, the sum of prots of Ui and Di is equal to

c + max
q f[P(q + q
c)   ci   ^ c i]qg   max
q f[P(q + q
c)   ^ ci   c i]qg:
We can now use this value to determine the protability of a vertical merger.
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3.5 Vertical Merger between U1 and D1
Suppose that U1 and D1 are integrated and the other rms are independent. The new
framework is given in Figure 3.2.
[FIGURE 3.2 ABOUT HERE]
The integrated rm trades the input good internally at marginal cost. This assumption
is standard in the literature (see e.g., Ordover, Saloner and Salop, 1990, Chen, 2001, or
Choi and Yi, 2001) and is justied by the fact that pricing at marginal cost is (ex-post) the
optimal strategy for the integrated rm. Even if it would like to credibly commit to outsiders
that the internal wholesale price is above marginal costs, it cannot do so, since it has an
incentive to secretly change the price afterwards, and it can do so via exchanging payments
between the upstream and the downstream unit, which is unobservable to outsiders.
3.5.1 Protability of foreclosure
Rey and Tirole (2007) show that an integrated rm nds it protable to soften downstream
product market competition via foreclosure. We will now analyze if this is still true if there
are complementary inputs.
In the following, we assess the protability of a \foreclosure" strategy of the integrated
operator U1   D1, at which it raises the input price to the downstream competitor D2 as
much as possible.10
As in the case without integration, the rms delivering the inputs still have all the
bargaining power; this implies that U2 makes a take-it-or-leave-it-oer to the newly integrated
rm. In other words, vertical integration does not imply a change of the bargaining power
positions. It only changes the strategic position of the newly integrated rm, which now
maximizes its joint prot.
Given that D2 has access to the input good 1 through ^ U1, in case of a foreclosure strategy
the integrated rm serves D2 but by making its marginal cost of production as high as
possible. However, U1   D1 is bounded by ^ c1 due to the bypass alternative and has to oer
a xed fee of zero. This means that the oer made by U1   D1 to D2 consists only of the
linear component and is given by
T
D2
U1 = ^ c1x1:
10We will later analyze under which conditions such a foreclosure strategy is no longer optimal and the
implications on optimal taris.
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Consequently, following the reasoning employed in the proof of Proposition 9, at an equilib-




q f[P(q + q
c







1 + q)   ^ c1   c2]qg: (3.1)
That is, the downstream market features an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly.
Since U2 has the bargaining power vis- a-vis D1 and D2, the xed component of the taris
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1)   ^ c1   ^ c2]qg:
c
i indexes the Cournot prot of rm i in this asymmetric case. Consequently, the prot of












2(^ c1   c1)   
c
1 + max
q f[P(q + q
c
2)   c1   ^ c2]qg
= max
q f[P(q + q
c
2)   c1   ^ c2]qg + q
c
2(^ c1   c1):
In a setting without a complementary input, the integrated rm would be able to extract
the full downstream rent, c
1, and the upstream rent, qc
2(^ c1 c1). Instead, here U1 D1 obtains
a rent in the downstream market that corresponds to the prot it would receive when using
the competitive provider of input 2. This rent is equal to maxqf[P(q+qc
2) c1 ^ c2]qg < c
1.




U2 , the prot of D2 is
given by D2 = max[maxqf[P(q +qc
1) ^ c1  ^ c2]qg;0] and the alternative sources, ^ U1 and ^ U2,
stay inactive.
We can now determine if vertical integration is more protable than staying independent.
To do so we have to compare U1 D1 with U1 + D1. As shown above, the expected sum
U1 + D1 in the case of no integration is given by

c   max
q f[P(q + q
c)   ^ c1   c2]qg + max
q f[P(q + q
c)   c1   ^ c2]qg: (3.2)
We thus get the following proposition.
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Proposition 11
A strategy of market foreclosure by a vertically-integrated rm is more protable than non-
integration if and only if
U1 D1   (U1 + D1) = max
q f[P(q + q
c
2)   c1   ^ c2]qg + q
c
2(^ c1   c1)   
c +
+ max
q f[P(q + q
c)   ^ c1   c2]qg   max
q f[P(q + q
c)   c1   ^ c2]qg > 0: (3.3)
In Rey and Tirole (2007) a strategy of vertical integration and foreclosure is always
more protable than non-integration. Rey and Tirole (2007)'s result is obtained because
the integrated rm gets the entire rent generated in the downstream market and this rent
is bigger than the corresponding prot of D1 in the non-integration case. Instead, in our
setting, the fact that U1 D1 is able to extract a higher downstream rent under the foreclosure
strategy than under non-integration leaves more room to the expropriation conduct of U2.
Consequently, dierently from a framework without a provider of a complementary input,
the sign of condition (3.3), which determines the protability of vertical integration under a
foreclosure strategy, is ambiguous. To see the dierence to the framework without comple-
mentary inputs in a clear way, suppose that the market for input 2 is perfectly competitive,
i.e. ^ c2 = c2, which implies that U2 has no bargaining power. Under this assumption, the
prot of U1 and D1 in case of no integration is given by c   maxqf[P(q + qc)   ^ c1   c2]qg
while the prot of U1   D1 after integration is maxqf[P(q + qc
2)   c1   c2]qg + qc
2(^ c1   c1).
Thus, foreclosure is protable if
max
q f[P(q + q
c
2)   c1   c2]qg + q
c
2(^ c1   c1)   
c + max
q f[P(q + q
c)   ^ c1   c2]qg > 0: (3.4)
We know that qc
2 < qc since qc is the optimal quantity of D2 given that its marginal costs
are c1+c2, instead qc
2 is the optimal quantity given that its marginal costs are ^ c1+c2. Thus,
maxqf[P(q + qc
2)   c1   c2]qg   c > 0, which implies that (3:4) holds. As a consequence,
vertical integration is always protable.
Now let us have a closer look at (3:3). Both in (3:3) and (3:4) the term
max
q f[P(q + q
c)   ^ c1   c2]qg + q
c
2(^ c1   c1)   
c (3.5)
is present. One can easily check that (3.5) is smaller than zero.11 In the case where U2 has
no bargaining power, the prot of the integrated rm in the downstream market, given by
11To see this, denote q0 by
q0  argmax
q f[P(q + qc)   ^ c1   c2]qg:
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maxqf[P(q + qc
2)   c1   c2]qg, must be added to the terms in (3:5), and we know that this
asymmetric Cournot prot is so large that it dominates the terms in (3:5). By contrast, if
U2 has bargaining power, that is ^ c2 > c2, the expression
max
q f[P(q + q
c
2)   c1   ^ c2]qg   max
q f[P(q + q
c)   c1   ^ c2]qg > 0 (3.6)
is added to (3:5). This expression is smaller than maxqf[P(q + qc
2)   c1   c2]qg for two
reasons. First, due to the bargaining power of U2, the integrated rm receives only a part of
its downstream prot, namely maxqf[P(q +qc
2) c1   ^ c2]qg, while in the case where ^ U2 is as
ecient as U2 the integrated rm keeps the full downstream prot. On top of that, in case
of no integration, D1 has to leave to U2 a rent equal to maxqf[P(q+qc) c1  ^ c2]qg and this
rent would be nil if ^ c2 = c2.
Concluding, under complementary inputs, the protability of vertical integration is threat-
ened by the expropriation incentive of the ecient producer of the complementary input.
Therefore, via staying independent U1 can shield some of its revenue from the bargaining
power of U2 and it can indeed be protable to do so.
3.5.2 General analysis
In the absence of the suppliers of the complementary good, we know from Rey and Tirole
(2007) that the integrated rm's dominant strategy would prescribe to raise rival's marginal
costs of production to the highest possible value by setting T
U1
D2 = ^ c1x1. However, the
expropriation incentive of U2 implies that as U1   D1 raises its wholesale price to ^ c1, the
prot of U1   D1 increases but this prot can now be squeezed by U2 via the xed fee. For
that reason it can be optimal for the integrated rm not to follow a foreclosure strategy. In
the following, we analyze the optimal strategy of U1   D1 and then determine under which
conditions foreclosure is optimal.
We can then write
max
q
f[P(q + qc)   ^ c1   c2]qg + qc
2(^ c1   c1)
as
[P(q0 + qc)   c1   c2]q0   (q0   qc
2)(^ c1   c1):
Since ^ c1 > c1, we have that q0 < qc. Then, [P(q0 + qc)   c1   c2]q0 < c. In addition, qc
1 > qc, which implies
that q0 > qc
2 (qc
2 is dened in (3.1)). Therefore, (q0   qc
2)(^ c1   c1) > 0 and the overall expression
[P(q0 + qc)   c1   c2]q0   (q0   qc
2)(^ c1   c1)
must be smaller than c.
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We start with the case in which U1   D1 is rst in negotiating with D2. The inecient
source ^ U1 is willing to oer a contract of w
D2
^ U1 = ^ c1 and F
D2
^ U1 = 0. The maximization problem














U1   c1) + F
D2
U1 ; (3.7)
s:t: maxqf(P(q + qc
1(w
D2
U1 ))   w
D2
U1   E[w2])qg   F
D2
U1  maxqf(P(q + qc






U1 ) = argmax











U1 ) = argmax




U1 ))   c1   c2]g;
and qc
1(^ c1) is dened by
q
c
1(^ c1) = argmax
q f[P(q + q
c




2(^ c1) = argmax
q f[P(q + q
c
1(^ c1))   ^ c1   c2]qg:
E[w2] denotes the wholesale price at which U1 expects rm D2 to buy input 2. Dierently
from the case without integration, in (3.8) U1 D1 takes into account that it is operating on
the downstream market, where it raises a rent equal to maxqf(P(q + qc
2(w
D2
U1 ))   c1   ^ c2)qg.
Indeed, by the same token as in Proposition 9, the formulation of (3.8) uses the result that
downstream rms produce the Cournot quantity, and that w
D1






U1 ))   c1   c2)qg   maxqf(P(q + qc
2(^ c1))   c1   ^ c2)qg.
Firm U1 receives as a prot from D2 the margin of its wholesale price over marginal costs
times the quantity that D2 buys, denoted by x
D2
U1, plus the xed fee. The constraint faced
by the integrated rm is that D2 accepts the oer of U1 only in case D2 can ensure itself
weakly larger prots from accepting U1's oer than from buying the input from ^ U1 at a price
of ^ c1 and a xed fee of zero. Note that in the latter case the integrated rm observes that
D2 does not buy from it. Thus, the downstream unit D1 adjusts its quantity accordingly,
i.e. it produces qc




By solving for the xed fee F
U1
D2 from a binding constraint, the problem that determines






q f(P(q + qc
2(w
D2






U1   c1) +
+ max
q f(P(q + qc
1(w
D2
U1 ))   w
D2
U1   E[w2])qg   max
q f(P(q + qc
1(^ c1))   ^ c1   E[w2])qg; (3.9)
where the last term does not depend on w
D2
U1 .
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U1 ))   w
D2







U1 ))   ^ c1   E[w2])qg;
(ii)max
q f(P(q + qc
1(w
D2
U1 ))   w
D2





q f(P(q + qc
1(^ c1))   ^ c1   ^ c2])qg;0]:
Constraint (i) ensures that D2 prefers to buy from U1   D1 rather than from ^ U1. Con-
straint (ii) implies that D2's prot when accepting the oers from U1 and U2 is larger
than the maximum of the prots when either accepting the oers from ^ U1 and ^ U2, which
is maxqf(P(q + qc
1(^ c1))   ^ c1   ^ c2])qg, or when rejecting all oers|which gives a prot of
zero. U1 optimally sets F
D2
U1 such that the binding constraint between (i) and (ii) holds with
equality. So, the value of F
D2








U1 ))   w
D2





U1 ))   ^ c1   E[w2])qg; (3.10)
max
q f(P(q + qc
1(w
D2
U1 ))   w
D2
U1   E[w2])qg   max[max
q f(P(q + qc



























U1 ))   w
D2
U1   E[w2])qg   max
q
f(P(q + qc






U1 ))   w
D2
U1   E[w2])qg   max[max
q
f(P(q + qc





Therefore, independently from which term is the minimum in expression (3:11), the maxi-
mization problem with respect to w
D2















U1   c1)+ (3.12)
+max




U1 ))   w
D2
U1   E[w2])qg;
because the terms in (3.9) and (3.11) that depend on w
D2
U1 are the same. As a consequence,
we have that independent of the order of oers, in equilibrium U1   D1 sets w
Di
Ui by solving






We obtain that the integrated rm follows a foreclosure strategy if the optimal w
D2
U1
resulting from problem (3:12) is larger than ^ c1. Since U1   D1's wholesale price to D2 is
Tarantino, Emanuele (2010), Three Essays in Industrial Organization and Corporate Finance 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/230623.5. VERTICAL MERGER BETWEEN U1 AND D1 121
bounded by ^ c1, it is optimal in this case to set w
D2
U1 = ^ c1. Otherwise, we have that w
D2
U1 < ^ c1
is the optimal strategy for the integrated rm.
Finally, we can determine the payo from integration. If U1   D1 is the rst to oer, it














U1   c1) +
+ max




U1 ))   w
D2
U1   c2)qg   max
q f(P(q + q
c
1(^ c1))   ^ c1   c2)qg; (3.13)
which uses the fact that qc
2 = x
D2
U1, since downstream rms transform all input into output.
Instead, if the integrated rm is second to oer, the expression for its prots is given by:
U1 D1(w
D2
U1 ) = maxqf(P(q + qc
2(w
D2













U1 ))   w
D2
U1   c2)qg   max
q
f(P(q + qc






U1 ))   w
D2
U1   ^ c2)qg   max[max
q
f(P(q + qc
1(^ c1))   ^ c1   ^ c2])qg;0]
i
; (3.14)











U1   ^ c2])qg when U2 is rst in negotiating with D2.
Concluding, the expected prot of U1   D1 is given by (3.13) in case the rst term in
expression (3:11) is smaller than the second. Otherwise, since each upstream rm is equally
likely to be rst in approaching D2, the expected prots of U1   D1 are equal to:
U1 D1(w
D2
U1 ) = maxqf(P(q + qc
2(w
D2











q f(P(q + qc
1(w
D2
U1 ))   w
D2
U1   c2)qg   max
q f(P(q + qc












U1 ))   w
D2
U1   ^ c2)qg   max[max
q
f(P(q + qc
1(^ c1))   ^ c1   ^ c2])qg;0]

: (3.15)
3.5.3 Analysis with linear demand
In the following, we compare the results under integration and non-integration and we restrict
ourselves to the case of linear demand by using the function P(q1+q2) = maxf0;1 q1 q2g.
It is easy to check that Assumption 5 is fullled in this case if i < (1   c1   c2)=2, where
i = ^ ci   ci. We obtain the following results.
Proposition 12
 If 2 2 (0;(1   c1   c2)=3) one has that:
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{ If 0 < 1  (1   c1   c2   32)=2  1, the integrated rm U1   D1 optimally
follows a foreclosure strategy and sets w
U1
D2 = ^ c1. Moreover, it is protable for U1
and D1 to integrate.
{ Dene
~ 1  [2(1   c1   c2)   62 +
p
[92 + 11(1   c1   c2)][(1   c1   c2)   32]=7
and
~ ~ 1  2(1   c1   c2)  
q
(1   c1   c2)(62 + 1   c1   c2) + 9=22
2:
If 1 < 1  minf~ ~ 1; ~ 1g, it is protable for U1 and D1 to integrate and set
w
U1
D2 = (1 + c1 + 2c2   3^ c2)=2 < ^ c1.
{ If minf~ 1; ~ ~ 1g < 1 < (1   c1   c2)=2, it is not protable for U1 and D1 to
integrate.
 If 2 2 ((1   c1   c2)=3;(1   c1   c2)=2) integration is not protable.
Proof See Appendix B.
First, the proposition shows that if 2 were nil, then foreclosure is always more protable
than non-integration.12 Indeed, as already alluded to after Proposition 10, if 2 is equal to
zero then the rent that the provider of the complementary input would be able to extract
from the integrated rm collapses, and so does the expropriation problem faced by U1  D1.
Therefore, the mechanism in this case is the same as in the framework of Rey and Tirole
(2007) and the presence of a complementary input does not play any role.
Second, we nd that following a foreclosure strategy is not necessarily optimal for the
integrated rm. This depends on the eciency of U1 with respect to ^ U1. If 1 is in a middle
range, it is optimal for the integrated rm to raise the per-unit price charged to D2 only to
a value that is smaller than ^ c1. The reason is that via doing so it leaves more prot to D2.
Since the bargaining power that U1 D1 and U2 have on D2 is the same, the integrated rm
can extract these prots to some extent. However, the prot that the integrated rm makes
on the downstream market can be squeezed by U2, where the only constraint is that U1 D1
can buy from ^ U2. Thus, it might pay o for the integrated rm to leave some prots to D2.
12This is the case because from Assumption (5) we know that 1  (1   c1   c2)=2, and thus at 2 = 0
we are always in the rst region.
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There are two main reasons for why in this middle range of values of 1, U1 and D1 may
still nd optimal to integrate. One is mentioned above and consists in the fact that U1  D1
can shield part of its prots via lowering the linear price set on D2. The second is that the
downstream unit of the integrated rm now knows if its downstream competitor has bought
from U1 or the inecient source for input 1, ^ U1. Thus, it can tailor its downstream quantity
to the competitor's decision and produce a dierent quantity if the competitor has bought
from ^ U1 than if it has bought from its upstream unit. As a consequence, the integrated
rm can extract more from D2: if D2 buys at the higher input price ^ c1, U1   D1 reacts by
increasing its quantity, this in turn induces D2 to lower its quantity, thereby leaving less
prot to D2. Thus, the eect that D1 is informed about the outcome of the oer game of U1
inherently gives the integrated rm an advantage in extracting prots.
Finally, if 1 and 2 are relatively large, vertical integration is no longer protable. In
case of no integration U1 could extract a lot of prot from D1 due to 1 being large. After
integration, U2 is the only one exerting bargaining power vis- a-vis D1 and is more able to
extract prots from D1 the bigger is the value of 2. Therefore, if 1 and 2 are above a
certain threshold, these eects dominate any positive eect due to vertical integration and
arising from the information eect. Thus, it is protable for U1 and D1 to stay independent.13
This last result is markedly dierent from the conclusion in Rey and Tirole (2007) that
vertical integration is particularly protable for ecient rms. An interesting (and perhaps
counter-intuitive) implication of our analysis is that in an industry with highly complemen-
tary inputs very ecient rms are less likely to vertically integrate than rms that are only
slightly more ecient than their competitors.
3.6 Public oers
In this section, we brie
y discuss the case in which oers are public, that is, each downstream
rm observes not only the oers to itself but also the ones to its rival. As mentioned by e.g.,
Rey and Tirole (2007), public oers are less realistic in many circumstances because nego-
tiations often take place privately and hard information about these contracts is relatively
dicult to communicate. However, the analysis can serve as benchmark case to the secret
oers case.
The goal of this section is to demonstrate in a simple way that vertical integration is
13Note that if an integrated rm could credibly commit to set its internal wholesale price above marginal
costs, this result would not occur. However, since this is impossible due to secret internal renegotiation's
incentives, vertical integration can be unprotable.
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never protable in case of public oers. The reason is that, the upstream rm can extract as
much as possible from the downstream rms already under non-integration, given the con-
straint that downstream rms can buy from the bypass alternatives. Thus, foreclosure is not
necessary to increase industry prots, and so vertical integration cannot improve the prots
of the upstream rm. In addition, the integrated rm's problem of expropriation conduct
by the complementary input provider remains. As a consequence, vertical integration yields
weakly lower prots to the integrated rms and, therefore, does not occur in equilibrium.
To show this intuition in a simple way, we concentrate our analysis to the case in which
upstream rms do not charge wholesale prices that are below marginal costs. This simplies
the analysis dramatically without aecting the main point.
Now consider the framework with public oers and no integration. The goal of the
upstream rms is to maximize industry prots in order to extract these prots from the
downstream rms, given the alternative sources. The easiest way to do so is to oer per-
unit prices of w
Di
U1 = c1 and w
Di
U2 = c2 to rm Di and very high wholesale prices to rm
D i. If there are no alternative sources, Di would then buy the monopoly quantity and
each upstream rm receives expected prots of half of the monopoly prot. However, rm
D i would buy from the alternative sources in this case. Therefore, it is optimal for the
upstream rms to serve D i themselves at wholesale prices of w
D i
U1 = ^ c1 and w
D i
U2 = ^ c2.
This implies that downstream rms play an asymmetric Cournot game in the downstream
market in which they produce quantities of
q(c) = argmax
q
f(P(q + q(^ c))   c1   c2)qg
and
q(^ c) = max

argmax
q f(P(q + q(c))   ^ c1   ^ c2)qg;0

:
Via inducing these quantities, the upstream rms are as close as possible to the monopoly
prot.
As a consequence, we have that the xed fees to rm D i are nil, while the xed fees to




q f(P(q + q(^ c))   ci   c i)qg   max
q f(P(q + q(^ c))   ^ ci   c i)qg; (3.16)




q f(P(q + q(^ c))   ci   ^ c i)qg max

max
q f(P(q + q(^ c))   ^ ci   ^ c i)qg;0

; (3.17)
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in case rm Ui is the second to oer to Di.14
Now, let us look the case of a vertical merger between Ui and Di. Since D i is operating
with the highest possible marginal costs in case of no integration, such a vertical merger
cannot raise industry prots because they are already as close as possible to the monopoly
prots. In addition, there is no information eect either, since D i buys input i at a price
of ^ ci in case of no integration already, and Di knows this. The only eect that is present is
that U i can now extract more prots from Di than in case of no integration since Ui has no
more bargaining power on Di. Overall, the result is that the merged rm would be put in
diculty as much as in a framework with secret oers due to the expropriation conduct of
the complementary input provider but the degree of downstream competition is not aected
by the vertical merger. As a consequence, a vertical merger cannot be protable.
3.7 Conclusion
This Chapter analyzed the protability and consequences of vertical integration in a model
where downstream rms need complementary inputs, and these inputs are supplied by pro-
ducers that exert market power vis- a-vis downstream rms. We showed that the presence of
the complementary input supplier gives rise to an expropriation conduct that is not present
in the case when only one input is necessary for production. A consequence of this is that
an integrated organization may not nd it optimal to foreclose its downstream rival since
the complementary input supplier can then extract large prots from the integrated rm.
Instead, via setting a lower wholesale price to the downstream rival, the integrated shields
some downstream prots from the expropriation conduct. Vertical integration is nevertheless
protable because the downstream unit of the integrated can now observe from which up-
stream rm the rival buys, taylor its quantity accordingly and extract more prots from the
same rival. Finally, we show that vertical mergers are unprotable in case the upstream units
are very ecient because the expropriation conduct of the complementary input producer is
most harmful.
14If upstream rms had the possibility to set wholesale prices below marginal costs, it can be protable
for them to do so under some circumstances. The reason is that q(^ c) is then more likely to be zero and so
upstream rms have to leave a smaller rent to downstream rms. However, the quantity in the downstream
market is biased to a too large one, which has a prot reducing eect on upstream rms. To determine
which of these eects dominates is a tedious matter because it depends on the particular shape of the
demand function and the cost dierences. Thus, we conned our analysis to this simpler case. As will
become clear from the next paragraph, the result on the protability of vertical mergers is not aected by
this assumption.
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We restricted our attention to the case in which there is just one vertical merger. However,
in our set-up it is also natural to consider the case of a counter-merger between U2 and
D2. In particular, it is interesting to analyze if the rst merger increases or decreases
the incentives for a second merger. This can give new insights under which conditions an
asymmetric outcome in an industry can arise, in which some rms stay separated while
others are integrated. Such an analysis would also show how the new eects identied in
this Chapter|e.g., the expropriation conduct and the information eect|play out in case
both chains are integrated and how this aects output prices and welfare.
Another direction for future research is to consider the case of Bertrand competition in
the downstream market. In our analysis we focussed on the case of Cournot competition|in
line with Rey and Tirole (2007)|which implies that rms' strategy variables are strategic
substitutes. It is also natural to consider the opposite case of strategic complements, for
example, via analyzing a model with dierentiated Bertrand competition as in O'Brien and
Shaer (1992). It is of interest how the problem of being expropriated, that drives many of
our results, is attenuated once the mode of competition in the downstream market is changed
and if our results are robust to this extension.
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3.8 Appendix A
We rst show that upstream rm Ui sets the per-unit price equal to marginal costs when
making an oer to a downstream rm Di.
We solve the game by backward induction. Thus, we start with the second stage, the
downstream stage. Since contracts oers to a downstream rm Di, i = 1;2, are non-
observable to the rival rm D i, and downstream rms hold passive conjectures, Di, inde-
pendent of the contract oers it receives, expects D i to produce the candidate equilibrium
quantity qD i. Therefore, if Di accepts oers such that its input costs are wi for input i and
w i for input  i, due to the one-to-one technology it will produce a quantity qDi that is
given by
qDi = arg max
q
 





In the following, we denote the downstream prot (P(qDi+qD i) wi w i)qDi by Di(qDi(wi;
w i);qD i).
We turn to the rst stage, the oer game. Suppose that Ui is the rst to oer to Di.
Since ^ Ui is less ecient than Ui, it is willing to oer a contract of w
Di
^ Ui = ^ ci and F
Di
^ Ui = 0.
The maximization problem of Ui with respect to w
Di
















Ui ;E[w i]);qD i)   F
Di
Ui  Di(qDi(^ ci;E[w i]);qD i): (3.20)
Here, E[w i] denotes the wholesale price at which Ui expects rm Di to buy input  i. Thus,
rm Ui receives as a prot from Di the margin of its wholesale price over marginal costs
times the quantity that Di buys, denoted by x
Di
Ui, plus the xed fee. The constraint that it
faces is that Di accepts the oer of Ui only in case Di can ensure itself weakly larger prots
from accepting Ui's oer than from buying the input from ^ Ui at a price of ^ ci and a xed
fee of zero. Since the downstream competitor D i does not observe the oer made to Di
and holds passive beliefs, the quantity that D i produces, qD i, does not change if the tari
oered to Di changes. Thus, we can treat qD i as a constant in the above maximization
problem.





Ui ;E[w i]);qD i)   Di(qDi(^ ci;E[w i]);qD i):













Ui ;E[w i]);qD i) Di(qDi(^ ci;E[c i]);qD i): (3.21)
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The last term is independent of w
Di
Ui .
Because of the envelope theorem, the eect of a change in qDi in response to a change in
w
Di

















Since downstream transformation technology is one-to-one and downstream rms transform








Ui ) < 0, we obtain w
Di
Ui = ci, i.e., Ui
optimally sets the per-unit price equal to marginal cost.
Suppose that Ui is the second to oer. As above, ^ Ui oers w
Di
^ Ui = ^ ci and F
Di
^ Ui = 0. If
Ui is the second to oer, it faces two constraints. First, it has to set its tari such that Di
prefers to buy the input from Ui and not from ^ Ui, given that it also accepts the oer from
U i. Second, Ui's tari has to be such that Di does not prefer to buy from both bypass


































Constraint (i) states that the prot of Di from accepting the oer of Ui must be weakly
larger than accepting the oer of ^ Ui given that Di also accepts the oer of U i which, by the
arguments above, oers a wholesale price of w
Di
U i = c i. Constraint (ii) implies that Di's
prot when accepting the oers from Ui and U i is larger than the maximum of the prots
when either accepting the oers from ^ Ui and ^ U i, which is Di(qDi(^ ci;^ c i);qD i), or when
rejecting all oers{which gives a prot of zero.15 As above, independently from constraint
(i) or (ii) being the binding one, Ui optimally sets F
Di
Ui such that the binding constraint
holds with equality. Now, inserting the respective F
Di
Ui of each constraint into the objective
function and maximizing with respect to w
Di
Ui , we obtain by the same arguments as above
that w
Di
Ui = ci. Therefore, we have that independent of the order of oers, in equilibrium Ui
sets w
Di
Ui = ci and U i sets w
Di
U i = c i.
15In case the rst-stage oers were not observable to Ui, constraints (i) and (ii) have to be modied by
writing E[F
Di
U i] instead of F
Di
U i, i.e., Ui has to form expectations about F
Di
U i. However, it is easy to show
that, since Ui knows that it is the second to oer and since expectations are correct in equilibrium, the result
is the same as in the case of observability of rst-stage oers.
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As a consequence, both downstream rms face marginal costs of c1 + c2. Therefore, the








; i = 1;2:
It thus follows that each downstream rm produces the Cournot quantity for marginal costs
of c1 + c2, that is
q1 = q2 = q
c = arg max
q f(P(q + q
c)   c1   c2)qg:
Finally, we turn to the xed fees. From above, it is evident that if Ui is the rst to oer





c)   Di(qDi(^ ci;c i);q
c): (3.25)
To the contrary, if Ui is the second to oer to Di, the xed fee depends on constraint (i) or
constraint (ii) being the tighter one. Since it is optimal for Ui to set w
Di
Ui = ci, constraint (i)





c)   Di(qDi(^ ci;c i);q
c): (3.26)






c)   Di(qDi(ci;^ c i);q
c):
Inserting this into constraint (ii) and rearranging, we obtain
F
Di
Ui = Di(qDi(ci;^ c i);q
c)   max[Di(qDi(^ ci;^ c i);q
c);0]: (3.27)
To determine which of the two constraints is binding, we have to compare the right-hand
sides of (3:26) and (3:27). Subtracting the right-hand side of (3:27) from the right-hand side





c);0] > Di(qDi(^ ci;c i);q
c)+Di(qDi(ci;^ c i);q
c): (3.28)
Let us rewrite (3:28) as
Di(q
c;q
c) + Di(qDi(^ ci;^ c i);q
c) > Di(qDi(^ ci;c i);q
c) + Di(qDi(ci;^ c i);q
c): (3.29)
The rst term on the left-hand side of (3:29) is the prot of rm Di given that its marginal
costs are c1 + c2, while the second term on the left-hand side is the prot of rm Di given
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that its marginal costs are ^ c1 + ^ c2. To the contrary, the two terms on the right-hand side
of (3:29) represent rm Di's prot given that its marginal costs are ^ c1 + c2 and c1 + ^ c2,
respectively.16 By Jensen's inequality, (3:29) is fullled if the prot function of Di is convex
in marginal costs. Now, dierentiating Di with respect to marginal costs Ci := c0
1 +c0
2 and
using the envelope theorem, we obtain
@Di
@Ci







Thus, Di is convex in marginal costs and (3:29) holds. The only dierence between (3:28)
and (3:29) is that in (3:28) the second term is given by the maximum of Di(qDi(^ ci;^ c i);qc)
and 0 while in (3:29) it is just Di(qDi(^ ci;^ c i);qc), but the convexity of the prot function
implies that (3:29) holds independently from the sign of Di(qDi(^ ci;^ c i);qc), so we necessarily
have that (3:28) is fullled as well. All this implies that the xed fee given by (3:26) is larger
than the one given by (3:27), constraint (ii) is the tighter one and if rm Ui is the second to
oer it sets a xed fee that is given by (3:27).
Therefore, we have that if rm Ui is the rst to oer to Di, it proposes a contract in which
the wholesale price is given by w
Di
Ui = ci and the xed fee is given by F
Di
Ui = Di(qc;qc)  
Di(qDi(^ ci;c i);qc) or F
Di
Ui = c   maxq f(P(q + qc)   ^ ci   c i)qg. Instead, if rm Ui is the
second to oer to Di, it proposes a contract in which the wholesale price is again given by
w
Di
Ui = ci and the xed fee is given by F
Di
Ui = Di(qDi(ci;^ c i);qc) max[Di(qDi(^ ci;^ c i);qc);0]
or F
Di
Ui = maxq f(P(q + qc)   ci   ^ c i)qg   max[maxq f(P(q + qc)   ^ ci   ^ c i)qg;0].
3.9 Appendix B
We rst determine the following expression

c   max
q f[P(q + q
c)   ^ c1   c2]qg + max
q f[P(q + q
c)   c1   ^ c2]qg; (3.30)
which would give us the value of the prots under non-integration and linear demand. As
for the Cournot prot c, standard computations yield to
q
c =
1   c1   c2
3
16Note that in each of the four terms in (3:29) rm D i produces a quantity of qc.
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and c = (qc)2.




q f[P(q + q
c)   c1   ^ c2]qg
which in case of linear demand can be written as
argmax
q f[1   c1   ^ c2   (1   c1   c2)=3   q]qg:
It turns out that:
q
0 =
2(1   c1   c2)   32
6
;
with q0 > 0 under our assumption i < (1   c1   c2)=2, and
max
q f[P(q + q
c)   c1   ^ c2]q = (q
0)
2:
Finally, we compute maxqf[P(q + qc)   ^ c1   c2]qg. Dening q00 such that
q
00 = argmax
q f[P(q + q
c)   ^ c1   c2]qg = argmax




2(1   c1   c2)   31
6
;
thus maxqf[P(q + qc)   ^ c1   c2]qg = (q00)2:
Then, the sum of U1 and D1 prots under non-integration is equal to

c   max
q f[P(q + q
c)   ^ c1   c2]qg + max
q f[P(q + q
c)   ^ c2   c1]qg =
=













31[4(1   c1   c2)   31] + [2(1   c1   c2)   32]2
36
: (3.31)





U1 ) = (1   2w
D2








U1 ) = (1   2c1   c2 + w
D2
U1 )=3 = (1   c1   c2 + w
D2
U1   c1)=3:
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U1   c1) = (w
D2









U1 ))   w
D2






Then, we compute the value of q000
1 (w
D2
U1 ), where q000
1 (w
D2




















2(1   c1   c2) + 2(w
D2














Finally, to determine the value of maxqf[P(q+qc
1(^ c1)) ^ c1 c2]qg we use the fact that the
vertically integrated rm U1 D1 now knows when D2 is buying from the bypass alternative
and it can react promptly on the product market. Therefore, one has that
q
c
2(^ c1) = argmax
q f[P(q + q
c




2(^ c1) = (1   c1   c2   21)=3
and
max
q f[P(q + q
c




We showed in the main text that the problem of maximization of the integrated rm can









U1 ) = max
















U1 ))   w
D2
U1   c2]qg =
=
h2(1   c1   c2) + 2(w
D2


















Tarantino, Emanuele (2010), Three Essays in Industrial Organization and Corporate Finance 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/230623.9. APPENDIX B 133
The resulting rst order condition with respect to w
D2
U1 is
c1   32   2w
D2
U1 + 1   c2
9
:






U1 = c1 +










= ^ c1 if 1 < (1   c1   c2)=2   32=2 = 1:
< ^ c1 otherwise:
Now, if
max




U1 ))   w
D2
U1   c2)qg   max
q f(P(q + q
c




q f(P(q + qc
1(w
D2
U1 ))   w
D2
U1   c2)qg   max
q f(P(q + qc






U1 ))   w
D2
U1   ^ c2)qg   max[max
q
f(P(q + qc
1(^ c1))   ^ c1   ^ c2)qg;0]
i
; (3.33)
the prot of U1   D1 is equal to:
max
















U1 ))   w
D2
U1   c2]qg   max
q f[P(q + q
c
1(^ c1))   ^ c1   c2]qg =
=
h2(1   c1   c2) + 2(w
D2






























U1 ))   w
D2
U1   c2)qg   max
q f(P(q + q
c
1(^ c1))   ^ c1   c2)qg;
max




U1 ))   w
D2
U1   ^ c2)qg   max[max
q f(P(q + q
c
1(^ c1))   ^ c1   ^ c2)qg;0]
i
=
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= max




U1 ))   w
D2
U1   ^ c2)qg   max[max
q f(P(q + q
c
1(^ c1))   ^ c1   ^ c2)qg;0];







U1   c1) + max















U1 ))   w
D2
















U1 ))   w
D2
U1   ^ c2]qg   max[max
q f(P(q + q
c
1(^ c1))   ^ c1   ^ c2)qg;0]
i
:
The rent that D2 raises when getting the inputs from rms ^ Ui is equal to maxqf[P(q +
qc











 0 if 1  (1   c1   c2)=2   32=4   1:
< 0 otherwise:
Consequently, if 1   1, the value of the expression above is equal to
=
h2(1   c1   c2) + 2(w
D2





































Instead, if 1 >  1, the value of the expected prots is
h2(1   c1   c2) + 2(w
D2






























The condition that determines which between (3.34) and (3.36) or (3.35) gives the prots
under integration is obtained by discussing (3.33) above, which boils down to
max




U1 ))   w
D2
U1   c2]qg   max
q f[P(q + q
c
1(^ c1))   ^ c1   c2]qg 
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max




U1 ))   w
D2
U1   ^ c2]qg   max[max
q f(P(q + q
c
1(^ c1))   ^ c1   ^ c2)qg;0] (3.37)
If 1 < (1   c1   c2)=2   32=2 = 1, one has that w
D2
U1 = ^ c1 and the condition above is
always satised. Indeed, at w
D2
U1 = ^ c1 one has that (3.37) is equal to

















Therefore, expression (3.34) evaluated at w
D2
U1 = ^ c1 gives the prot of U1   D1.
If 1 2 [(1 c1 c2)=2 32=2;(1 c1 c2)=2 32=4){that is, into [1;  1){, w
D2
U1 < ^ c1
and condition (3.37) becomes




















which is satised for all 1  (1 c1 c2)=2 32=2 = 1, meaning that for all 1 2 [1;  1)
(3.35) is the relevant expression for the prots of U1 D1. Finally, if 1 2 [ 1;(1 c1 c2)=2)
we know from above that one has that
max















Therefore, condition (3.37) is given by
















This is satised for all 1  (1   c1   c2)=2   3
p
32=4 < (1   c1   c2)=2   32=4 =  1.
Hence, for 1 2 [ 1;(1   c1   c2)=2) (3.36) determines the prots of U1   D1.
We can conclude that the threshold below which (3.34) must be used is equal to the
threshold below which foreclosure is optimal, this is given by
1 = (1   c1   c2)=2   32=2:
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We now turn to the analysis of the protability of integration.
Below 1, where foreclosure is optimal, the prots of the integrated rm are equal to
[2(1   c1   c2) + 21   32]2 + 121[(1   c1   c2)   21]
36
;
and the value of this expression is bigger than the one of the prots under non integration
(3.31) in the range of interest (that is, below 1).
In the interval [1;  1), with  1  (1 c1  c2)=2 32=4, the prots under integration
are given by expression (3.35) evaluated at w
U1
D2 < ^ c1. In particular, they are equal to
4[(1   c1   c2)(41   32)   1(41 + 32)] + 5(1   c1   c2)2
36
:
By comparing this expression with the prots under non integration, (3.31), one has that



















2(1   c1   c2)   62 +
p
[92 + 11(1   c1   c2)][(1   c1   c2)   32]
7
 ~ 1:
In the interval [ 1;(1   c1   c2)=2) the prots under integration are given by expression
(3.36) evaluated at w
U1
D2 < ^ c1. In particular, they are equal to
161(1   c1   c2   1)   92[4(1   c1   c2)   2] + 14(1   c1   c2)2
72
:
By comparing this expression with the prots under non integration one has that










1   41(1   c1   c2) + 3(1   c1   c2)(1   c1   c2   22)]
72
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1   41(1   c1   c2) + 3(1   c1   c2)(1   c1   c2   22)]
72
 0 ()





+ (1   c1   c2)(1   c1   c2 + 62)  ~ ~ 1:
Notice that if 2 < 2(2
p
15   5)=21 one has that
~ 1    1  0 and ~ ~ 1    1  0:
So, if 2 < 2(1   c1   c2)(2
p
15   5)=21 then  1 < minf~ 1; ~ ~ 1g. Instead, if 2 >
2(1   c1   c2)(2
p
15   5)=21 then  1 > maxf~ 1; ~ ~ 1g.
Concluding, if 2 2 (0;2(1   c1   c2)(2
p
15   5)=21) we obtain the following result:
 If 0 < 1  1, the integrated rm sets w
U1
D2 = ^ c1 and integration is protable.
 If 1 < 1  ~ ~ 1, the integrated rm sets c1 < w
U1
D2 < ^ c1 and integration is protable.
 If ~ ~ 1 < 1 < (1   c1   c2)=2, the integrated rm would set w
U1
D2 < ^ c1, but integration
is not protable.
If instead 2 2 (2(1   c1   c2)(2
p
15   5)=21);(1   c1   c2)=3) we obtain the following
result
 If 0 < 1  1, the integrated rm sets w
U1
D2 = ^ c1 and integration is protable.
 If 1 < 1  ~ 1, the integrated rm sets w
U1
D2 < ^ c1 and integration is protable.
 If ~ 1 < 1 < (1   c1   c2)=2, the integrated rm would set c1 < w
U1
D2 < ^ c1, but
integration is not protable.
Finally, for 2 2 ((1 c1 c2)=3;(1 c1 c2)=2) the integrated rm would set w
U1
D2  c1,
but integration is not protable.
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